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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays on the economics of transbound-
ary river management (contained in chapters 2-4) the contents of which is
outlined below:
Chapter 2 examines the equity-eciency trade-og on a transboundary
river where an upstream and a downstream riparian withdraw irrigation wa-
ter. Equity is deÞned as equal sharing of waters - a notion consistent
with egalitarianism and equality of opportunity. Property rights are unde-
Þned, a priori, but riparians can enter an equal quota cooperative agreement
(with side payments and restricted trade in water quotas). We Þnd that the
equity-eciency trade-og is relatively insigniÞcant, in prevalence as well as
magnitude, and limited to special cases where the upstream riparian has a
substantial relative cost advantage and/or water is very scarce.
Chapter 3 examines a transboundary river conßict arising when upstream
hydropower water releases do not coincide with the seasonal irrigation needs
of a downstream riparian. We consider and rank the qualitative impact of
a range of infrastructure investments, potentially initiated and co-Þnanced
by multilateral development banks (MDBs). Basinwide social eciency and
regional stability can, under certain conditions, be improved through Pareto-
improving investments, including enhancement of upstream hydropower ef-
Þciency and expansion of downstream reservoir capacity. The Þndings are
used to analyse proposed infrastructure projects in the Syr Darya Basin
shared by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
Chapter 4 examines riparian cooperative behaviour on the Syr Darya
river. To resolve their conßict of interest, riparian states have resorted to
annual cooperative agreements. This arrangement, however, has largely
failed due to lack of trust between the parties. Striving for self-suciency in
irrigation water, Uzbekistan has initiated new reservoir construction. The
chapter examines their economic impact. We report a laboratory experi-
ment modelling the Syr Darya river scenario as a multi-round three-player
trust game with non-binding contracts. Payog schemes are estimated us-
ing real-life data. While basinwide eciency maximisation requires regional
cooperation, our results demonstrate that cooperation in the laboratory is
hard to achieve. Uzbek reservoirs improve the likelihood of cooperation only
weakly and their positive economic impact is limited to low-water years.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis is a collection of three essays on the economics of transbound-
ary river management. The essays address digerent aspects of what is es-
sentially the same problem: how to share water which originates within the
geographical boundaries of an upstream country and ßows into the territory
of at least one other downstream country.
Transboundary river sharing raises several interesting issues and we shall
focus on three broad themes in this thesis. The Þrst relates to a classical
topic in economic analysis, namely that of equity and eciency. We con-
sider whether it is possible to share transboundary rivers in an economically
ecient manner which also reßects reasonable notions of equity. The second
theme is conßict and cooperation. We examine potential sources of conßict
and identify determinants of cooperative behaviour. A third theme relates
to the role of third-party agencies in promoting transboundary river manage-
ment. More speciÞcally, the thesis aims to answer the following questions:
 What is the relationship between equity and eciency when an up-
stream and a downstream riparian withdraw irrigation water from a
transboundary river?
 How can multilateral development banks help reduce the regional ten-
sion that may arise from upstream hydropower use and downstream
irrigation use?
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 Can economic analysis contribute to understanding the incentives for
cooperation on transboundary rivers? SpeciÞcally, how will the con-
struction of re-regulating reservoirs in Uzbekistan agect cooperative
behaviour on the Syr Darya river in Central Asia?
Each of these questions will be dealt with separately in Chapters 2, 3
and 4, respectively. Our approach is motivated by the global public goods
literature which extends the public goods concept to the regional and inter-
national level using the concept of spill-over range across national borders
(see section 3.1 in this chapter). To address the above questions, we draw
primarily upon microeconomic theory on unidirectional externalities com-
bined with insights from game theory and bargaining theory. Additionally,
we conduct a behavioural investigation in Chapter 4 which makes use of lab-
oratory experiments. These experiments were informed by primary data
collected on a Þeld visit to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in December 2004
(see Appendix E for details).
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organised as follows: Sec-
tion 1 highlights the relevance of transboundary river management and moti-
vates the choice of case study. Section 2 presents some basic characteristics
about transboundary rivers and the international treaties that govern them.
Section 3 examines the relevance of existing analytical frameworks to the
analysis of transboundary rivers. Finally, section 4 outlines the contents of
the thesis.
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1. Motivation
1.1 The relevance of transboundary river management
Transboundary river management encompasses a wide range of mecha-
nisms and instruments. Examples include: data and information exchange
between riparians, river ßow modelling for improved planning, reservoir con-
struction and maintenance, provision of third-party process Þnancing, and
the development and management of river basin commissions.
There are two main reasons why transboundary river management is im-
portant. The Þrst relates to the fact that freshwater is a scarce natural
resource, upon which all life depends. Thus, to ensure preservation, na-
tional as well as transboundary water resources must be carefully managed.
The second reason is political. While transboundary rivers can elicit cooper-
ation it is particularly disruptive in cases where water is the source of conßict
between nations. Not only do the people who (want to) use the water suger,
but water conßicts can also gravely agect other important issues (such as
trade and investment relations) to the detriment of the regional population
as a whole.
Although there is a tendency to believe that resource scarcity is a principal
source of conßict (the neo-Malthusian hypothesis1) it may be more appropri-
ate to consider water scarcity and river conßict as two distinct challenges, as
elaborated further below.
1According to Neomalthusians, resource depletion and scarcity (caused by population
pressures and high consumption) lead to resource competition and, ultimately, armed
conßict (see for instance Gleditsch (2002)).
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1.1.1 Water as a scarce resource2
Water plays an essential role for human survival and well being. In ad-
dition to its use for drinking and sanitation, water is an important economic
input, especially in the agricultural sector. Around 40 percent of global food
crops are produced using irrigated agriculture. Irrigation alone accounts for
70 percent of global water withdrawals while industrial and municipal use 20
percent and 10 percent respectively. There are non-consumption economic
beneÞts of water use too. The most important example is hydropower pro-
duction which generates almost 20 percent of world electricity output. Many
of the worlds rivers and lakes are also used for navigation and tourism.
Today, around 3,800 billion cubic metres (BCM) of fresh water is with-
drawn annually from the worlds lakes, rivers and aquifers. This is twice the
volume extracted 50 years ago. Population growth and economic develop-
ment are the main driving forces. Between 1950 and 2000, world population
more than doubled and world GDP more than quadrupled. The unprece-
dented increase in water consumption has brought major gains. The intro-
duction of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) during the Green Revolution, for
instance, neccessitated a huge expansion in irrigated area and improved wa-
ter management practices. The resultant abundance in food production cut
food-grain prices by half to great beneÞt for consumers worldwide, especially
the poor. Substantial improvements have also been registered in terms of
water and sanitation. Over the past 20 years, more than 2.4 billion people
have gained access to water supply and 600 million people to sanitation.
2This section is based on the following sources: Merrett (2003), Moller et al. (2005),
Nationmaster.com., World Bank (2003, 2004c, 2004e), World Commission on Dams (2000)
and World Water Commission (2000).
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Despite these achievements, there is growing recognition that the world
is starting to experience a more chronic and systemic water crises. There
are a number of unsolved problems: 1.2 billion people continue to lack access
to clean water and 3.4 billion people still do not have access to adequate
sanitation facilities. There is also evidence of a slowdown in both the growth
of irrigated land and the productivity of that land. On top of this, there are
new problems of environmental degradation: some rivers no longer reach
the sea; 50 percent of the worlds wetlands have disappeared in the past
century; 20 percent of freshwater Þsh are endangered or extinct; and many
of the most important groundwater aquifers are being mined. At the very
extreme, human activity has caused environmental disaster, such as in the
case of the Aral Sea in Central Asia which has shrunk to a fraction of its
original size due to excessive water diversions for agricultural irrigation.
It is useful to examine the aggregate balances of supply and demand, with
due recognition of the fact that the issues of water are speciÞc to time and
place. In doing so, some observers, such as the World Water Commission
(2000), conclude that the arithmetic simply does not add up: By 2025, the
world population will increase by about one-third to 8 billion while there
is no prospect of any increase in the global egective rainfall that feeds its
lakes, rivers and aquifers. Global water use is projected to increase by a
further 50 percent over the same period. An estimated 4 billion people
will live under conditions of severe water stress in 2025, with conditions
particularly severe in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. As is often
the case, it is the poorest countries and poorest people who are most directly
agected. Addressing this challenge requires political will and implies changes
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from current practices. A wide range of interventions at the national level
are relevant in this respect, including improvements in water use eciency,
full-cost pricing of water, construction of dams and technical innovation.
Management of transboundary rivers will equally require attention. Consider
the Syr Darya river in Central Asia - the case study of this thesis - where
annual water losses are estimated at 14 to 17 BCM (billion cubic metres),
or approximately 70 percent of the water diverted. The water scarcity
experienced in this region can be characterised primarily as a management
and incentive problem.
1.1.2 Water as a source of conßict (and catalyst for cooperation)
Early post-cold war research on water conßicts exaggeratedly predicted
water wars - a term coined by Starr (1991) - and subsequent research in the
Þeld of environmental security endorsed the notion that water scarcity leads
to international conßict (Ravnborg, 2004). This claim, however, seems to
have been based on highly selective evidence of the hottest basins such as the
Jordan, Tigris, Euphrates, Indus and Nile. A comprehensive study of 1,831
recorded international water related events between 1948 and 1999 by Wolf
et al. (2003) reveals a more balanced reality: Two-thirds of all water-related
events on international rivers were cooperative; 28 percent were conßictive
and 5 percent were neutral/non-signiÞcant.3 Moreover, no war has ever
been fought over water. Figure 1.1 illustrates the frequency of the issue
3Water events were assessed according to a political intensity scale consisting of 15
steps ranging from formal declaration of war (-7) to neutral (0) through to voluntary uni-
Þcation into one nation (+7). A conßictive event represents a serious deterioration in the
international relations between the riparians such as negative verbal expressions, hostile
and even military actions. In comparison, the term noncooperation - a term frequently
used in the economic literature - signiÞes the absence of cooperation.
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associated with a water related event. While cooperative events involve a
wide variety of issues, conßict events tend to be dominated by water quantity
(sharing of water) and infrastructure - accounting for 86 percent of the total.
Water sharing, associated with most cooperative water related events, will
be explored further in Chapter 2. In Chapters 3 and 4 we consider the
impact of infrastructure investments (i.e. reservoirs or hydropower plants)
on noncooperative outcomes and cooperative behaviour.
Figure 1.1 Cooperative, neutral and conßictive water events by issue.
Source: Yoe et al. (2001) reprinted from Ravnborg (2004).
The study by Wolf et al. (2003) found no support for the neo-Malthusian
hypothesis. The data analysed contained no statistically signiÞcant correla-
tion between water scarcity and conßict. Instead, the authors hypothesise
that the likelihood of conßict is determined by increases in the magnitude
and amount of physical or institutional change relative to the capacity to
absorb such changes (ibid. p. 51). The most radical of such changes is
the internationalisation of a basin, i.e. division of basins whose management
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was developed institutionally under one single jurisdiction into two or more
nations. The collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance, has caused conßicts
between the now independent Central Asia republics in the Syr Darya and
Amu Darya basins.
1.2 The relevance of Syr Darya as a case study
In addition to illustrating the importance of transboundary river manage-
ment in addressing the twin challenges of scarcity and conßict, the Syr Darya
river has a number of interesting characteristics which makes it an ideal can-
didate for a case study. First, as already mentioned, it is one of several hot
basins in the world where riparian relations are fundamentally conßictive
and water a source of regional tension. Policy recommendations aimed at
dehydrating the conßict thus have the potential of improving the well being
of millions of people across the region. Secondly, the type of conßict currently
experienced on the Syr Darya is likely to become more widespread across the
globe in the future as upstream riparians move to exploit their substantial,
but yet unused hydropower potential. Thirdly, the Syr Darya conßict has
attracted substantial interest within the international community and sev-
eral donors have been actively engaged in promoting regional cooperation.
The case study thus Þts squarely with one of the themes of the thesis: the
role and relevance of third party agencies in promoting transboundary river
management. Fourthly, despite considerable interest in identifying cooper-
ative solutions on the Syr Darya, economic analysis of the conßict has been
surprisingly limited. The contributions in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis
aim at Þlling this gap. Finally, although incomplete, cooperative egorts on
the Syr Darya have been based on the sound economic principle of side pay-
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ments. This in itself is interesting since side payments across international
borders are quite rare in practice. Moreover, it underscores the relevance
of applying game theoretical concepts in analysing the conßict as we do in
Chapter 4.
2. Transboundary rivers: some basic characteristics
2.1 DeÞning shared rivers: transboundary or international?
This thesis deals with the management of rivers that cross the border of
two or more riparian states. Some scholars refer to these as international
rivers while others call them transboundary rivers. Neither concept is
without its ßaws (see Sadog and Grey (2002) for a discussion). To some,
the use of the word international is incorrect as it implies that the waters (as
in seas) do not belong to any state, whereas in reality only the basin states
have rights to the water. Others may be confused about transboundary
rivers as many river channels form international borders without crossing
them. Transboundary may also refer to rivers that cross intra-national
(e.g. state) borders - not only international borders.
To complicate matters, these terms also have political connotations im-
plying that some countries may prefer the use of one over the other if it serves
their interests. Turkey, for instance, which is an upstream riparian in the Eu-
phrates/Tigris river basin distinguishes a border river from a transboundary
river that crosses the border. This distinction serves a purpose by allowing
Turkey to claim sovereignty over the Euphrates/Tigris watercourse within its
borders. Iraq, which is a downstream riparian in this basin, is against the
use of the term transboundary river and calls for the removal of this term
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from the legal text wherever it occurs. Syria, the midstream riparian of both
Euphrates/Tigris and the Orontes river, argues that the former are interna-
tional rivers while the latter is not (although the Orontes touches Lebanon
and Turkey as well). The Syrian non-recognition of Turkish sovereignty over
Alexandria, where the Orontes water reach the Mediterranean Sea, explains
this equivocal attitude (Yetim, 2002).
The fact that both concepts are politically contentious and widely used
in the literature makes it dicult to use one at the exclusion of the other.
Nevertheless, for practical reasons we shall primarily use the term trans-
boundary rivers albeit we occasionally make reference to international river
basins, particularly when referring to statistics about rivers and the treaties
that govern them. Although this choice of terms has inevitable political
implications these are entirely unintentional.
2.2 International river basins in the world
The best source of statistics about international river basins is Wolf et al.
(1999) which contains an update of the 1978 UN Register of International
Rivers. They deÞne a river basin as the area which contributes hydro-
logically (including both surface- and groundwater) to a Þrst order stream,
which, in turn, is deÞned by its outlet to the ocean or to a terminal (closed)
lake or inland sea. Such a basin is international if any perennial tributary
crosses the political boundaries of two or more nations. By this deÞnition,
there are 261 international river basins in the world covering 45.3 percent of
the land-surface of the earth (excluding Antarctica). Table 1.1 breaks this
data down by continent and Appendix A presents maps of these river basins.
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Table 1.1 International river basins by continent
Africa Asia Europe N. America S. America World
River basins 60 53 71 39 38 261
Percentage 23.0 20.3 27.2 14.9 14.6 100.0
Source: Wolf et al. (1999).
Around two-thirds of all international river basins are shared by only two
countries. River basins shared by a large number of countries such as the
Danube (17), the Congo (11), the Niger (11), the Nile (10), the Rhine (9), the
Zambezi (9), the Amazon (8) and Lake Chad (8) are therefore exceptional
(Table 1.2 refers and Appendix B provides a complete list).
Table 1.2 Number of countries that share a river basin
Number of countries in basin 2 3 4 5+
River basins (number) 176 49 17 19
Percentage 67.4 18.8 6.5 7.3
Source: Wolf et al. (1999).
It should be noted that an international river basin can contain sev-
eral transboundary rivers. This is best illustrated with an example. The
Aral Sea basin is shared by the following six countries: The Kyrgyz Repub-
lic, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan. This
basin consists of two major transboundary rivers, both of which feed the
Aral Sea: The Amu Darya (shared by Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan) and the Syr Darya (The Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan). In addition, there are a number of smaller
transboundary rivers in the Aral Sea basin, such as the Chui and Talas rivers
shared by the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan. It follows that the number
of transboundary rivers in the world is greater than the number of interna-
tional river basins.
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2.3 International river basin treaties
There are 145 treaties (dating from 1870 onwards) which deal with non-
navigational issues of water management such as ßood control, hydropower
projects, or allocations for consumptive or non-consumptive uses in interna-
tional river basins. Eighty-six percent of these treaties are bilateral (Hamner
and Wolf, 1998). This is partly because two-thirds of all international river
basins are shared by only two nations, but partly because multilateral agree-
ments are more dicult to reach. To illustrate, some riparian countries
(such as India) have a deliberate policy to enter only bilateral agreements
over transboundary rivers so as to maximise their political inßuence.
Table 1.3 provides a summary of relevant treaty characteristics. Most
treaties deal with hydropower and water supplies. It is fair to say that the
145 treaties covering the worlds 261 international river basins, and the inter-
national law on which they are based, are in their respective infancies. Less
than half of these treaties include no monitoring provisions, two-thirds do
not delineate speciÞc allocations and four-Þfths have no enforcement mech-
anisms. This state of agairs, combined with the fact that almost half of
all international river basins are not currently covered by a treaty, ogers
potential breeding ground for conßict over shared water resources.
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Table 1.3 Characteristics of the 145 international river basin treaties
Signatories: Monitoring: Water allocations:
Bilateral 86% Provided 54% Equal portions 10%
Multilateral 14% Not provided, N/A 46% Complex but clear 27%
Unclear 10%
Principal Conßict None or N/A 53%
focus: resolution:
Hydropower 39% Council 30%
Water supply 37% Other govt. unit 6% Unequal power
Flood control 9% UN 10% relationship:
Industrial uses 6% None or N/A 54% Yes 36%
Navigation 4% No 64%
Pollution 4% Enforcement:
Fishing <1% Council 18% Nonwater linkages:
None or N/A <1% Force 1% Money 30%
Information: Economic <1% Land 4%
Sharing None or N/A 80% Political concessions 1%
Yes 64% Other 7%
No or N/A 36% None or N/A 56%
Source: Hamner and Wolf (1998).
3. The relevance of existing analytical frameworks
In this thesis we analyse problems that may arise when at least two coun-
tries share a river. Economists tend to classify rivers as either public goods,
common-pool resources or externalities. This section brießy reviews exist-
ing analytical frameworks and assesses their relevance for analysing the river
sharing problem. It begins by recalling some deÞnitions.
It is sometimes useful to distinguish an economic good by whether its
beneÞts are non-rival and/or non-excludable. Non-rivalry implies that an
economic agent can consume the good without agecting the consumption
possibilities of other agents. Non-excludability means that it is dicult to
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exclude other agents from enjoying the beneÞts. Table 1.4 classiÞes goods
according to these two properties.
Table 1.4 A general classiÞcation of goods
Rival Non-rival
Excludable Private Goods Club Goods
Non-excludable Common-Pool Resources (Pure) Public Goods
Public goods are goods whose beneÞts have characteristics of being non-
rival and non-excludable. A common-pool resource is an impure public good
which is rival, but non-excludable. Conversely, club goods are non-rival
but excludable. More generally, it can be argued that public goods can be
thought of as a special case of externalities (Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 6).
Externalities, in turn, arise when an economic agent does not bear all the
costs or beneÞts of his/her actions.
3.1 Global Public Goods
Interest in public goods can be traced back to the classical economists,
notably David Hume and Adam Smith. Modern economic theory of pub-
lic goods starts with Paul Samuelsons seminal work (1954, 1955) and has
evolved considerably since then as illustrated in the textbook by Cornes and
Sandler (1996). Public goods have traditionally been analysed in a local or
national context, although in recent years considerable attention has been
given to the fact that many global challenges can be framed as regional,
international and global public goods (Sandler, 1997, Kaul et al., 1999, Kan-
bur and Sandler, 1999). This includes problems as diverse as reducing the
spread of HIV/AIDS, controlling climate change, containing Þnancial crises
and combating drug tracking.
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In addition to their characteristics on the demand side, i.e. non-rivalry
and non-excludability of consumption, public goods can also be digerentiated
in terms of their supply characteristics. Samuelson deÞned public good
supply as the simple sum of individual private contributions. Hirshleifer
(1983, 1985) expanded this deÞnition by including weakest-link and best-shot
supply technologies. For a weakest-link public good the supply equals the
smallest of the individual contributions while in the case of best-shot only the
largest individual contribution matters. Finally, Cornes (1993) introduced
a general class of public goods by suggesting a CES-type public good supply
function which also included intermediate cases such as weaker-link, better-
shot and average technologies. Public goods can also be sorted according
to their place in the production chain, i.e. whether they are a Þnal (i.e. an
outcome or an end) or intermediate (i.e. an output or means) towards the
provision of Þnal public goods (Kaul et al., 1999).
Transboundary rivers as regional public goods
Having brießy introduced the public goods concept we now turn to the
question of the extent to which it can be applied to analyse transboundary
rivers. Starting with the demand side characteristics, we observe that con-
sumptive river sharing is nonexcludable, but rival in consumption. (Trans-
boundary) rivers therefore belong to the particular class of (regional) impure
public goods known as common-pool resources. The non-excludability prop-
erty derives from the fact that all the riparian countries, by deÞnition, have
access to the transboundary river and cannot be excluded from making use
of the water which runs through their sovereign territory.4 As the name
4We ignore here the case where a regional hegemon prevents water use by co-riparians
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suggests, rivers are also rival in their use.5 Water withdrawals by an up-
stream riparian clearly reduces the consumption possibilities of any riparian
further downstream. A similar case can be made for transboundary water
pollution by interpreting this as consumption of water quality. Consider
also the case where an upstream riparian decides to operate its hydropower
plant such that it agects downstream water availability in any given season.
By interpreting the upstream action of storing water in its reservoir as con-
sumption, water use at time t is rival. We now demonstrate how the public
good concept can be applied to analyse the management and infrastructure
of a transboundary river.
Transboundary river management as a regional public good
Transboundary river management may be classiÞed as a regional public
good. This public good can be provided by transboundary river management
institutions (ranging from treaties to river basin commissions) as well as by
a third party (i.e. international development agencies). If all riparians
on the river take part in the institutional arrangement then the services
provided by this institution, such as data and information exchange, have
a pure public good nature. However, if at least one of the riparians is
excluded or choose to opt-out then the institution becomes a club good.
Irrespective of this, the public good provision is provided by the weighted sum
of individual contributions. Furthermore, transboundary water institutions
through the use of political power and threat of military force. Until recently, Egypt
successfully pursued such a strategy on the Nile, eectively preventing upstream riparians
such as Tanzania and Kenya from withdrawing water from that river. In recent years,
however, these countries have openly challenged Egypts right to the water.
5The word rival has the same root as river, derived from the riparian concept of dwellers
on opposite riverbanks (Sado and Grey, 2002).
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may also be classiÞed as a means type public good to the extent that its
output produces other public goods such as regional peace and security (ODI,
2001). While such classiÞcations demonstrate the application of the concept
of global public goods and may yield insights which are relevant for other
types of analysis, their usefulness for our research is relatively limited.
Transboundary river infrastructure as a regional public good6
Infrastructure, such as dams or pumping stations, located on transbound-
ary rivers may also be classiÞed as regional public goods. This is the case
if the beneÞts of dam operation and maintenance accrue to the host ripar-
ian as well as the downstream riparian(s) and the latter cannot be excluded
from these beneÞts. Dams play many useful roles, intra-seasonal as well as
inter-seasonal, through their ability to regulate the natural river ßow. Some
examples of the water storage services provided by dams include: timely
release of irrigation water; storage during wet years and release during dry
years, and absorption of excess water inßow to reduce ßood risk. Dams
operated exclusively to produce upstream hydropower, on the other hand,
may have a negative downstream impact, as analysed in detail in Chapters
3 and 4. In this case, an upstream dam can be considered a regional public
bad from the perspective of the downstream riparian(s). Another example
of a potential negative impact is the issue of dam safety. The collapse of a
dam would instantly release enormous water masses and the resulting shock
wave can have a tremendously damaging downstream impact for humans,
animals and infrastructure. In this case the proper maintenance of dam
structures and the development and maintenance of early warning systems
6This section is based on Moller et al. (2005).
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are a regional public good. As expected, it is often quite dicult to make
downstream riparians contribute towards the maintenance of upstream in-
frastructure from which they beneÞt, because of the free-riding property of
public goods. This leads to under-investment in these facilities because the
host riparian will only contribute up to the point where its marginal costs
equal its marginal beneÞts. Optimal provision, in contrast, requires that the
marginal costs of all riparians equal the sum of their marginal beneÞts (the
Samuelson condition). As emphasised in the global public goods literature,
this incentive structure can be used as a rationale for development assistance.
In Central Asia, for instance, international donors have played an important
role in contributing towards the maintenance of river infrastructure to ensure
dam safety.
The pure public goods model and river conßicts
As demonstrated above, the consumptive water use, the institutions and
the infrastructure of a transboundary river can indeed be considered regional
public goods. This raises the question of whether the basic model of pure
public goods provision would be suitable to address the questions pursued in
this thesis.7 Recall that this model produces a best-response or replacement
function of player i whose payog depends partly on that players own con-
tribution as well as the contribution of other players. While some degree of
heterogeneity can be introduced in the public goods model, such as the ini-
tial resource endowment of player j, the structure of the model is essentially
symmetrical. Since each player must choose an optimal response without
7A formal description of this model would be unnecessary for our purposes, but see
Cornes and Sandler (1996).
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knowing the decisions of the other players, there is some degree of strategic
interaction between the players, i.e. it is a game.
Consider next the basic set-up on a transboundary river involving an up-
stream and a downstream riparian. The actions of the upstream riparian
may agect the welfare of the downstream riparian while the reverse is not the
case. The optimal upstream choice is strategically independent of the opti-
mal downstream choice unless the downstream riparian is equipped with an
additional strategic variable, such as military action or a monetary transfer.
This asymmetry in water use, or unidirectional rivalry, distinguishes this sit-
uation from other pure public goods problems. The pure public goods model
would therefore be inadequate in describing the transboundary river prob-
lem. There is, however, also a class of models for common-pool resources
and the relevance of this framework is considered next.
3.2 Common-Pool Resources
Common-Pool Resources (CPRs) are commonly thought to lead to situa-
tions of overexploitation. There are at least three formal arguments in sup-
port of this hypothesis. First, there is the so-called Tragedy of the Commons
- a phrase often associated with Hardin (1968). Analysis of this type of prob-
lem, however, dates back at least to the work of David Hume in 1739. The
tragedy is often illustrated by referring to a situation in which n farmers share
an open grassland where they graze their animals. Over-exploitation occurs
because each farmer considers only the marginal beneÞts and costs of adding
yet another grazing animal to the Þeld, but ignores the negative externality
one extra grazing animal imposes on other farmers. A second argument in
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support of the over-exploitation hypothesis is contained in the seminal work
by Olson (1965) on The Logic of Collective Action. Olsons central thesis
was that self-interested and rational individuals would not necessarily choose
a socially optimal outcome. Although none of the propositions put forward
by Olson are true in general, most are valid in many cases that correspond to
important real-world scenarios (Sandler 1992). Amongst others, Olson high-
lighted the free-riding problem, caused by the non-excludability property, as
one of the toughest dilemmas in providing public goods and preserving the
commons.8 Third, and Þnally, there is the Prisoners Dilemma Game which
suggests it is impossible for rational individuals to cooperate, since defec-
tion is the best strategy in which individuals are always better-og no matter
what others choose. To be precise, the Nash equilibrium is Pareto inferior
in one-shot games with complete information.
The overexploitation hypothesis has been criticised by the neo-institution-
alist school (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994). While
acknowledging the relevance of the insights outlined above, Ostrom (1990)
argues that these arguments cannot explain all CPR situations. For in-
stance, by changing the assumptions of the Prisoners Dilemma and allowing
communication between players or by repeating the game, Pareto optimal
outcomes can indeed be attained. More generally, it is argued that by
devising their own rules-in-use, individuals using such CPRs have overcome
the Tragedy of the Commons (Ostrom et al., 1994: 5). This conjecture is
supported by a wide range of case studies in which the institutions governing
8Although his analysis can be applied to natural resources management, Olson (1965)
himself does not discuss this subject.
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CPRs are shown to have been egective in avoiding the tragedies associated
with open access. From these case studies follows a list of design principles
which characterise long-enduring CPR institutions, including:
1. Clearly deÞned boundaries: the individuals or households who have the
right to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly deÞned,
as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local con-
ditions: appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or
quantity of resource units relate to local conditions and to provision
rules requiring labour, material, and/or money.
3. Collective-choice arrangements: most individuals agected by the oper-
ational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
4. Monitoring: monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appro-
priator behaviour are accountable to the appropriators or are the ap-
propriators.
5. Graduated sanctions: appropriators who violate operational rules are
likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the serious-
ness and context of their ogence) by other appropriators, by ocials
accountable to these appropriators, or by both.
6. Conßict-resolution mechanisms: appropriators and their ocials have
rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conßicts among appro-
priators, or between appropriators and ocials.
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7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise: the rights of appropriators
to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external govern-
mental authorities.
8. Nested enterprises for CPRs that are part of larger systems: appro-
priation, provision, monitoring enforcement, conßict resolution, and
governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enter-
prise (this last principle is for CPRs that are parts of a larger system)
(Ostrom, 1990).
Transboundary rivers as international common-pool resources
To what extent can the insights provided by the neo-institutionalist school
be applied to the management of transboundary rivers? Some scholars, such
as Yetim (2002), argue that the CPR approach yields useful insights and can
help identify important aspects of the commons problem which must be ad-
dressed to egectively manage transboundary rivers. In his case study of
the international water courses of the Middle East, Yetim highlights the
need for determination of property rights and enforcement mechanisms in
international common pool disputes - a need exacerbated by high levels of
complexity, transaction costs, lack of predictability and information, and
trust among riparians. Other scholars, such as Williams (2003) are more
sceptical about the explanatory power of the CPR framework. Williams ad-
dresses the more fundamental question of whether transboundary rivers can
be classiÞed as common-pool resources in the Þrst place. The prototypical
commons problem, he argues, implies a relative symmetry of harmful conse-
quences related to a unique combination of structural attributes: total supply
of beneÞts is subtractable, thereby generating rivalry, but it is costly (but
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not impossible) to exclude the potential beneÞciaries from obtaining bene-
Þts to its use. In other words, the users of the commons harm each other
reciprocally through over-consumption. Williams highlights that Ostroms
(1990) seminal work explicitly omitted cases in which some users can con-
trol the supply or unreciprocally pass the negative externality costs of their
over-consumption along to others. Clearly, this would exclude transbound-
ary rivers formed along an upstream-downstream axis because they create an
asymmetrical rivalry. According to Williams, this seems to call into question
the non-exclusivity criterion because, to some extent, the upstream riparian
has the ability to exclude the downstream riparian(s) from using the water.
Moreover, it patently strains the CPR concept to reconcile the notion that
water is a common resource with the assumption that individual states have
a sovereign right to control territorial resources. Williams sums up his point
by arguing that it is this asymmetrical physical interdependence that forms
one of the largest barrier to constructing the sense of common fate necessary
to resolve the collective-action dilemma.
The common pool-model and river conßicts
Is the standard common-pool model suitable to address the questions
pursued in this thesis? In this model each individual ultimately cares about
the total availability of the resource (because this determines private con-
sumption) and the costs of accessing the resource. As noted by Cornes and
Sandler (1996: 65), this model has precisely the same structure as the stan-
dard pure public good model. This, again, implies that the common pool
model is equally inadequate in describing the asymmetric nature of a river
conßict.
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In conclusion, the upstream-downstream transboundary river problem
is characterised by a unidirectional rivalry which cannot be adequately de-
scribed if a public goods or common-pools model is applied. Therefore,
to characterise this problem we must model the unidirectional externality
explicitly.
3.3 Unidirectional externalities
As previously argued, the public good and open access problems can be
thought of as special cases of externalities. The underprovision of a public
good, for instance, occurs because contributors fail to internalise the positive
externality that their public good supply confers on others. In these special
cases, each individual is simultaneously a sender as well as a receiver of a
reciprocal externality. In contrast, a unidirectional externality occurs when
the spill-over egect arising from the action of one economic agent agects at
least one other agent, while the reverse is not the case.
Modern literature on externalities ßows from Pigous (1946) classical con-
tribution. Pigous approach consists of a system of taxes and subsidies
designed to distort individual choices towards an optimal outcome. His so-
lution recognises the distortions introduced by externalities and attempts to
nullify them imposing precisely equal and opposite tax distortions, thereby
egectively internalising the externality. The Pigouvian approach has been
clariÞed, extended and criticised by countless others. James Meade (1973),
for instance, introduced a much broader, and hence controversial, deÞnition
of the externality concept including situations where no ineciency or mar-
ket failure are present. The most powerful critique of Pigous analysis was
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presented in a well-known paper by Coase (1960). He argued that an exter-
nality would not persist - but would be internalised - if the sender and the
recipient of an externality could bargain costlessly. In other words, there
would be an amount which the recipient would be willing to pay as compen-
sation in return for a reduction of a negative externality (and vice versa). An
important policy implication of this argument is that the mere existence of
an externality is not a sucient reason for government intervention (Cornes
and Sandler, 1996: 6).
Transboundary rivers as unidirectional externalities
There are at least two papers in the economics literature which classify
transboundary rivers as unidirectional externalities. In his essay on inter-
national environmental problems, Ma¨ler (1990) uses a taxonomy in which
he inter alia distinguishes between unidirectional and reciprocal externali-
ties. To model unidirectional externalities he examines the case of an up-
stream polluting country and a downstream sugering country. While Ma¨lers
treatment gives the impression that river externalities are typically negative,
Rogers (1997) analysis highlights that they be positive as well and he gives
a range of examples (see Table 1.5).
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Table 1.5 Downstream egects of upstream water use
Downstream eect
Water use Positive Negative
Direct
Hydropower
-base load Helps regulate river
-peak load Creates additional peaks
Irrigation diversions Removes water from
the system
Flood storage Provides downstream
ßood protection
Municipal and Removes water from
industrial diversions the system
Wastewater treatment Adds pollution to the river
Navigation Keeps water in river
Recreation storage Keeps water out of the system
Ecological Keeps ßow low
maintenance in river
Groundwater Reduces groundwater avail-
development ability and stream ßows
Indirect
Agriculture Adds sediment and chemicals
Forestry Adds sediment and chemicals
and increases run-o
Animal husbandry Adds sediments and nutrients
Filling wetlands Reduces ecological carrying
capacity and increases ßoods
Urban development Induces ßooding;
adds pollutants
Mineral deposits Adds chemicals to surface
and ground water
Source: Rogers (1997).
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Unidirectional externalities - a basic model
A model of a unidirectional externality may take the following form
(Cornes and Sandler, 1996: 70). Consider a two-person model with two
marketed commodities where yij denotes individual is consumption of com-
modity j. Each consumer has a given money income, Ii, and can trade with
the rest of the world at Þxed prices p1 and p2. The externality is modelled
by including the quantity of commodity 2 chosen by individual A in the util-
ity function of individual B. The problems of individuals A and B are,
respectively:
Max
{yA1 ,y
A
2 }
©
UA(yA1 , y
A
2 )|p1y
A
1 + p2y
A
2 = I
A
ª
(1)
Max
{yB1 ,y
B
2 }
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UB(yB1 , y
B
2 , e
B)|p1y
B
1 + p2y
B
2 = I
B, eB = yA2
ª
The equilibrium allocation is characterised in the usual way by the equalities:
YUA/YyA1
YUA/YyA2
=
YUB/YyB1
YUB/YyB2
=
p1
p2
(2)
It can be shown that the competitive equilibrium in (2) is not Pareto-ecient
due to the presence of the externality eB.9 To attain Pareto-eciency,
economists have traditionally proposed one of three alternative policy reme-
dies: (a) a quantity constraint; (b) a Pigouvian tax/subsidy and (c) Coasian
externality trading. The relative merits and de-merits of these alternative
approaches shall not be discussed further here. Instead we engage in an
informal illustration of the qualitative properties of the Pigouvian approach
and draw parallels to results presented later in the core chapters, notably in
Chapter 3.
9We shall not attempt a formal demonstration of this result here. Interested readers
are referred to Cornes and Sandler (1996).
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Suppose in the above model, that individual As consumption of com-
modity 2 has a negative impact on individual Bs utility, i.e. YU
B
YeB < 0. A
Pigouvian taxation scheme aimed at attaining Pareto-eciency would there-
fore involve taxation of individual As consumption of commodity 2. This
intervention is income-neutral because A receives a positive lump-sum trans-
fer L so that his or her new budget constraint is given as:
p1y
A
1 + (p2 + t
A
2 )y
A
2 = I
A + L (3)
while that of individual B remains unchanged. This implies that there are
no net transfers between the two individuals. As illustrated in Figure 1.2 (on
page 41), the egect of the tax is to change the relative prices facing individual
A. This correction of relative prices makes A worse-og in the Pigouvian
equilibrium P compared to the initial equilibrium O. If the Pigouvian tax
is indeed sucient to attain Pareto-eciency, then by implication individual
B must be better-og ex-post because the externality has been reduced. The
egect of a Pigouvian tax can also be illustrated using a diagram of the utility
possibility frontier (see Figure 1.3). The Pigouvian tax implies a move from
the inecient point O to the Pareto-ecient point P on the frontier and A
will be worse-og while B is better-og.
Pareto-eciency vs. Pareto improvement
The question of how economic agents can sustain a Pareto-ecient allo-
cation has received a great deal of attention in the economic literature. An
important drawback of the Pareto-eciency criterion, however, is that it ig-
nores distributional issues. While in a Pareto optimum the winners of a pol-
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icy could potentially compensate the losers such compensation will typically
require access to some means of making net transfers between individuals.
To illustrate, the Pigouvian tax discussed above addresses the objective of
Pareto-eciency, but lacks a transfer policy to improve the utility of individ-
ual A. To incorporate this, consider the modiÞed budget constraints of the
two individuals:
p1y
A
1 + (p2 + t
A
2 )y
A
2 = I
A + L+ T (4)
p1y
B
1 + p2y
B
2 = I
B  T (5)
where T is a lump-sum net transfer from individual B to individual A.10
Thus, the attainment of what is, in egect, two policy objectives, namely the
improvement of the utility of individual A and individual B, requires two
policy instruments (tA2 and T ).
One way to overcome the distributional problem is to focus attention on
Pareto-improving policies in which at least one individual is made better
og without making any other individual worse-og. This approach is taken
by Cornes and Sandler (2000) in the context of public goods provision. In
Chapter 3 of this thesis we adopt a similar approach. More speciÞcally, we
analyse a situation in which the actions of an upstream riparian state gen-
erate a negative unidirectional externality agecting a downstream riparian
state. In the absence of a supra-national tax-collecting agency, the use of a
Pigouvian taxation scheme is generally not feasible. On the other hand, a
10The treatment of T as genuinely lumpsum may be justiÞed if we assume that the
economy consists of large number of A and B types. Then a small change of behaviour
by one of the A types will hardly aect the share of transfer that he expects to pay or
receive.
36
subsidy paid by a third-party agency to either of the riparians may well be
feasible. Indeed, we investigate a number of ways in which multilateral devel-
opment banks can Þnance externality-reducing infrastructure projects, such
as hydropower plants or dams, in the riparian states. Without pre-empting
the analysis, we derive an interesting and nontrivial result: A subsidy pro-
vided from a third-party agency to the upstream riparian may, under certain
circumstances, lead to a Pareto-improvement.
While this type of intervention has the ßavour of a Pigouvian subsidy
there are a number of noticeable digerences which are worth pointing out at
this stage. First, the transfer from the third-party agency is a net transfer,
i.e. the subsidy is not Þnanced through a lump-sum tax of the externality
sender (but possibly through taxation in donor countries). Secondly, as op-
posed to a pure monetary transfer the subsidy is used to improve the technical
eciency of the externality sender. Thirdly, the intervention achieves two
policy objectives (improves upstream and downstream welfare) with only one
policy instrument (the subsidy). Finally, while the intervention may pro-
duce a Pareto-improvement it will generally not be sucient to guarantee
the attainment of Pareto-eciency. We use Figure 1.3 to illustrate this con-
ceptual point, although this Þgure cannot immediately be derived from the
analysis in Chapter 3. The the ex-post equilibrium E is located north-east
of the ex-ante equilibrium O, but the Pareto frontier expands simultaneously
due to the increase in upstream technical eciency.
In sum, the unidirectional externality framework turns out to be the
most useful analytical framework to study the type of upstream-downstream
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transboundary river sharing problems considered in this thesis. Since ex-
ternalities are sources of ineciency there is a scope for identifying policy
interventions aimed at enhancing economic eciency as we do in Chapter
3. Further, in Chapters 2 and 4 we propose the use of eciency-enhancing
cooperative agreements (with side payments). To some extent, these two
contributions are reminiscent of a Coasian analysis in which the downstream
receiver of the unidirectional externality bribes the upstream sender to re-
duce the externality. In Chapter 2 the unidirectional externality arises over
the consumptive rivalry of the river water. A quota allocation is proposed
in which the two riparians share the water equally. Full-scale Coasian water
trading across international borders is assumed infeasible, however, such that
riparians are only allowed to trade unutilised water units. In Chapter 4 we
explore the possibility that the downstream riparians on the Syr Darya pay a
bribe to the upstream riparian to reduce the negative externality caused by
its regulation of the natural river ßow. We show how lack of trust between
the riparians can be an obstacle for the attainment of Pareto eciency.11
The subsequent section presents a more detailed outline of the thesis.
4. Thesis outline
This thesis seeks to Þll some gaps in the economics literature on trans-
boundary river management. More speciÞcally, it examines two digerent
types of conßict over shared water resources. In the Þrst type of conßict, ex-
plored in Chapter 2, there is rivalry over the total amount of water resources
11To a certain degree, therefore, it can be argued that all three classical instruments
of environmental policy making are considered at various stages of the thesis: a) quota
(chapter 2); b) taxation/subsidy (chapter 3) and c) quota trading (chapters 2 and 4).
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available. In the second type of conßict, explored in Chapters 3 and 4, water
use at time t is rival. The digerence between the two types of conßict is
explained in more detail below as the contents of each of the thesis chapters
is outlined.
At the heart of many transboundary river disputes is the lack of interna-
tionally accepted criteria for sharing water resources between riparians (Wolf,
1999). The identiÞcation of equity criteria is essentially a political question,
but economists have an important role to play in terms of highlighting the
eciency implications of the proposed criteria. Is there a trade-og between
the policy objectives of equity and eciency? To address this question,
Chapter 2 develops a theoretical model of an upstream and a downstream ri-
parian both of which use water for agricultural irrigation. Equity, of course,
is a contestable term. We deÞne it as equal sharing of waters - a notion
consistent with several theories of justice, such as egalitarianism and equality
of opportunity. Property rights are undeÞned in the model, a priori, but
riparians can enter an equal quota cooperative agreement with side payments
and restricted water trade. To model riparian heterogeneity we allow for
digerences in the economic value of alternative uses of water. After de-
tailing the relationship between equity and eciency, the chapter concludes
by presenting an algorithm that can guide policy makers in deciding how
to share transboundary rivers fairly and eciently. The main contribution
of the chapter is the development of an analytical framework within which
the eciency implications of any exogenously deÞned sharing rule, or equity
criteria, can be examined.
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In Chapter 3 we present a theoretical model of a transboundary river
conßict involving upstream hydropower use and downstream irrigation use.
The conßict arises because upstream water release may not coincide with
seasonal irrigation needs of the downstream riparian. From the perspec-
tive of the downstream riparian, the result is that in any given season either
too little or too much water is available relative to its optimum. Conßict-
reducing policy interventions by multilateral development banks (MDBs) are
of particular interest because these agencies have a comparative advantage
in transboundary river management. There are essentially two digerent
approaches to reducing the conßict: A cooperative approach where the
downstream riparian issues a side payment to persuade the upstream ripar-
ian to introduce a more favourable water release vector. This approach is
explored further in Chapter 4. The noncooperative approach, examined in
Chapter 3, on the other hand, considers the conßict-reducing role of infras-
tructure investments, such as construction of hydropower plants and dams,
potentially initiated and co-Þnanced by a MDB. The chapter addresses two
digerent policy questions: First, is it possible to identify policy interventions
that simultaneously promote regional stability and enhance social eciency?
Secondly, could a downstream client be more egectively assisted through in-
direct intervention in an upstream state, as opposed to direct investments
within the clients own territory? These questions are addressed within a
theoretical model. We discuss the relevance of some of the Þndings in a case
study of the Syr Darya river. The contribution of the chapter is twofold:
It adds to the sparse literature on international hydropower-irrigation con-
ßicts by providing an analytical framework within which real-life cases can be
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analysed. Secondly, it contributes to the general literature on transboundary
rivers by explicitly considering a potential role for third-party intervention.
In Chapter 4 we explore the cooperative approach in the conßict over
hydropower and irrigation use on the Syr Darya river. With the disinte-
gration of the USSR a conßict arose between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. Upstream Kyrgyzstan operates the Toktogul reservoir which
generates hydropower demanded mainly in winter for heating. Downstream
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan need irrigation water in summer, primarily to
grow cotton. Regional agreements obliging Kyrgyzstan to high summer dis-
charges in exchange for fossil fuel transfers in winter have generally been
unsuccessful, notably due to lack of trust between the parties. Striving
for self-suciency in irrigation water, Uzbekistan has therefore initiated new
reservoir construction. This chapter examines their potential impact on
riparian cooperative behaviour. To address this question we conducted a
laboratory experiment modelling the Syr Darya river scenario as a multi-
round three-player trust game with non-binding contracts. Payog schemes
were estimated using real-life data. The chapter contributes to the litera-
ture on transboundary river conßicts by introducing a novel methodology to
investigate riparian cooperative behaviour.
The concluding Chapter 5 summarises the main Þndings of the chapters.
This includes the main contributions of the thesis, the drawbacks of the
techniques used, and some lines of suggestion for future work.
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Figure 1.2 The effect of a Pigouvian tax on A’s optimal choice
Figure 1.3 Pareto-efficiency vs. Pareto-improvements
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Appendix A. Maps of international river basins
Map A.1 International river basins of Africa
Source: Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD),
Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information
about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu
(Printed with the permission of the copyright holder.)
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Appendix A. Maps of international river basins
Map A.2 International river basins of Asia
Source: Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD),
Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information
about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu
(Printed with the permission of the copyright holder.)
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Appendix A. Maps of international river basins
Map A.3 International river basins of Europe
Source: Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD),
Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information
about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu
(Printed with the permission of the copyright holder.)
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Appendix A. Maps of international river basins
Map A.4 International river basins of North America
Source: Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD),
Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information
about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu
(Printed with the permission of the copyright holder.)
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Appendix A. Maps of international river basins
Map A.5 International river basins of North America
Source: Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD),
Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information
about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu
(Printed with the permission of the copyright holder.)
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Appendix B. Names of international river basins
Countries Basins International basins
17 1 Danube.
11 2 Congo and Niger.
10 1 Nile.
9 2 Rhine and Zambezi.
8 2 Amazon and Lake Chad.
6 8 Aral Sea, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, Jordan, Kura-Araks,
Mekong, Tarim, Tigris and Euphrates, and Volta.
5 3 La Plata, Neman, and Vistula.
4 17 Amur, Daugava, Elbe, Indus, Komoe, Lake Turkana, Limpopo,
Lotagipi Swamp, Narva, Oder, Ogooue, Okavango, Orange, Po,
Pu-Lun-To, Senegal, and Struma.
3 49 Asi, Awash, Cavally, Cestos, Chiloango, Dnieper, Dniester, Drin,
Ebro, Essequibo, Gambia, Garonne, Gash, Geba, Har Us Nur,
Hari, Helmand, Hondo, Ili, Incomati, Irrawaddy, Juba-Shibeli,
Kemi, Lake Prespa, Lake Titicaca-Poopo System, Lempa,
Maputo, Maritsa, Maroni, Moa, Neretva, Ntem, Ob, Oueme,
Pasvik, Red, Rhone, Ruvuma, Salween, Schelde, Seine, St. John,
Sulak, Torne, Tumen, Umbeluzi, Vardar, Volga, and Zapaleri.
2 176 Akpa, Alesek, Amacuro, An Nahr Al Kabirm, Artibonite, Astara Chay,
Atrak, Atui, Aviles, Aysen, Baker, Bangau, Bann, Baraka, Barima,
Barta, Beilun, Belize, Benito, Bia, Bidasoa, Buzi, Ca, Cancoso
Candelaria, Castletown, Catatumbo, Changuinola, Chico, Chilkat,
Chira, Chiriqui, Choluteca, Chuy, Coatan Achute, Coco, Colorado,
Columbia, Comau, Corubal, Coruh, Courantyne, Cross, Cullen,
Daoura, Dasht, Don, Douro, Dra, Elancik, Erne, Etosha/Cuvelai, Fane,
Fenney, Firth, Flurry, Fly, Foyle, Fraser, Gallegos-Chico, Gauja,
Goascoran, Golok, Great Scarcies, Grijalva, Guadiana, Guir, Han, His,
Isonzo, Jacobs, Jurado, Kaladan, Karnafauli, Klaralven, Kogilnik,
Kowl-E-Namaksar, Krka, Kunene, Lagoon Mirim, Lake Fagnano,
Lake Natron, Lake Ubsa-Nur, Lava, Lielupe, Lima, Little Scarcies,
Loga, Ma, Mana-Morro, Massacre, Mataje, Mbe, Medjerda, Mino,
Mira, Mississippi, Mius, Mono, Motaqua, Murgab, Naatamo, Nahr El
Kebir, Negro, Nelson-Saskatchewan, Nestos, Nyanga, Olanga, Oral,
Orinoco, Oued Bon Naima, Oulu, Oyupock, Pakchan, Palena,
Pandaruan, Parnu, Pascua, Patia, Paz, Pedernales, Prohladnaja, Puelo,
Rezvaya, Rio Grande (N. America), Rio Grande (S. America), Roia,
Rudkhaneh-ye, Sabi, Saigon, Salaca, Samur, San Juan, San Martin,
Sarata, Sarstun, Sassandra, Sembakung, Seno Union, Sepik, Sixaola,
Song Vam Co Dong, St. Croix, St. John, St. Lawrence, St. Paul,
Stikine, Suchiate, Sujfun, Tafna, Tagus, Taku, Tami, Tana, Tano,
Terek, Tijuana, Tjeroeka/Wanggoe, Tuloma, Tumbes-Poyango, Umba,
Utamboni, Valdivia, Velaka, Venta, Vijose, Vuoksa, Wadi Al Izziyah,
Whiting, Yalu, Yaqui, Yelcho, Yenisey, Yser, Yukon, and Zarumilla.
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Chapter 2:
Sharing Transboundary Rivers Fairly and Eciently1
1. Introduction
Transboundary rivers can elicit either cooperation or conßict depending
on the perceptions of their relative beneÞts (Sadog and Grey, 2002). Encour-
agingly, the study by Wolf et al. (2003) cited in the introductory chapter
suggests that cooperation is relatively more common than conßict. Nev-
ertheless, water has indeed been a cause of political tensions between the
Arabs and Israelis; Indians and Bangladeshis; Americans and Mexicans; and
several of the ten riparian states of the Nile River. At the heart of many
regional water disputes is the lack of internationally accepted criteria for
sharing water resources between riparians (Wolf, 1999). The identiÞcation
of suitable equity criteria is essentially a political question, but economists
can inform decision making by highlighting the eciency implications of the
various criteria under consideration. Indeed, if economic analysis is to make
an important contribution to policy formulation in transboundary water co-
operation it must give due attention to distributive issues in addition to
its traditional focus on eciency (Just et al., 1998). The purpose of this
chapter is therefore to provide an analytical framework within which the
equity-eciency relationship on transboundary rivers can be explored.
Several authors emphasise the intrinsic and instrumental importance of
reasonable and equitable use of transboundary rivers (Barrett (1994), Sad-
og et al. (2002), Wolf (1996, 1999), Wolf and Dinar (1994)). These papers
1A version of this chapter also exists as a working paper (Moller, 2004).
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take a discursive approach to equity by presenting and contrasting the vague,
numerous and sometimes contradictory principles of international law. The
principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, for instance, gives a country the
right to manage the waters within its territory, but is potentially in con-
ßict with the principle of unlimited territorial integrity which gives a country
the right of uninterrupted water ßow upstream of its territory. The most
comprehensive analysis is undertaken by Wolf (1999) who compares interna-
tional practice with legal principles in 149 existing treaties on international
freshwater resources. Wolf observes a general shift in negotiations over time
away from rights-based towards needs-based criteria (e.g. for agricultural
irrigation).
There are relatively few contributions in the economics literature on ef-
Þcient water sharing agreements among countries sharing a transboundary
river. Eciency is typically approached either via market solutions (Kilgour
and Dinar (1995, 2001), Dinar and Wolf (1994)), or via cooperation in the
form of joint development projects (Rogers (1997), Barrett (1994), Ambec
and Sprumont (2002)). Acknowledging that annual river ßows vary con-
siderably, Kilgour and Dinar identify Pareto-optimal allocations for every
possible ßow volume, but they do not directly address questions of equity.
Dinar and Wolf (1994) Þnd that a welfare-enhancing market scheme for the
Middle East is theoretically feasible under certain conditions, but acknowl-
edge that political obstacles are likely to occur.
The joint development approach lends itself directly to equity analysis
because a cooperative agreement between the riparians must be reached on
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which projects to pursue and how to distribute the beneÞts and costs. Some
authors take the view that the objectives of equity and eciency are insepa-
rable and potentially at odds with each other. The best example is Rogers
(1997) who demonstrates how the simultaneous pursuance of both objec-
tives can lead to situations where one riparian might prefer a Pareto-inferior
project solution to one which is Pareto optimal, even though this would give
it (and other riparians) a lower net beneÞt. The potential problem with some
Pareto-optimal allocations, according to Rogers, is that they might induce
envy between the parties, for instance regarding the geographical location of
infrastructure investments. The implication of this is a second-best solution
where ecient development of the river basin is planned under the restriction
of non-envy. A related point is found in Sadog et al. (2002) who criticise
the conventional economic argument that, Þrst, aggregate beneÞts to society
should be maximised, and thereafter issues of distribution can be addressed.
Redistribution of economic gains, especially over international borders, is ex-
tremely complex in reality and the authors argue that there are few successful
precedents anywhere in the world. The absence of side payments implies a
recommendation of second-best policies which do not necessarily maximise
social welfare, but lead to equitable agreements, acceptable to all parties.
Finally, a few authors apply cooperative game theory to identify fair and
ecient water allocations in river sharing problems. Barrett (1994) analyses
how two digerent rights-based doctrines (territorial sovereignty vs. territorial
integrity) agect the set of core allocations in situations with three riparians.
The Shapley value is also invoked, although primarily as a means to select
a unique, stable and ecient allocation rather than as a means to achieve
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equity. Ambec and Sprumont (2002) analyse a model of n identical riparians
who have quasi-linear preferences over water and money (thus allowing for
side payments). They identify exactly one welfare distribution in the core,
and this fair and ecient outcome represents a compromise between the two
conßicting doctrines analysed by Barrett.
In sum, the literature on transboundary rivers presents several digerent
views on how the objectives of equity and eciency interrelate. The market
approach interprets water as a private good with clearly deÞned property
rights. Guided by the second welfare theorem and the Coase theorem, this
approach implies separability and the corresponding policy implication of
eciency Þrst - equity afterwards. In comparison, the joint development
approach interprets water as an open access resource with undeÞned property
rights which, in addition to possible restrictions on side payments, implies
inseparability. Trade-ogs may occur if equity is deÞned as non-envy or
agreement acceptability, but objective compatibility is also a possibility if
an appropriate measure of equity can be identiÞed within the core.
The common approach in the economics literature is to initiate the anal-
ysis by identifying ecient allocations and address distributional issues sub-
sequently, if at all. This chapter turns issues around by examining the
eciency implications of an equity-Þrst policy. Equity, of course, is a con-
testable term. We deÞne it as equal sharing of waters - a notion consistent
with several theories of justice, such as egalitarianism and equality of oppor-
tunity. Property rights are undeÞned in the model, a priori, but riparians
can enter an equal quota cooperative agreement with side payments and
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restricted water trade. We Þnd that an equity-Þrst policy does not neces-
sarily imply an eciency trade-og and that it may, under certain conditions,
introduce eciency gains. The remainder of the chapter is organised as fol-
lows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the main results.
Section 4 discusses agreement stability. Section 5 draws policy implications.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
An upstream and a downstream riparian share a transboundary river
with a (perfectly forecasted) average annual ßow of Q > 0 units of water
originating entirely within the former. Sharing takes place when the up-
stream riparian (u) does not use the entire volume, instead passing some of
it on to the downstream neighbour (d). Any unused water can be costlessly
discharged into the sea. Each riparian withdraws irrigation water qi  0
(i = u, d) to produce an agricultural output yi  0 which may be thought of
as rice or cotton. The agricultural output is sold at competitive world mar-
kets that both riparians are too small to inßuence, thus pwi (yu, yd) = p
w = 1.
Riparians are described in terms of an agricultural production function ex-
hibiting diminishing returns to scale yi = y(qi) where y(0) = 0,
dy(q)
dq
> 0 and
d2y(q)
dq2
< 0.2 Each riparian incurs a constant unit cost ci of using water, thus
Ci(qi) = ciqi, which can be thought of as the fuel cost associated with pump-
ing irrigation water to the Þelds. Digerences in unit costs are introduced
as a means to model digerences in the economic value of alternative uses of
water.
2In the market approach, riparians are represented by water demand functions (see
Kilgour and Dinar, 1995).
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2.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
Riparian i chooses an optimal level of water input qWi to maximise proÞt Zi
subject to a water availability constraint qi, where qu = Q and qd = Q qWu.
The upstream riparian chooses qWu Þrst thereby agecting the constraint of the
downstream riparian.3 The optimisation problem of riparian i is:
max
qi
{Zi = y(qi) ciqi | qi  qi} (1)
which yields the necessary and sucient Kuhn-Tucker Þrst-order conditions:
dy(qWi )
dqi
 ci  0, qWi  qi,
µ
dy(qWi )
dqi
 ci
¶
(qi  qWi ) = 0 (2)
At an interior solution for optimal water input we get qWi =
³
dy(qi)
dqi
´31
 g(ci)
where g (c) > 0 and dg(c)
dc
< 0. Since we are particularly interested in rel-
ative unit costs, we normalise the cost digerential by assuming cu = 1 and
cd = c > 0. Thus, for c > 1 the upstream riparian has the relative cost
advantage, while the opposite is the case for c < 1. Table 2.1 presents
the noncooperative equilibria for the three possible cases NH , NM and NL
where N stands for Noncooperation and the subscript refers to the water
level (High, Medium or Low). In NH water is abundant and the ripari-
ans coexist peacefully without any need for cooperation. To some extent,
this reßects the historical situation in many river basins decades ago. In
NM and NL water is scarce relative to demand and this introduces a con-
ßict of interest with which most riparians are familiar today. In the model,
the upstream riparian imposes a negative unidirectional externality upon
3The Þrst-mover advantage is determined entirely on the basis of geography here, but
could equally well be a consequence of political power. An alternative speciÞcation of a
relatively powerful downstream riparian with a credible punishment strategy would yield
the same qualitative results.
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the downstream riparian by preventing the latter from attaining an uncon-
strained proÞt maximising water input level. In NM the upstream riparian
has sucient water to attain a proÞt maxium, while the downstream ripar-
ian experiences water scarcity. In NL water is so scarce that the upstream
riparian leaves a volume insucient for the downstream riparian to engage in
any commercially viable agricultural production with irrigation water as an
input. The three noncooperative cases can be deÞned more precisely as sets
in (c,Q)-space: NH =
©
g(1) + g(c)  Q
ª
, NM =
©
g(1) < Q < g(1) + g(c)
ª
and NL =
©
0 < Q  g(1)
ª
.
Table 2.1 Noncooperative equilibria
NH NM NL
qWu g(1) g(1) Q
qWd g(c) Q g(1) 0
ZWu y (g(1)) g(1) y (g(1)) g(1) y
¡
Q
¢
Q
ZWd y (g(c)) cg(c) y
¡
Q g(1)
¢
 c
¡
Q g(1)
¢
0
2.2 Basinwide social eciency
A feasible water allocation is socially ecient if it maximises basinwide
proÞt. The socially ecient allocation is thus the solution to the social
planners problem:
max
qu,qd
{ = Zu + Zd = y(qu) qu + y(qd) cqd | qu + qd  Q} (3)
The necessary and sucient Kuhn-Tucker Þrst-order conditions yield:
dy(qu)
dqu
 1  0, dy(qd)
dqd
 c  0, dy(qu)
dqu
 1 = dy(qd)
dqd
 c (4)
µ
dy(qu)
dqu
 1
¶µ
dy(qd)
dqd
 c
¶¡
Q qu  qd
¢
= 0, Q qu  qd  0 (5)
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Thus in an ecient allocation the marginal proÞts of both riparians must
be equalised. If this is not the case then a water redistribution from the
riparian with lowest marginal proÞt to that with highest marginal proÞt will
increase regional proÞt. We have the following result:
Proposition 1 Suppose that riparians are identical (c = 1). The equal quota
allocation (qu = qd =
Q
2
) is at least as ecient as the noncooperative equilib-
rium.
Proof. First, the equal quota allocation is always ecient because condi-
tions (4)-(5) are satisÞed. Secondly, consider the eciency properties of the
noncooperative equilibrium. If water is abundant then Q qu  qd > 0 and
dZu(qu)
dqu
= dZd(qd)
dqd
= 0 thus satisfying the eciency conditions (4)-(5). How-
ever, if water is scarce then Q  qu  qd = 0. Since upstream chooses Þrst
then qu > qd , dZu(qu)dqu <
dZd(qd)
dqd
because of concavity and noncooperation is
socially inecient.
2.3 Equity and equal quota
The noncooperative equilibrium emerges as an undesirable solution to the
water conßict if water is scarce (NM and NL) for two reasons. First, it is so-
cially inecient, i.e. it does not maximise basinwide proÞt, as demonstrated
for identical riparians in Proposition 1 and generalised later in the chapter.
Secondly, recall the tendency observed by Wolf (1999) that international wa-
ter negotiations are increasingly focusing on needs-based allocations. Apart
from digerences in location and cost structure, our model assumes that both
riparians are identical, i.e. they have the same GDP per capita, population
size, geographical area etc. They therefore also have the same absolute and
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relative need for water for agricultural irrigation. This begs the question
why one riparian should be entitled to a larger share of the water than the
other. In light of the undesirable properties of the noncooperative solution we
aim to identify an alternative distribution rule which can enhance basinwide
economic eciency and satisfy reasonable notions of equity.
As demonstrated later in the chapter, the equal quota distribution rule
emerges, on eciency grounds, as a superior alternative to noncooperation.
We deÞne equal quota as an equal share of the available ßow to each of the
two riparians. Is the equal quota allocation equitable? We shall not attempt
a deÞnitive answer to this dicult philosophical question here. Rather, we
are interested in making explicit the value judgements that are embodied in
an armative answer.
Approaching equity
In deciding how to share water equitably between riparians one must
specify a distribution rule. There are at least four digerent (but not mu-
tually exclusive) conceptual approaches to identifying such a rule. First,
by using a reference base, such as population size, proportion of land area
within the river basin or relative contribution to the water course. This is a
pragmatic approach commonly used in political debates when riparians argue
over water sharing. Secondly, through the use of digerentiation rules which
focus on principles which are likely to be acceptable or coalition forming in
international agreements. Examples include, but are not limited to, prin-
ciples derived from cooperative game theory such as individual rationality
and the core. Thirdly, distribution rules can be derived on the basis of
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stand-alone equity criteria which can be traced back to either moral philos-
ophy, economic or political theory. These principles, which are based on a
normative approach to distribution issues, have been widely applied in other
circumstances, for instance in domestic tax systems (e.g. vertical equity) or
in international agairs (e.g. sovereignty). The fourth approach is to use
a distribution rule which can be derived from a theory of distributive jus-
tice. Theories of distributive justice speciÞcally address the question of how
a society or group should allocate its scarce resources or product among indi-
viduals with competing needs or claims (see Roemer (1996) or Shaw (1999)
for an introduction). This type of philosophical inquiry goes back at least
two millennia to great thinkers such as Aristotle, Plato and the Talmud.4
Theories of Distributive Justice5
Alternative theories of distributive justice can be distinguished by whether
they subscribe to the egalitarian principle of equal treatment of equals. Since
equal water sharing is quintessentially an egalitarian distribution rule6, this
immediately rules out two prominent theories of justice, namely utilitarian-
ism and Nozicks Entitlement Theory. Utilitarianism, originally proposed
by Bentham (1789), aims at maximising the sum of utilities across all indi-
4The dierence between the third and the fourth approach is often discussed in the
literature as: micro vs. macro justice. Micro justice aims at identifying the most
appropriate distributive rule given the practical problem in question (see Young (1994)).
In contrast, macro justice aims at identifying a single principle of justice which should be
used in all dierent aspects of society (see Roemer, 1996).
5The summary discussion in this sub-section draws upon Roemer (1996) and World
Bank (2005).
6There is some empirical support for choosing an egalitarian standard in water disputes.
A household survey undertaken in the urban areas of Western Australia where groundwater
allocation was an ongoing salient issue found relatively strong support for this principle
(Syme et al., 1999). The universality of this Þnding to other types of water disputes and
locations remains to be tested.
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viduals, but is not concerned with its distribution.7 Nozicks (1974) theory
is distinctively anti-egalitarian. He argued that justice should concern itself
not with the patterns of outcome, but with the procedures by which agents
interact economically. According to the Entitlement Theory, a person is en-
titled to his/her possessions if these have been obtained without infringing
the rights of others. The policy implication is that any redistribution is
unwarranted and unjust (Heywood, 1994).
Since the early 1970s, a number of inßuential thinkers, including John
Rawls, Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin and John Roemer, have made separate
and important contributions to a range of egalitarian theories of distributive
justice. Although distinct, these theories have several elements in common:
First, they reject the use of Þnal welfare (or utility) as the equalisandum or
equity metric to judge the fairness of a given allocation or system. Secondly,
they acknowledge the importance of individual responsibility in moving from
resources to Þnal outcomes, including welfare. Thirdly, all prefer to see some
combination of the set of liberties and resources available to individuals as the
right space to form a social judgment. Finally, they appeal, at some stage,
to the veil of ignorance argument (Harsanyi, 1955), that a fair allocation
of resources should be one that all prospective members of society would
agree on, before they knew which position they would occupy (also known
as the original position).
One important source of disagreement in these theories of distributive
7Utilitarianism may nevertheless have egalitarian implications under certain restrictive
assumptions: (1) the existence of a utility function; (2) cardinality; (3) inter-personal
comparability; (4) decreasing marginal utility of income, and; (5) all individuals have
identical utility functions.
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justice is the choice of equalisandum. In his seminal work, A Theory of Jus-
tice, Rawls (1971) argues that social justice requires that two basic principles
of justice should hold. The Þrst demands the most extensive liberty for each,
consistent with similar liberty for others. The second requires that opportu-
nities - which he related to the concept of primary goods - should be open
to all members of society. Under the Digerence Principle, he proposes that
the chosen allocation should be one that maximizes the opportunities of the
least privileged group.
Amartya Sen (1985) suggested in his Theory of Well-Being that digerent
people might have digerent conversion factors from resources to actions
and welfare. He argued that all goods, including Rawls primary goods are
inputs to a persons functionings - the set of actions a person performs and
of states the person values or enjoys. For Sen, the concept to be equalized
across people is the set of possible functionings from which a person might
be able to choose. This he called the capability set - or midfare as Cohen
(1993) termed it, i.e. something which is midway between goods and welfare.
In 1981, Ronald Dworkin published a pair of articles in which he dis-
cussed the most appropriate equalisandum for an egalitarian theory of jus-
tice (Dworkin, 1981ab). He argued that the right alternative to equalizing
welfare is to equalize the bundles of resources available to persons. To him,
justice required that individuals should be compensated for aspects of their
circumstances over which they had no control, or for which they could not
be held responsible. He argued for a distribution of resources that compen-
sates people for innate digerences that they could not have helped, including
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digerences in talent.
Finally, according to Roemer (1998), equity demands an equal opportu-
nities policy (which he discusses in the context of access to education and
jobs). He acknowledges that individuals bear some responsibility for their
own welfare, but also that circumstances over which they have no control
agect both how much they invest and the level of welfare they eventually
attain. He argued that public action should therefore aim to equalize ad-
vantages among people from groups with digerent circumstances at every
point along the distribution of egorts within the group.
Equal quota as equality of opportunity
The application of the equal quota rule to the sharing of transboundary
waters follows largely the same principles as the egalitarian theories of justice
discussed brießy above.8 Water input is used as the equalisandum as opposed
to the beneÞts of water (agricultural proÞt). Each riparian is responsible for
arriving at these beneÞts, for instance by investing in cost-egective irrigation
technologies. Finally, the rule aims at reducing, although not eliminating,
the geographical disadvantage of the downstream riparian by ogering access
to an equal share of the resource - an appealing proposition, arguably, when
judged from the original position.
Which of these alternative theories, then, can be most appropriately be
invoked in support equal water sharing? Since all invoke a notion of equality
8The conceptual problem of applying theories of justice - originally designed to address
distributive issues between individuals within societies rather than between societies -
cannot immediately be overcome, unless we assume the existence of a representative
individual for each riparian state.
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of opportunity the key digerence lies in the choice of equalisandum. Equal
water sharing would satisfy neither a Rawlsian nor a Senian theory of justice.
Rawls index of primary goods - which includes basic rights, liberties, oppor-
tunities, income and wealth - would clearly not be equalised since incomes
may diger even if water access is equalised due to assumed digerences in
cost-egectiveness. Similarly, Sen would be concerned about equalising the
functionings that individuals attain, i.e. what the representative individual
is capable of doing or being as a consequence of selling the irrigation-fed
crop on the world market. Equal water sharing is comparatively more in line
with the resource egalitarian view of Dworkin (1981b) and, to some extent,
with Roemers idea of an equality of opportunities policy. On the basis of
Dworkin we can argue that the downstream riparian should be compensated
because its geographical position on the river is beyond its control. However,
we must assume that both riparians are equally talented, otherwise Dworkin
would also ask us to equalize those talents. Equality of opportunity, accord-
ing to Roemer, leads to a policy which aims at equalizing advantages, which
in our case translates into a policy aimed at equalizing advantage to access
water. Again, other advantages would not be equalized in our case. To sum
up the discussion, by interpreting equal water quota as an equitable allo-
cation, we subscribe to the ethical principle of egalitarianism, and, to some
extent, to Dworkin and Roemers notion of equality of opportunity.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that discussions over choice of equalisan-
dum is not merely a matter of philosophical inquiry. In practice, interna-
tional negotiators have had to decide between sharing the water or sharing
the beneÞts of the water (Wolf, 1999). Although water measurement is not
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trivial it is generally much more easily measured than beneÞts. Equal water
sharing (9 out of 149 treaties) is also more common in international agree-
ments than equal beneÞt sharing (2 out of 149 treaties), possibly for this
reason. Equal sharing of water, even between very unequal neighbours, is
therefore not an uncommon arrangement. To give an example from the Cen-
tral Asian region, the water in the Chui and Thalas rivers is shared equally
between the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan.
2.4 The equal quota allocation
In the remainder of this chapter we focus our attention on the eciency
properties of equal quota vis-a-vis noncooperation, particularly when unit
costs are allowed to diger. It should be emphasised, though, that the model
presented here is suciently ßexible to deal with a wide range of exogenously
deÞned sharing rules. Under equal quota each riparian chooses an optimal
level of water input qWi to maximise proÞt Zi subject to the constraint qi  Q2 .
The optimisation problem of riparian i is otherwise similar to (1). We note
that the equal quota entitlement has neutralised the strategic Þrst-mover
advantage of the upstream riparian due to the assignment of property rights.
Since we are not only interested in interior solutions for identical ripari-
ans, but also in corner solutions where unit costs can diger between riparians
we must examine a number of special cases. Nine possible cases for the equal
quota allocation can be identiÞed and we label them as follows: H, M and
L stand for High, Medium and Low water ßow. In addition, subscript U
refers to a situation when the Upstream riparian has the relative cost ad-
vantage; D when Downstream has the lowest cost and; I when the riparians
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have identical unit cost. Cases EHU , EHD and EHI therefore refer to Equal
quota allocations where there is sucient water for both riparians to max-
imise proÞts unconstrained thus the allocations are identical to NH . Cases
EMU and EMD, where one of the two riparians is constrained, diger from
each other because of cost digerences. The riparian with the cost advantage
will choose higher scales of production and will thus be the Þrst to become
constrained under an equal quota allocation. Finally, both riparians are con-
strained in ELU , ELD, ELI and EMI (identical riparians become constrained
simultaneously). Table 2.2 gives an overview of the equal quota allocation
and Table 2.3 summarises the nine deÞnitions.
Table 2.2 The equal quota allocation
EHU , EHD, EHI EMU EMD ELU , ELD, ELI , EMI
qWu g(1)
Q
2
g(1) Q
2
qWd g(c) g(c)
Q
2
Q
2
ZWu y (g(1)) g(1) y
³
Q
2
´
 Q
2
y (g(1)) g(1) y
³
Q
2
´
 Q
2
ZWd y (g(c)) cg(c) y (g(c)) cg(c) y
³
Q
2
´
 cQ
2
y
³
Q
2
´
 cQ
2
Table 2.3 Equal quota deÞnitions
EHU =
©
c > 1 | 2g(1)  Q
ª
EMU =
©
c > 1 | 2g(c) < Q < 2g(1)
ª
ELU =
©
c > 1 | 0 < Q  2g(c)
ª
EHD =
©
c < 1 | 2g(c)  Q
ª
EMD =
©
c < 1 | 2g(1) < Q < 2g(c)
ª
ELD =
©
c < 1 | 0 < Q  2g(1)
ª
EHI =
©
c = 1 | 2g(1) < Q
ª
EMI =
©
c = 1 | Q = 2g(1)
ª
ELI =
©
c = 1 | 0 < Q < 2g(1)
ª
2.5 Restricted water trading
With property rights well-deÞned under the cooperative equal quota agree-
ment we must also specify the conditions under which riparians are allowed
to trade water. At one extreme, one could allow for full-scale trading as
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in the market approach literature. At the other extreme, trading could be
assumed infeasible. The stylised facts suggest that both extremes are un-
realistic. No two countries are currently involved in anything resembling
full-scale water trading across international borders. One explanation is
that riparians may lack the necessary information to estimate the marginal
value of water in alternative uses. Another reason is that existing water
users (e.g. farmers groups) are likely to oppose sale of water, especially if
they do not expect to be adequately compensated. There are, nevertheless,
empirical examples of inter-country water trade of relatively small quantities,
also known as water loans. The 1959 Nile River Waters Treaty, for instance,
allocated 55.5 billion cubic meter (BCM) per year for Egypt and 18.5 BCM
per year for Sudan. Since Sudan could not absorb that much water at the
time, the Treaty provided for a Sudanese water loan to Egypt of up to 1.5
BCM per year through 1977 (Wolf, 1996). Allowing for this possibility in
the model we shall henceforth assume that if one riparian has unutilised wa-
ter which is in demand by the other riparian then the former will sell these
units to the latter. Arguably, the practical obstacles to this type of trading
are limited. The economic value-in-use of unutilised water to the seller is
zero while the buyer has some information about its alternative value from
the noncooperative situation. It is reasonable to expect that a transaction
would occur between the two parties due to the mutual beneÞts of trade.
Political objections are also less likely to occur since there are no existing
water users in the territory of the selling riparian. Finally, such trade only
requires a minor adjustment of the existing equal quota arrangement. In
contrast, trading in water which is already in use is not allowed in the model
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because of the combination of informational constraints and political objec-
tions. In sum, our water market institution amounts to a tradeable quota
scheme with upper bounds on transferable quantities. We deÞne it formally
as follows:
DeÞnition 1 Let Q
2
be the water entitlement of riparians j and k, (j 6= k).
If bqj denotes the unconstrained optimal water use of riparian j then B =
max{bqj  Q2 , 0} expresses riparian js water deÞcit. The water surplus of
riparian k is given by j = max{Q
2
 qWk, 0}. A restricted water trade is a
transfer of { = min{B,j} units of water from riparian k to riparian j in
exchange for a transfer payment p  0.
The size of the transfer payment depends critically upon geography. In
the case of an upstream seller we may expect that p = 0. If upstream has no
alternative but to release the water to the downstream riparian why should
the latter pay for it? In the case of a downstream seller we assume that
upstream can withdraw an additional { units from the perfectly forecasted
ßow volume, Q, before releasing it downstream. Here we would expect p > 0
because downstream could legitimately claim its entitlement and release it
in the ocean. Irrespective of our expectations, the transfer payment would
be the result of a negotiated agreement between the two riparians. More
importantly, this outcome does not agect the central results of this analysis.
To take restricted water trading into account we must modify some of
the results presented in Table 3.2. We note that trading only occurs in
scenarios EMU and EMD where one of the two riparians is constrained while
the other does not use its full quota. Before presenting the post-trade allo-
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cation, however, we must complete the taxonomy. Consider all the possible
combinations of noncooperative and equal quota cases by recalling the def-
inition of the respective sets. The combination of two cases (sets) yield
a number of scenarios (joint sets), such as EMD _ NH = {0 < c < 1,
g(1) + g(c) < Q  2g(c)} which reads as follows: The exogenously de-
termined values of c and Q are such that the two riparians would be in
case NH in a noncooperative situation but in case EMD under equal quota.
One can identify fourteen joint sets: (EHD _ NH , EMD _ NH , EMD _ NM ,
ELD _NM , ELD _NL) when the downstream riparian is most cost-egective,
(EHI _NH , EMI _NM and ELI _NL) for identical riparians and (EHU _NH ,
EMU _NH , ELU _NM , EMU _NM , ELU _NL, EMU _NL) when the upstream
riparian is most cost-egective (see Appendix C for a deÞnition).
Restricted trading takes place in Þve of the fourteen scenarios. To illus-
trate, consider EMD_NH again. At the unconstrained optima qu = g(1) < Q2
and qd = g(c) >
Q
2
. Downstream therefore has a water deÞcit of B = g(c) Q
2
while upstream has a surplus of j = Q
2
 g(1). From the deÞnition of
EMD _ NH we have g(1) + g(c)  Q , g(c)  Q2 
Q
2
 g(1) implying
that there is excess water on the market (unless the expression holds with
equality). { = B = g(c) Q
2
units of water are transacted from upstream to
downstream at the negotiated transfer payment p. The post-trade water al-
locations are qu = g(1) and qd =
Q
2
+{ = g(c). The remaining four scenarios
are calculated in a similar manner. Table 2.4 gives an overview of the results
where we have omitted the transfer payments in the proÞt expressions since
these do not agect regional proÞt.
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Table 2.4 The equal quota allocation after trade of unused water units.
EMD _NH EMU _NM
EMU _NH EMD _NM EMU _NL
qWu g(1) g(1) Q g(c)
qWd g(c) Q g(1) g(c)
ZWu y (g(1)) g(1) y (g(1)) g(1) y
¡
Q g(c)
¢
Q+ g(c)
ZWd y (g(c)) cg(c) y
¡
Q g(1)
¢
 c
¡
Q g(1)
¢
y (g(c)) cg(c)
Finally, we note that restricted trade does not occur on the remaning
nine joint sets: (EHD _ NH ELD _ NM , ELD _ NL,EHI _ NH , EMI _ NM ,
EHU _NH , , ELU _NM , , ELU _NL, ) The equal quota allocation for these
joint sets is presented in table 2.2.
3. Main Results
Proposition 1 established that the equal quota allocation is at least as
ecient as noncooperation when riparians are identical. Indeed, in situations
of water scarcity the introduction of an equal quota will generate an eciency
gain (i.e. a cooperative surplus). To what extent does this result hold when
relative cost digerences are introduced? If the downstream riparian has the
relative cost advantage then the result is qualitatively similar, although the
cooperative surplus exceeds that attained for identical riparians. When the
upstream riparian has the lowest unit cost the results are less straightforward
and will ultimately depend on the functional form of the production function.
We demonstrate and explain these results below.
3.1 Downstream has a cost advantage
Proposition 2 Suppose the downstream riparian has the relative cost ad-
vantage (c < 1). The equal quota allocation is at least as ecient as the
noncooperative allocation.
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Proof. Let E and Ndenote the regional proÞt in the equal quota
allocation (net of trade) and under noncooperation, respectively. We must
show that E  N ;(c,Q) on the relevant domain for each of the Þve joint
sets identiÞed in section 2.4. Since the noncooperative equilibria and equal
quota allocations diger on each of these sets (see tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4) we
have to check Þve digerent (weak) inequalities:
On EHD _NH , EMD _NH , EMD _NM we get E = N because the
equal quota (net of trade) and noncooperative allocations are identical in
each of these three cases.
On ELD_NM we get E > N since the full proÞt expression yields:
y
³
Q
2
´
 Q
2
+ y
³
Q
2
´
 cQ
2
> y (g(1)) g(1)+ y
¡
Q g(1)
¢
 cQ+ cg(1)/
2y
³
Q
2
´
 (1 c)Q
2
> y (g(1)) + y
¡
Q g(1)
¢
 (1 c)g(1).
which is true since 2y
³
Q
2
´
> y (g(1))+y
¡
Q g(1)
¢
because of concavity
and because ELD _NM = {g(1) < Q  2g(1)} so we have Q2  g(1),
(1 c)Q
2
 (1 c)g(1).
On ELD _NL we get E > N since the full proÞt expression yields:
y
³
Q
2
´
 Q
2
+ y
³
Q
2
´
 cQ
2
> y
¡
Q
¢
Q/ 2y
³
Q
2
´
+ (1 c)
³
Q
2
´
> y
¡
Q
¢
which is true since 2y
³
Q
2
´
> y
¡
Q
¢
(concavity) and (1 c)
³
Q
2
´
> 0.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward. Equal quota im-
plies a redistribution of water from the upstream to the downstream riparian.
When the downstream riparian has the relative cost advantage then its pro-
ductivity (marginal proÞt) is at least as high as that of the downstream
riparian. This is the case in the noncooperative allocation as well as in the
equal quota allocation. It follows that basinwide proÞt cannot fall when
riparians move from noncooperation to equal quota.
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A more careful analysis of each of the Þve possible scenarios reads as
follows: If water is suciently abundant then the riparians would be uncon-
strained by equal quota, i.e. the noncooperative and equal quota basinwide
proÞts are identical (EHD _NH). The second scenario is that where there is
sucient water in the noncooperative case, but where the downstream ripar-
ian is constrained by the equal quota (EMD _ NH). Here the downstream
riparian buys unused water from its upstream neighbour to attain exactly
the same proÞt level as under noncooperation and basinwide proÞts again
become identical. The third scenario (EMD _ NM) where the downstream
riparian is constrained in the noncooperative as well as the equal quota al-
location yields the same qualitative result. Fourthly, if water is so scarce
that the downstream riparian is constrained under noncooperation and both
riparians are constrained in equal quota (ELD _ NM) then the two parties
generate a cooperative surplus. In the Þfth and Þnal case, both riparians are
constrained under noncooperation as well as equal quota (ELD _NL). The
marginal product of the downstream riparian is very high under noncooper-
ation because it is producing zero output. By sharing the water equally in
this situation the riparians can attain substantial cooperative beneÞts.
Corollary 1 If the downstream riparian has the relative cost advantage and
water is suciently scarce, Q  2g(1), then the equal quota allocation is more
ecient than noncooperation thus generating a cooperative surplus.
Proof. Follows from the proof of Proposition 2 given the deÞnition of
ELD.
70
3.2 Upstream has a cost advantage
The eciency implications of introducing equal quota when the upstream
riparian has the relative cost advantage are ambiguous. In the noncooper-
ative equilibrium the productivity (marginal proÞt) of the downstream ri-
parian is at least as high as that of the upstream riparian. In the equal
quota allocation, however, the opposite is the case: the productivity of the
upstream riparian is at least as high as that of the downstream riparian.
Consequently, the cooperative surplus can take positive as well as negative
values. To reduce this ambiguity we need to introduce more structure to the
model by making additional assumptions about the production function. An
exact speciÞcation of the functional form of the production function would
be sucient to draw inferences about the eciency implications of equal
quota for any given values of the exogenous variables (c,Q). More generally,
it emerges that the sign of the third derivative of the production function,
d3y(q)
dq3
, is an important determinant of the sign of the cooperative surplus.9
Assumptions about the third derivative are sucient to fully determine the
eciency implications of introducing equal quota in 13 out of 18 special cases.
Proposition 3 Suppose the upstream riparian has the relative cost advan-
tage (c > 1). The equal quota allocation is at least as ecient as the nonco-
operative allocation, except for the following four special cases: (1) EMU_NM
for d
3y(q)
dq3
< 0; (2) ELU _NM for d
3y(q)
dq3
< 0; (3) ELU _NL for d
3y(q)
dq3
T 0, and;
(4)EMU _NL for d
3y(q)
dq3
T 0. Table 2.5 summarises the results:
9I thank Bouwe Dijkstra for bringing this to my attention.
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Table 2.5 Sign of the cooperative surplus for c > 1.
d3y(q)
dq3
= 0 d
3y(q)
dq3
> 0 d
3y(q)
dq3
< 0
EHU _NH = 0 = 0 = 0
EMU _NH = 0 = 0 = 0
EMU _NM = 0 > 0 < 0
ELU _NM > 0 > 0 T 0
ELU _NL T 0 T 0 T 0
EMU _NL < 0 T 0 < 0
Proof. See appendix D.
The general conclusion that emerges from Table 2.5 is that equal quota
is at least as ecient as noncooperation unless water is too scarce and the
cost digerential too substantial. If d3y(q)
dq3
= 0 then the combination of water
scarcity and cost digerential is problematic on EMU _NL and parts of ELU _
NL. For
d3y(q)
dq3
> 0 these problems may occur on the same two joint sets,
while they are much more pervasive when d
3y(q)
dq3
< 0.
To improve the understanding of these results we provide a graphical
illustration of the case where d
3y(q)
dq3
= 0. If the third derivative is zero then the
production function is quadratic and of the form y = aqi bq2i where a, b are
positive parameters. The proÞt function can be written Zi = (a ci)qi bq2i
where a > ci. At an interior solution q
W
i =
a3ci
2b
. Supposing for simplicity
that a  cu = 1 for the upstream riparian and b = 12 we get qWu = 1 and
qWd = a  cd > 0. If the upstream riparian has the cost advantage then
0 < a  cd < 1. Figure 2.1 illustrates the marginal proÞt curves of the
two riparians. The width of the diagram is determined by the availability
of water Q. Water use by the upstream riparian qu is measured from left
to right and that of the downstream riparian qd in the opposite direction.
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In what follows we compare the two allocations (noncooperative and equal
quota) as water becomes increasingly scarce.
If water is abundant, EHU _NH , the riparians choose the unconstrained
optimal water input under noncooperation as well as equal quota where
marginal proÞt equals zero (points A and B in the diagram). In both al-
locations, upstream and downstream proÞt are given by |OPA| and |RSB|,
respectively. On EMU _ NH the noncooperative allocation is in A for the
upstream riparian and in B for the downstream riparian. Upstream is
constrained by equal quota (point D) while downstream has surplus water.
Trade in unused water units (moving from D to A) increases upstream proÞt
by |ACD| which implies that regional proÞt |OPA| + |RSB| is identical in
both allocations. At lower levels ofQ the introduction of equal quota has dis-
tributional implications. On EMU _NM the noncooperative allocation is in
A. By moving to the post-trade equal quota allocation, in B, upstream loses
|ABD| but downstream gains an equivalent amount |ABE|. On ELU _NM
the noncooperative allocation is in A and the post-trade equal quota alloca-
tion in F . Downstream gain |AEDF | is larger than upstream loss |ACF | so
equal quota generates a cooperative surplus. On EMU _NL, noncooperation
is in R and equal quota (net of trade) in B. Equal quota causes a loss of
 |DERB|+ |RSB| due to the low values of (ac,Q). Finally, on ELU _NL
the noncooperative allocation is in point R and the equal quota allocation
in H. In this scenario equal quota can lead to trade-ogs as well as the op-
posite depending on the values of (a c,Q). Upstream loses |CFRH| and
downstream gains |RSDH|. In Figure 2.1.e the two areas are identical, and
higher values of (a c) would lead to a regional gain, while lower values to
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a regional loss. More generally, it can be shown that equal quota is at least
as ecient as noncooperation if Q  2 2(a c).
Figure 2.2 gives an overview of the fourteen digerent scenarios in ((a 
c), Q)-space when d
3y(q)
dq3
= 0 (where for simplicity the three scenarios for
identical riparians are omitted). The Þgure is drawn using the deÞnitions of
the joint sets presented in Apppendix C. The trade-og between equity and
eciency is limited to the dark shaded area close to the origin where water is
very scarce and the cost digerential too substantial. Figure 2.3 illustrates the
magnitude of the cooperative surplus for digerent values of (a c,Q) (note
that the horizontal axis is inverted). We make the following observations.
First, the cooperative surplus is an increasing function of the relative cost
advantage of the downstream riparian, (a  c). Secondly, it is maximised
when Q = 1, i.e. on the NM  NL border. Thirdly, cooperative surpluses
are generally of a higher order of magnitude than cooperative deÞcits.
Diagrams similar to those produced in Figure 2.1 can also be drawn for the
two cases d
3y(q)
dq3
> 0 and d
3y(q)
dq3
< 0. If the third derivative of the production
function is positive (negative) then the marginal proÞt function is downward
sloping and convex (concave) in q. To ascertain the sign of the cooperative
surplus, one merely has to compare the two areas under the marginal proÞt
curves associated with the gain (loss) of the downstream (upstream) riparian.
Figure 2.4 illustrates scenario EMU _ NM under alternative assumptions of
the third derivative of the production function where upstream loss is given
by |ABD| and downstream gain by |ABE| . A positive (negative) third
derivative implies a cooperative surplus (deÞcit) under equal quota.
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4. Agreement stability
The principal analytical concern thus far has been whether equal quota
represents a superior alternative to noncooperation in terms of its eciency
and equity properties. As previously highlighted equal quota can only be
attained by means of a cooperative agreement between the two riparians. In
the absence of a supranational body to enforce the agreement, neither of the
signatories must Þnd it in their own interest to deviate and act unilaterally.
Since equal quota implies a redistribution of water, and hence proÞt, from
upstream to downstream the key question is whether the upstream riparian
would Þnd it individually rational to enter the agreement. Clearly, were
the downstream riparian to keep all its additional proÞts under an equal
quota agreement then the upstream riparian would never sign. The analysis
therefore presupposes the possibility of lump-sum side payments payable from
the winner of cooperation to the loser. This is why the size of the cooperative
surplus matters. If the surplus is non-positive then it would be undesirable
from an eciency point of view for any of the riparians to enter the agreement
although this could be justiÞed on equity grounds provided the trade-og is
politically acceptable.
Suppose in the following example that there are beneÞts from cooperation.
The subsequent analysis gives an illustration of how a stable agreement can be
reached. We assume identical Cobb Douglas production functions, yi = q
k
i ,
where k = 1
2
, c = 2 (upstream riparian has the cost advantage) and Q = 1
5
which implies that the riparians are in EMU _ NL. For simplicity we set
the transfer payments p of the water trade equal to zero. Table 2.6 gives an
overview:
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Table 2.6 Example of a stable equal quota agreement
qWu ZWu qWd ZWd 
1. Noncooperation 0.20 0.247 0.00 0.000 0.247
2. Equal quota (net of trade) 0.14 0.233 0.06 0.125 0.358
3. Stable agreement 0.14 0.247 0.06 0.111 0.358
4. Splitting the surplus 0.14 0.302 0.06 0.056 0.358
Given the noncooperative payogs, the individual rationality constraint of
the upstream riparian is ZEu  ZNu = 0.247, and, ZEd  ZNd = 0 for the down-
stream riparian. The downstream riparian gains substantially under equal
quota (after selling 0.04 units) while upstream incurs a minor loss. Although
equal quota is more ecient than noncooperation (E = 0.358 > N =
0.247) it is not individually rational for the upstream riparian to cooperate.
To make the upstream riparian sign the agreement, the downstream riparian
must issue a side payment of at least ZNu ZEu = 0.2470.233 = 0.014. This
side payment is sucient to guarantee a stable agreement (see line 3 in Table
2.6). Ultimately, the size of the side payment will be a matter of negotiation
between the two riparians. The Nash bargaining solution provides a theo-
retical solution to this problem. Supposing both riparians are risk neutral
we must solve the following problem max
Zu+Zd$0.358
{(Zu  0.247)q(Zd  0)13q}.
The result embodies the popular notion of splitting the cooperative surplus
for riparians with identical bargaining power (q = 1
2
).
To what extent can the Þnal outcome (in terms of water shares and proÞt)
in the Nash bargaining solution be said to be equitable? It is important
here to re-emphasise that our notion of equity is the egalitarian standard of
equal shares of water to equals, or alternatively, equality of opportunity (water
access). The cooperative agreement does indeed reßect these principles:
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Both countries are given an equal share of the water. The reason why
the downstream riparian only uses 30 percent of the water is due to a lack of
innate capability of making productive use of its entitlement. The inequality
of proÞt is a consequence of the fact that the noncooperative outcome is very
unequal (upstream gets all the proÞts). The cooperative surplus, however,
is split evently. Irrespective of this, since our equity metric is water - not
Þnal outcomes such as proÞts - we should refrain from making any evaluative
judgement of the fairness of the basinwide proÞt distribution.
Before concluding the analysis of stability it is worth pointing out that
riparians do sometimes sign (and respect) international agreements even
though they are unstable in a narrow economic sense. As pointed out in the
international relations literature such behaviour can be entirely rational if
one also considers the broader political beneÞts from signing such an agree-
ment (LeMarquand, 1977). First, the signatories to an agreement may want
to project a positive international image of themselves as in the case of the
decision by the US Government to build a desalting plant on the Lower Col-
orado River in the 1970s. Secondly, river sharing agreements are only one of
many ways in which countries interact, thus one country might accept a bad
deal if a linkage has been made to another bilateral agreement on which it
stands to gain more substantially (see Bennett et al., 1998). Finally, a reluc-
tant upstream riparian may be downstream to the same or other countries
on other rivers and this produces a more ßexible stance (Sadog et al., 2002).
On the other hand, there are also examples of economically rational, but
politically infeasible agreements, as exempliÞed by Dinar and Wolfs (1994)
analysis of water markets for the Middle East.
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5. Policy implications
Suppose the model presented in this chapter gives a suciently reasonable
description of reality. How could it be used for practical purposes to guide
the negotiation of a water sharing agreement between two riparians? What
are the informational requirements? What are the policy implications? The
answers to these questions are best addressed by proposing an algorithm that
negotiators can adopt. Inevitability, this proposal represents a simpliÞcation
of what in most cases is a complex negotiation scenario. Nevertheless, it
constitutes a basic prescription of the steps necessary to determine whether
an equal quota agreement (or any other exogenously deÞned share) is worth
pursuing vis-a`-vis noncooperation when riparians aspire for an ecient and
equitable solution.
In step 1 the riparians must collect all relevant information. First,
this includes an estimate of the production functions (where water is an in-
put) of each riparian. Secondly, riparian cost functions must be estimated.
What matters here is the relative digerence in unit costs between riparians.
Thirdly, a reliable estimate must be made over the range of annual water
ßow. The annual ßow volume is usually stochastic (agected by weather)
and ßuctuations of 25 percent above or below the mean annual ßow are quite
common (Kilgour and Dinar, 1995). Flow data is often (but not always)
available to negotiators and can be estimated more easily than production or
cost functions. Step 2 involves a re-speciÞcation of the theoretical model in
light of the available data. For instance, riparians may have production or
cost functions which are digerent from those presented in this chapter. On
the basis of the data collected in step 1 negotiators must, in step 3, make
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an overall assessment of which of the many possible scenarios the riparians
are most likely to Þnd themselves in. This may not be a unique scenario,
such as ELD_NM , but rather a range of possible scenarios. The uncertainty
derives partly from the statistical uncertainty of the parameter values of the
production and cost functions, but most importantly the substantial varia-
tion in annual water ßow. Step 4 involves an estimation of the expected
cooperative surplus of introducing equal quota. This obviously depends on
the conclusions of step 3 and riparians must also account for possible trans-
action costs. In step 5, the riparians must decide whether it is worthwhile
to share the water equally (or according to any other exogenous rule). If
the cooperative surplus (net of transaction costs) is non-negative then equal
quota is a Þrst-best policy. If the cooperative surplus is negative then ri-
parians trade-og eciency to attain equity. Finally, in step 6 the riparians
must embark on negotiations of how to share the cooperative surplus.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the question of how, in the context of man-
agement of transboundary rivers, the two objectives of social equity and eco-
nomic eciency interrelate and whether they conßict with each other. The
theoretical results contain a relatively optimistic policy message: Although
equity and eciency are inseparable objectives when water is scarce this does
not necessarily imply a trade-og. Under certain circumstance, cooperating
riparians can be rewarded with a cooperative surplus. Trade-ogs do occur,
albeit less frequently and in smaller magnitude relative to cooperative surplus
outcomes.
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Appendix C. DeÞnition of joint sets
This appendix deÞnes the fourteen joint sets identiÞed in section 2.5.
Using the deÞnitions of the noncooperative sets (listed above table 2.1) and
of the equal quota sets (see table 2.3) we have:
Table C.1 Upstream riparian has a cost advantage
EHU _NH =
©
c > 1 | 2g(1)  Q
ª
EMU _NH =
©
c > 1 | g(1) + g(c)  Q < 2g(1)
ª
ELU _NM =
©
c > 1 | g(1) < Q  2g(c)
ª
EMU _NM =
©
c > 1 | g(1) < Q < g(1) + g(c)
ª
EMU _NL =
©
c > 1 | 2g(c) < Q  g(1)
ª
ELU _NL =
©
c > 1 | 0 < Q  2g(c) a 0 < Q  g(1)
ª
Table C.2 Downstream riparian has a cost advantage
EHD _NH =
©
c < 1 | 2g(c)  Q
ª
EMD _NH =
©
c < 1 | g(1) + g(c)  Q < 2g(c)
ª
EMD _NM =
©
c < 1 | 2g(1) < Q < g(1) + g(c)
ª
ELD _NM =
©
c < 1 | 0 < Q  2g(1)
ª
ELD _NL =
©
c < 1 | 0 < Q  g(1)
ª
Table C.3 Identical riparians
EHI _NH =
©
c = 1 | 2g(1) < Q
ª
EMI _NM =
©
c = 1 | g(1) < Q  2g(1)
ª
ELI _NL =
©
c = 1 | 0 < Q  g(1)
ª
Figure 2.2 provides an illustrates of the joint sets for the special case
where d
3y(q)
dq3
= 0 and production is given by y = aqi bq2i , a, b > 0 and proÞt
by Zi = (a ci)qi  bq2i , a > ci. Assume further that b = 12 and a cu = 1.
Then the upstream riparian has a cost advantage when 0 < (a  cd) < 1
and the downstream riparian has a cost advantage when (a  cd) > 1. To
derive the lines in Þgure 2.2 we use the deÞnitions in table C.1 C.3 where
g(1)  qWu = (a3cu)2b = 1 and g(c)  qWd =
(a3cd)
2b
= (a cd).
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Appendix D. Proof of results in table 2.5
Let qu be upstreams water use in the noncooperative outcome and let
qd by downstreams water use in the equal quota arrangement. DeÞne
  quqd as the quantity of water transferred from upstream to downstream
riparian when moving from the noncooperative allocation to the equal quota
arrangement. Finally, let {Zu be upstreams loss and let {Zd be down-
streams gain in moving from the noncooperative allocation to the equal
quota allocation. Then for i = (u, d):
{Zi =
Z 
0
Z0i(qi  w)dw
Note that Z00i (qi) = y00(qi) < 0 ; qi, i = (u, d).
1. EHU _NH and EMU _NH : The noncooperative and equal quota allo-
cations are identical (net of trade), thus {Zd = {Zu for y000 S 0.
2. EMU _NM :
In this case, Z0i(qi) = 0, i = (u, d), qu = g(1), qd = Q  g(c) and
 = qu  qd = g(1) + g(c)Q > 0.
(a) When y000 = 0, Z00i (qi) = y00(qi) = 4 < 0. Then Z0i(qi  w) = 4w ;
w > 0, i = u, d. Thus, {Zd = {Zu.
(b) When y000 > 0, Z00i (qd) < Z00i (qu). Then Z0d(qd  w) > Z0u(qu  w) ;
w > 0. Thus, {Zd > {Zu.
(c) When y000 < 0, Z00i (qd) > Z00i (qu). Then Z0d(qd  w) < Z0u(qu  w) ;
w > 0. Thus, {Zd < {Zu.
87
3. ELU _NM :
In this case, Z0u(qu) = 0 and Z0d(qd) > 0, qu = g(1), qd = Q2 and
 = qu  qd = g(1) Q2 > 0.
(a) When y000 = 0, Z00i (qi) = y00(qi) = 4 < 0. Then Z0d(qu  w) >
Z0u(qd  w). Thus, {Zd > {Zu.
(b) When y000 > 0, Z00i (qd) < Z00i (qu). Then Z0d(qd  w) > Z0u(qu  w) ;
w > 0. Thus, {Zd > {Zu.
(c) When y000 < 0, Z00i (qd) S Z00i (qu). Then Z0d(qd  w) S Z0u(qu  w) ;
w > 0. Thus, {Zd S {Zu.
4. EMU _NL :
In this case, Z0u(qu) > 0 and Z0d(qd) = 0, qu = Q, qd = Q  g(c) and
 = qu  qd = g(c) > 0.
(a) When y000 = 0, Z00i (qi) = y00(qi) = 4 < 0. Then Z0d(qu  w) <
Z0u(qd  w). Thus, {Zd < {Zu.
(b) When y000 > 0, Z00i (qd) S Z00i (qu). Then Z0d(qd  w) S Z0u(qu  w) ;
w > 0. Thus, {Zd S {Zu.
(c) When y000 < 0, Z00i (qd) > Z00i (qu). Then Z0d(qd  w) < Z0u(qu  w) ;
w > 0. Thus, {Zd < {Zu.
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5. ELU _NL :
In this case, Z0u(qu) > 0 and Z0d(qd) > 0, qu = Q, qd = Q2 and  =
qu  qd = Q2 > 0.
(a) When y000 = 0, Z00i (qi) = y00(qi) = 4 < 0. Then Z0d(qu  w) S
Z0u(qd  w). Thus, {Zd S {Zu.
(b) When y000 > 0, Z00i (qd) S Z00i (qu). Then Z0d(qd  w) S Z0u(qu  w) ;
w > 0. Thus, {Zd S {Zu.
(c) When y000 < 0, Z00i (qd) S Z00i (qu). Then Z0d(qd  w) S Z0u(qu  w) ;
w > 0. Thus, {Zd S {Zu.
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Chapter 3. Transboundary Water Conßicts over
Hydropower and Irrigation: Can Multilateral
Development Banks Help?1
1. Introduction
In this chapter we focus on a particular type of conßict which arises when
the timing of upstream water discharges does not coincide with the seasonal
needs of the downstream riparian. We exemplify the problem by considering
the case of an upstream hydropower producer and a downstream agricultural
producer. From the perspective of the downstream riparian, the result is
that in any given season either too little or too much water is discharged
relative to its optimum. The Syr Darya river conßict in Central Asia is
an important and interesting case study which we examine in more detail
in this chapter. Other relevant case studies also brießy deserve mention.
The other great Central Asian river, the Amu Darya, has characteristics
that could create a situation similar to that on the Syr Darya, if upstream
Tajikistan proceeds with plans to expand its hydropower capacity. On the
river Nile there is also potential for conßict if upstream Ethiopia decides
to develop its substantial hydropower potential thus disrupting the growing
season in Egypt. Namibian plans for the Popa Falls hydropower plant on
the Okavango river potentially agect wildlife-oriented tourism in Botswanas
national parks in the downstream Okavango delta. These examples share
a potential conßict between hydropower in an upstream country and other
economic interests in a downstream country. In future it is likely that more
such conßicts will emerge since only 10 percent of the worlds hydropower
potential is currently being exploited (Khagram, 2004).
1A version of this chapter also exists as a working paper (Moller, 2005).
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Development agencies can play an important role in fostering basinwide
cooperation in the developing world, for instance by improving technical
and political communication between riparians, acting as honest brokers and
providing third-party process support and Þnancing, such as setting up bas-
inwide trust funds (ODI, 2001). Multilateral development banks (MDBs) in
particular, i.e. the World Bank and the regional development banks, have a
comparative advantage in promoting transboundary river management, es-
pecially in the area of infrastructure investments. This is partly because
of their extensive lending facilities and partly because the co-riparians are
typically also their client countries thus enhancing the scope for basinwide
solutions. Furthermore, in the case of the World Bank there is substantial
in-house experience in river management in light of its involvement as a Þ-
nancier of large dam construction over the past 30 years. Although regional
interventions by MDBs, at times, are impeded by their operational mode
of country assistance programs (Cook and Sachs, 1999), there has been a
gradual shift in recent years towards a more proactive and conscious sup-
port of river basin organisations involving several riparian states. The Nile
Basin Initiative, supported by the World Bank, is by far the most prominent
example of this trend although it does represent the exception rather than
the rule. The most progressive regional development bank in the area, the
Asian Development Bank, recently included a mandate of promoting regional
cooperation in its ocial Water Policy, but still has relatively few activities
on the ground (ADB, 2004). There is thus potential for further involvement
by multilateral development banks in transboundary water management.
Almost all of the economic literature addressing the energy versus irri-
gation trade-og is concerned with inter-state or domestic rivers, especially
in the United States. Particularly pertinent are the studies of the Snake-
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Columbia river by McCarl and Ross (1985), Houston and Whittlesey (1986),
McCarl and Parandvash (1988), and Hamilton et al. (1989). The Colorado
river has been analysed by Gisser et al. (1979) and the irrigation districts
in Central California by Chatterjee et al. (1998). The study by Owen-
Thomsen et al. (1982) of Egypts High Aswan Dam therefore represents an
exception to the focus on US-based rivers. These studies use mathematical
programming to model agricultural production and to analyse the impacts on
the agricultural sector of a water transfer to hydropower production because
the latter typically has the highest marginal productivity. They generally
conclude that such diversions have the potential to generate welfare gains.
Market mechanisms (as studied by Hamilton et al. (1989)) could potentially
improve resource allocation, although this depends critically upon the estab-
lishment of clearer property rights as emphasised by Chatterjee et al. (1998).
International trade in water is rare, however, partly because the conßicting
principles of international law complicate the property rights issue and partly
for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2.
To our knowledge, there have been only two economic studies of interna-
tional hydropower-irrigation conßicts. The World Bank (2004a) examines
the conßict between the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on
the Syr Darya. The study Þnds that basinwide beneÞts are maximised when
the upstream hydropower plant operates to facilitate downstream irrigation.
To support a cooperative outcome, downstream riparians should compensate
the upstream riparian for its water storage services by issuing side payments.
In the other study, Aytemiz (2001) examines the conßict between Turkey and
Syria on the Euphrates. In addition to focusing on the optimal allocation
of surface water, this study also addresses the question of whether there is
sucient water for both riparians needs, and comes to a negative conclusion.
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There is also a more general economic literature on transboundary rivers
as reviewed in Chapter 2. A non-exhaustive list includes contributions by
Barrett (1994), Dinar and Wolf (1994), Rogers (1997), Kilgour and Dinar
(2001) and Ambec and Sprumont (2002). These authors are typically pre-
occupied with how and under what circumstances riparians can cooperate on
their own, but do not directly address the question of whether third-party
intervention may be useful. An important reason for this omission is the
common underlying assumption of riparian sovereignty, the consequence of
which is to ignore the relevance of supra-national bodies in fostering coop-
eration. While this may be a realistic assumption in some circumstances,
this is not always the case. Many international river basins are located in
developing nations (twenty percent are located in Africa, for instance). The
ability of poor, indebted and aid-recipient countries to fully control domestic
and foreign policy, is sometimes compromised in practice. The proposition
that external agencies could play a role in promoting riparian cooperation
can therefore not be dismissed a priori.
In this chapter we consider a range of policy interventions undertaken by a
multilateral development bank in the context of a transboundary hydropower-
irrigation water conßict. The chapter considers two policy issues: First,
interventions by an MDB can be motivated by at least two objectives: a)
maximising basinwide social welfare and b) promoting regional stability. As
noted above, existing economic literature has emphasised (a) and paid little
attention to (b). This prioritisation can be readily justiÞed in a domestic
context where the problem is primarily one of suboptimal resource alloca-
tion. In an international context, on the other hand, it is often political
priorities which is the major concern and economic objectives are secondary.
The distinction is important because interventions may result in a trade-og.
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For instance, an intervention which increases upstream welfare more than
it reduces downstream welfare enhances basinwide welfare but jeopardises
regional stability unless side payments are made. Is it possible to identify
policy interventions that simultaneously promote regional stability and en-
hance social eciency? Secondly, an interesting policy option emerges for
an MDB that intends to assist a downstream client: Could the client be
more egectively assisted through indirect intervention in an upstream state,
as opposed to direct interventions within the clients own territory? To illus-
trate this point in a broader context, annual ßoods in Bangladesh have been
exacerbated in recent years as a consequence of deforestation and overgrazing
in upstream India, Nepal and Tibet. Is Bangladesh best protected against
ßoods through upstream measures, e.g. deforestation control, or through
in-country interventions, such as ßood control defences?2
The present chapter contributes to existing literature in two ways. First,
it adds to the sparse literature on international hydropower-irrigation con-
ßicts by providing an analytical framework within which case studies, such
as those provided by the World Bank (2004a) and Aytemiz (2001), can be
examined. Secondly, it contributes to the literature on transboundary rivers
by explicitly considering a potential role for third-party intervention. The
chapter identiÞes and ranks a range of policy interventions in terms of their
ability to reduce regional tension and enhance basinwide social welfare. In
comparison to the existing hydro-irrigation literature, we present an analyt-
ical model that is simple enough to capture the essence of the problem. On
the other hand, our model is not suciently elaborate to allow for accurate
2Related policy options arise for a host of other international challenges driven by
cross-border spillover eects. Apart from the related area of transboundary pollution, this
includes many other global public goods (see Kaul et al. 1999).
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empirical estimations of individual river basins (see Chatterjee et al., 1998
for an example). It should also be emphasised from the outset that the
interventions analysed here are costly infrastructure projects, such as con-
struction of hydropower plants and dams which take several years, sometimes
decades, to complete. The theoretical analysis emphasises the qualitative
impact of these projects, but is necessarily silent about other important as-
pects such as the investment cost or the social, environmental or political
impact. A Þnal decision to pursue any such projects must obviously also
be informed by these factors. The remainder of the chapter is structured as
follows: Section 2 presents the model and its noncooperative equilibrium.
Section 3 computes the socially ecient allocation. Section 4 contains the
policy analysis based on comparative statics. Section 5 ranks and compares
policies. Section 6 uses the theoretical Þndings to illustrate the relevance of
the model in the context of the Syr Darya conßict. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
Two riparian states share a transboundary river. The upstream ripar-
ian (UP) is a hydropower producer and the downstream riparian (DOWN)
withdraws water for agricultural irrigation.3 There are two periods which
may be thought of as seasons within a water year (period 1 is the summer
season and period 2 is the winter season). Second-period (winter) electricity
demand in UP is assumed higher than Þrst-period (summer) demand. In
the Þrst period, therefore, UP prefers to store some water in its reservoir in
order to increase second-period electricity production. This mode of opera-
tion conßicts with the interests of DOWN. It receives insucient irrigation
water in the Þrst period, which is the growing season, and may experience
3Note the distinction between consumption and non-consumption water use. Irrigation
is an example of the former and hydropower use an example of the latter.
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ßooding in the second period.
2.1 Upstream hydropower production4
Upstream hydropower is generated by a single, state-regulated plant which
produces yt units of electricity in period t, t = (1, 2), by making use of qt
units of water ßowing to it. Let k > 0 be an eciency parameter. The
hydropower production function
yt = kf(qt) (1)
can exhibit either diminishing or constant returns to scale, thus Yf(qt)Yqt > 0,
Y2f(qt)
Yq2t
 0 and f(0) = 0.5 The hydropower plant serves the entire domestic
market for electricity which has the inverse demand function in period t,
denoted pt:
pt(yt) = at  byt (2)
for 0  yt  atb , and pt = 0 for yt > atb where at > 0 and b > 0 are
parameters. Let 0 < B < 1 denote the discount factor between the two
periods. The relatively higher second-period electricity demand is reßected
in the assumption: Bp2(yt) > p1(yt),;yt. The natural inßow of water, Qt,
denotes the (perfectly forecast) exogenous volume of water supplied in the
reservoir controlled by UP in period t and Q = Q1 +Q2 denotes the annual
inßow. It is assumed that water is scarce enough not to be wasted. In
other words, over the two periods UP uses all of the water inßows to produce
electricity.6 Water available to UP in period one can be used to produce
electricity in the Þrst period or can be stored in UPs reservoir for use in the
4The hydropower model presented here is an extension of that developed by Ambec
and Doucet (2003).
5Ambec and Doucet (2003) assume constant returns to scale while the models developed
by Edwards (2003) exhibit diminishing returns.
6This simplifying assumption reßects the physical limitation that, on average in a long-
term equilibrium, hydro plants cannot have net positive or negative accumulation of water.
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second period. In the Þrst period, UP relies on water in its reservoir (i.e.
no water is available from the previous period). Hence, UP faces the input
supply constraint
q1  Q1 (3)
The volume of water stored in UPs reservoir during the Þrst period is used
in its entirety to produce electricity in the second period. This volume is
bounded by the reservoir capacity denoted s > 0. In terms of Þrst-period
water release we have:
q1  Q1  s (4)
We normalise operating costs to zero and write proÞt in period t as a function
of water input, qt:
Zut (qt) = ptyt = kf(qt) (at  bkf (qt)) (5)
By serving the domestic market, the plant generates a consumer surplus in
period t of:
CSt(qt) =
1
2
yt(at  pt) =
bk2
2
[f(qt)]
2 (6)
Let social welfare of the upstream riparian in period t be the sum of con-
sumer surplus and proÞt: SW ut (qt) = CSt(qt) + Zut (qt). Since second-period
water release is determined residually, q2 = Q q1, we can write down UPs
optimisation problem in terms of choosing q1 optimally:
max
q1
©
SW u1 (q1) + BSW u2 (Q q1) | Q1  s  q1  Q1
ª
(7)
The Lagrangian is written:
L(q1,b,b) = SW u1 (q1) + BSW u2 (Q q1) + b(Q1  q1) + b(Q1 + q1  s) (8)
where b and b are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the input
supply constraint and the storage constraint, respectively. The Þrst-order
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conditions yield:
YSW u1 (qW1)
Yq1
+ BYSW
u
2 (Q qW1)
Yq1
= b b (9)
b(Q1  qW1) = 0 (10)
b(Q1 + qW1  s) = 0 (11)
At the interior solution (b = b = 0), the Þrst-order condition reduces to:
Yf(qW1)
Yq1
p1 (y
W
1) B
Yf(qW2)
Yq2
p2 (y
W
2) = 0 (12)
Upstream social welfare, SW u, is strictly concave in q1. The second-order
condition yields:
Y2f(qW1)
Yq21
p1(y
W
1) bk
µYf(qW1)
Yq1
¶2
+ BY
2f(qW2)
Yq22
p2(y
W
2) bkB
µ
Yf(q
W
2)
Yq2
¶2
< 0
(13)
The Þrst-order condition (12) captures the upstream planners choice be-
tween Þrst- and second-period water release. To maximise social welfare,
UP must equate the discounted marginal social welfare of the two peri-
ods. At the interior solution this implies that qW2 > q
W
1 because the as-
sumption Bp2(yt) > p1(yt) implies that Bp2 (yW2) > p1(yW1) so that we must
have
Yf(qW1)
Yq1 >
Yf(qW2)
Yq2 . The corner solutions are straightforward: When the
input supply constraint binds (b > 0), the optimal production plan requires
more water in period one than is available so qW1 = Q1. This implies that the
Þrst-period marginal social welfare is higher than that of the second period
(discounted):
YSWu1 (qW1)
Yq1 > B
YSWu2 (qW2)
Yq2 . When the storage constraint binds
(b > 0), the optimal production plan requires more storage capacity in period
one than is available thus qW1 = Q1  s and YSW
u
1 (q
W
1)
Yq1 < B
YSWu2 (qW2)
Yq2 . Finally,
we note that the assumption of water scarcity implies that the technical ef-
Þciency coecient has a maximum value which is denoted k. For k > k
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electricity demand is fully satisÞed in period 1 and 2 given the total amount
of water available in each period, Q1 and Q2. By setting p1 = p2 = 0 and
using equations (1) and (2) we get that water scarcity implies k  at
bf(qWt )
for
t = 1, 2. Given the assumption that second-period demand is highest we
Þnd that k = a2
bf(qW2)
. It is henceforth assumed that k < k.
2.2 Downstream agricultural production
In period one, DOWN grows an irrigation-fed agricultural crop x, such
as cotton or rice, which it sells on the world market at the exogenous output
price p(x) = p = 1. Irrigation supply is available from two main sources:
upstream water releases, qW1, and water available from DOWNs own reservoir,
r > 0, which is assumed full in the beginning of period one. The agricultural
production function, x(qW1+r), exhibits diminishing returns to scale,
Yx(·)
Yq1 > 0,
Y2x(·)
Yq21
< 0 and x(0) = 0. The cost function c(qW1 + r) is convex,
Yc1(·)
Yq1 > 0 and
Y2c1(·)
Yq21
 0. We write DOWNs Þrst-period proÞt as:
Zd1 = x(qW1 + r) c1(qW1 + r) (14)
In the second period DOWN is not engaged in any economic activities which
use irrigation water from the river as an input. Water may, nevertheless,
have economic consequences if ßooding occurs. In our model, as in reality,
ßooding has positive and negative implications. We model the positive
egects as a replenishment of DOWNs reservoir, thus we assume r < QqW1.7
The negative egects of ßooding, such as damages to physical infrastructure,
are described by the convex cost function c2(q
W
2  r eq) where Yc2(·)Yq > 0 and
Y2c2(·)
Yq2  0. In words, only second-period water inßow that exceed the sum
7Although this is a two-period model, there is an implicit assumption that period two
is followed by a third period (which has the characteristics of the Þrst period), a fourth
period (similar to the second period) and so on. Thus the reason why the downstream
reservoir is assumed full in the Þrst period is that it was fully replenished in period zero.
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of the conveyance capacity of the river, eq, and the reservoir capacity r has a
negative economic impact. Second period proÞt is given by:
Zd2 = c2(Q qW1  r  eq) (15)
DOWNs proÞt is maximised when Þrst-period and second-period marginal
proÞts are equalised:8
Yx(q1 + r)
Yq1
 Yc1(q1 + r)Yq1
= BYc2(Q q1  r  eq)Yq2 (16)
Note that maximisation of DOWNs proÞt implies non-positive marginal
proÞts (YZt(·)Yqt  0). If the sum of the conveyance and reservoir capacity
(eq+ r) is relatively small, and ßooding occurs, then marginal proÞts are neg-
ative. In this case DOWN would prefer to reduce second-period ßooding
by using more than optimal irrigation input in the Þrst period. If ßooding
can be avoided (eq + r is relatively substantial) then DOWN would prefer to
irrigate until Þrst-period marginal proÞt equals zero.
2.3 Noncooperative equilibrium
Due to the geographic position of the two riparians the noncooperative
equilibrium is determined entirely by the actions of the upstream riparian
(at least in the short term).9 Because of assumed water scarcity in the Þrst
period, DOWN does not maximise its proÞt, thus its Þrst-period marginal
proÞt is positive
YZd1(qW1+r)
Yq1 > 0.
The noncooperative solution may take any of 3 forms: The interior
solution or either of the two corner solutions. Figure 3.1 (at the end of the
8The assumptions about the production and cost functions imply that d is strictly
concave in q1.
9We ignore here the possibility that DOWN issues a side payment to UP in exchange
for a release vector more favourable to DOWN. This policy option is discussed further in
the Syr Darya case study (section 6) and is treated explicitly in chapter 4.
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chapter) illustrates the noncooperative equilibrium at the interior solution.
The width of the diagram is determined by the total water inßow over the
two periods, Q. First-period water release, q1, is measured from left to right
and second-period water release, q2, in the opposite direction. Panel (a)
depicts the upstream hydropower producer. Each period is represented by
a convex marginal social welfare (MSW ) curve. At an interior solution,
the noncooperative input vector (qW1, q
W
2) is determined at the intersection of
the two MSW -curves located between the two vertical lines representing,
respectively, the storage constraint (Q1 s) and the supply constraint (Q1).
Panel (b) illustrates the downstream riparian. First-period crop production
is represented by a convex marginal proÞt curve. DOWN receives qW1 water
units from UP and by using all the water from its reservoir r it operates at
B. First-period proÞt is maximised at D where marginal proÞt equals zero.
In the second period UP releases qW2 of which r units are used to replenish
DOWNs reservoir. The excess water causes ßooding in the territory of the
downstream riparian, represented by point C on its concave marginal proÞt
curve. In comparison, total downstream proÞt is maximised at E where the
marginal proÞt curves intersect. The location of the second-period marginal
proÞt curve is determined by the conveyance capacity eq (a higher eq moves
the curve further to the left). If the conveyance capacity eq were suciently
large then marginal proÞt curves would not intersect and DOWNs optimum
would be atD. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the two corner solutions. When
the storage constraint binds (Figure 3.2) UP must produce more Þrst-period
electricity (and release more water) than it would do if the storage constraint
was not binding. In this case the equilibrium is determined by the location
of the (Q1 s)-curve. On the other hand, if the supply constraint binds the
equilibria are determined by the location of the Q1-curve (Figure 3.3).
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3. Basinwide social eciency
The presence of a production externality implies that the noncooperative
equilibrium is typically not socially ecient. In this chapter, the socially
ecient allocation is deÞned as the feasible water allocation (qo1, qo2) which
maximises basinwide social welfare, denoted SW = SW u1 + BSW u2 + SW d1 +
BSW d2 . Note that SW d1 + BSW d2 = Zd1 + BZd2, i.e. there is no consumer
surplus from agricultural production because DOWNs crop is exported to
markets outside the basin. The socially ecient allocation is the solution to
the problem:
max
q1
{SW u1 (q1)+BSW u2 (q1)+SW d1 (q1)+BSW d2 (q1) | Q1s  q1  Q1} (17)
The Þrst-order conditions yield:
Yf(qo1)
Yq1
p1 (y
o
1)B
Yf(qo2)
Yq2
p2 (y
o
2)+
Yx (qo1 + r)
Yq1
Yc1 (q
o
1 + r)
Yq1
BYc2 (q
o
2  r  eq)
Yq2
= µµ
(18)
µ(Q1  qo1) = 0 (19)
µ(Q1 + q
o
1  s) = 0 (20)
where µ and µ are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the input
supply constraint and the storage constraint, respectively. A basinwide social
planner aims to equalise the marginal social welfare of both riparians. In
comparison to the noncooperative equilibrium, the externality is internalised
because downstream agricultural proÞts and ßooding damage are considered
when choosing q1. First-period water release is generally larger in the socially
ecient allocation compared to noncooperation, qo1 > qW1, because
YSWd1 (qW1)
Yq1 
B YSWu2 (qW1)Yq2 > 0. The two allocations may, however, also be identical, q
o
1 = q
W
1,
if there is a binding constraint for the upstream planner as well as for the
basinwide planner. Formally, we have:
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Proposition 1 The noncooperative allocation is not socially ecient, except
if one of the following conditions is true:
(a) b¯ > 0 then µ¯ > 0 and qo1 = qW1 = Q1
(b) µ > 0 then b > 0 and qo1 = qW1 = Q1  s
Proof. This follows from a comparison of the Þrst-order conditions for
the upstream planner (9)-(11) with those of the basinwide planner (18)-(20).
4. Policy Analysis
As outlined in the introduction our aim is to identify policy interventions
which promote regional stability and enhance social eciency. Promotion
of regional stability requires that an intervention makes at least one riparian
better og without making the other riparian worse-og. Such interventions
are also known as Pareto improvements. A Pareto improvement, in turn,
implies an enhancement of social eciency (while the reverse is not the case).
The root cause of riparian conßict and social ineciency is the unidirectional,
negative externality caused by upstream regulation of the natural river ßow.
Pareto-improving policies that reduce this externality (or its impact) are
therefore particularly attractive because both riparians are made better-og.
Although we are primarily interested in interventions co-Þnanced by multilat-
eral development banks, the comparative static results derived in this section
are independent of agency and could, in principle, also be undertaken by the
riparians themselves or other external agents.
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4.1. Increase hydropower eciency
Consider a policy intervention aimed at increasing the parameter k, i.e.
the technical eciency of hydropower production. A higher k implies that
each unit of water released upstream produces more units of electricity than
previously. This could, for instance, be achieved through the construction of
additional hydropower plants along the river cascade so that each water unit
passes through several turbines. The upstream impact is straightforward:
Proposition 2 An increase in the technical eciency of hydropower pro-
duction, k, enhances upstream social welfare.
Proof. This follows from the fact that SW u(qW1,k) is strictly concave in
k and the assumption that k < k.
Upstream welfare increases because water is a scarce input. The down-
stream impact is less obvious and depends critically upon UPs choice of input
vector when it operates with enhanced eciency. A shift from second- to
Þrst-period water release would reduce the negative externality and enhance
downstream welfare. We Þnd that UPs input choice depends on several
factors, notably: 1) the production technology; 2) whether it operates at an
interior solution or a corner solution.
Proposition 3 At the interior solution, an increase in upstream hydropower
eciency, k, reduces the negative externality and enhances basinwide social
welfare if the following condition is satisÞed :
B Yf(qW2)Yq2
Yf(qW1)
Yq1
>
f(qW1)
f(qW2)
(21)
Proof. The externality is reduced if Þrst-period water release, q1, in-
creases (and q2 decreases). We totally digerentiate the Þrst-order condition
(12) and re-arrange for
dqW1
dk to get:
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dqW1
dk =
b
[
³
Yf(qW1)
Yq1 f(q
W
1) + B
Yf(qW2)
Yq1 f(q
W
2)
´
, where
[ = p1 (yW1)
Y2f(qW1)
Yq21
bk
Yf(qW1)
Yq1
¸2
+Bp2 (yW2)
Y2f(qW2)
Yq22
bkB

Yf(q
W
2)
Yq2
¸2
< 0
(22)
, dqW1
dk > 0/
³
Yf(qW1)
Yq1 f(q
W
1) + B
Yf(qW2)
Yq1 f(q
W
2)
´
< 0, which after re-arranging
yields (21).
Condition (21) reßects certain requirements on the production function
f(qt). This is best illustrated with an example:
Example 1 Let f(qt) = Vqqt , V > 0. Condition (21) reduces to:
B(qW2)2q31 > (qW1)2q31 (23)
Assume constant returns to scale (q = 1) and insert the equilibrium value
qW1 =
BQ
(1+B) +
(a13Ba2)
bk(1+B) to get Ba2 > a1 which is true by assumption. More
generally, expression (23) is true for q > 1
2
and B = 1. Intuitively, expression
(21) is satisÞed provided that the production function is not too curved,
which implies that the returns to scale are suciently high.
If condition (21) is satisÞed then we can fully characterise the egect of
enhanced hydropower eciency at the interior solution: First-period hy-
dropower production increases partly because more water is released and
partly because of enhanced eciency. In period two, higher eciency more
than og-sets the reduction in water release so production increases. Up-
stream welfare increases in both periods because of water scarcity. The shift
towards Þrst-period water release has positive implications downstream. In
period one, agricultural production and proÞt increase due to a higher irri-
gation input. In period two, the cost of ßooding is reduced (provided that
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it occurs). Figure 3.4 illustrates this scenario where we have assumed con-
stant returns to scale (CRS). An increase in k pivots both MSW -curves
downward and changes the noncooperative equilibrium from A to F .
If, on the other hand, condition (21) is not satisÞed then upstream welfare
increases, while downstream welfare decreases due to lower irrigation input
in period one and increased ßooding in period two. Graphically, this corre-
sponds to a situation where the ex-post equilibrium F is located to the left
of the ex-ante equilibrium A. Under these circumstances, the intervention
exacerbates the conßict of interest. The impact on basinwide welfare de-
pends on whether upstream gains outweigh downstream losses. If basinwide
welfare improves then there is a trade-og between the two policy objectives
of regional stability and social eciency.
If the hydropower plant is operating at a corner solution (and continues
to do so ex-post) then basinwide welfare increases without reducing the ex-
ternality. This is true, irrespective of whether condition (21) is satisÞed.
Upstream welfare increases, cf. Proposition 2, but downstream welfare re-
mains unchanged. This is because an increase in hydropower eciency has
no impact on the water release pattern across the two periods. Figure 3.5
illustrates this situation in the case where the supply constraint binds. The
downward shift in the MSW curves does not agect the equilibrium which
is determined by the resource constraint rather than the intersection of the
MSW curves.
Finally, if the hydropower plant is facing a binding constraint, then there
is the possibility that an increase in k implies a move to the interior solution
ex-post. With a binding supply constraint this must imply a fall in q1,
i.e. the intersection of the MSW curves move to a point to the left of the
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Q1-curve. Conversely, a binding storage constraint ex-ante must imply an
increase in q1 and an intersection to the right of the (Q1  s)-curve. Table
3.1 summarises the results:
Table 3.1 Comparative static results (k % )
Case YSW
u
Yk
YSWd
Yk
YSW
Yk
1. a) IN and (21) or; b) from ST to IN > 0 > 0 > 0
2. a) IN not (21) or; b) from SU to IN > 0 < 0 Q 0
3. Corner solutions (ex-ante and ex-post) > 0 = 0 > 0
Note: IN = interior solution, ST = storage constraint binds,
SU=supply constraint binds.
4.2 Expand downstream reservoir capacity
DOWN beneÞts from its own reservoir, r, in two ways: In period one,
it increases irrigation input by augmenting to upstream releases, qW1. In
period two, it enhances the absorptive capacity thus reducing the potentially
negative impact of ßooding.
Proposition 4 An expansion in downstream reservoir capacity r reduces the
impact of the negative externality and enhances basinwide social welfare.
Proof. From equations (14) and (15) the comparative statics yield:
YZd1
Yr =
Yx(·)
Yr 
Yc1(·)
Yr > 0 and
YZd2
Yr = 
Yc2(·)
Yr  0, thus YSWF
d
Yr =
YZd1
Yr +
YZd2
Yr > 0.
An expansion in r increases Þrst-period agricultural output. The impact
on downstream welfare is positive because water is assumed scarce in the Þrst
period. In the second period, the cost of ßooding (if it occurs) is reduced.
This intervention is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
4.3 Expand upstream reservoir capacity
UP beneÞts from its own reservoir, s, because it expands the production
possibility set. Higher upstream dam capacity changes the production plan
if, and only if, the storage constraint is binding.
107
Proposition 5 If the storage capacity constraint is binding, an expansion of
the upstream reservoir, s, would exacerbate the negative externality.
Proof. If the storage constraint is binding then qW1 = Q1s, qW2 = Q2+s.
We get the following comparative static results:
YqW1
Ys = 
YqW2
Ys = 1.
YSWu1 (qW1)
Yq1 < B
YSWu2 (qW2)
Yq2 ,
YSWu
Ys =
YSWu1 (qW1)
Yq1
YqW1
Ys 
YSWu2 (qW2)
Yq2
YqW2
Ys > 0.
YSWd1
Ys =
YZd1
YqW1
YqW1
Ys < 0 and
YSWd2
Ys =
YZd2
YqW2
YqW2
Ys < 0, YSW
d
Ys < 0.
An increase in upstream reservoir capacity s enables the upstream ripar-
ian to produce more electricity in the second period where the marginal social
welfare is relatively higher. Thus, it releases less water in the Þrst period and
more in the second period. Unfortunately, the change in the operation mode
of the hydropower plant has negative ramiÞcations downstream because it
enhances the negative externality egects of too little water in period one
and too much in period two. Graphically, this intervention would imply a
leftward shift of the (Q1s)curve in Figure 3.2. As mentioned previously,
a trade-og between the policy objectives of regional stability and basinwide
welfare will occur if upstream gains outweigh downstream losses.
5. Evaluation of policy interventions
5.1 Policy ranking
On the basis of the comparative statics derived above we have ascertained
the qualitative implications of three digerent policy interventions. These
policies are ranked below in terms of their ability to reduce the negative
externality. The rank of a particular intervention depends critically on
the characteristics of the upstream riparian. More speciÞcally, whether
the hydropower plant is operating at an interior or a corner solution, and,
whether condition (21) is satisÞed or not.
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Table 3.2 Ranking of policy interventions
Policy intervention YSW u YSW d Externality Welfare
1. UP HP eciency (IN and (21)) > 0 > 0 Reduced Higher
2. DOWN reservoir (IN/ST/SU) = 0 > 0 Reduced Higher
3. UP HP eciency (ST/SU) > 0 = 0 Same Higher
4. UP reservoir (IN/SU) = 0 = 0 Same Same
5. UP reservoir (ST ) > 0 < 0 Increased Uncertain
5. UP HP eciency (IN not (21)) > 0 < 0 Increased Uncertain
Note: IN = interior solution, ST = storage constraint binds, SU=supply
constraint binds. Policy interventions 1 and 6 include the possibilities of moving
from a corner solution to an interior solution, cf. Table 3.1.
An expansion in upstream hydropower eciency is the qualitatively most
attractive policy, but only at the interior solution and provided that the hy-
dropower production function exhibits suciently high returns to scale, i.e.
condition (21) is satisÞed. If this is not the case, then the second best policy
is to expand downstream reservoir capacity. Expansion of upstream storage
capacity is at best inegective, at worst, exacerbates the externality problem.
An intervention in an upstream state by a multilateral development bank
would therefore wisely include a policy conditionality that prevents a uni-
lateral expansion of upstream reservoir capacity without consultation with
co-riparians. We also note that if (21) is not satisÞed and the hydropower
plant is operating at an interior solution then expanded hydropower e-
ciency emerges as the least attractive policy option. Thus, while this inter-
vention guarantees a positive upstream impact, its downstream implications
are uncertain unless accurate and reliable data can be obtained about the
hydropower production function and the electricity demand function. If this
is not possible, a risk-averse policy maker would prefer the safer option of
expanded downstream capacity. Policy conditionality, if egective, may help
reduce risk if the multilateral development bank can credibly persuade the
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upstream hydropower plant to increase Þrst-period water release, possibly in
exchange for part-Þnancing the intervention.
While these observations give policy makers an overview of the merits and
demerits of alternative interventions they are not a shortcut to a detailed cost-
beneÞt analysis. The above ranking necessarily ignores several important
aspects, including economic (e.g. cost of investment), social impact (e.g.
local population displaced by dam construction) and environmental impact
(e.g. soil erosion caused by ßow alterations). Such aspects must obviously
be considered before a Þnal policy decision is made.10
5.2 Direct or indirect intervention?
Our research was also motivated by the question of whether the down-
stream riparian is best assisted by an MDB through upstream or downstream
intervention. In our context, this reduces to a question of whether DOWN
should be assisted indirectly by increasing upstream hydropower eciency,
or directly, through an expansion in downstream reservoir capacity. This
comparison is relevant only at the interior solution, since upstream interven-
tion would otherwise be inegective or counterproductive. Both investments
have the same desirable property of reallocating irrigation water from period
two to period one. Letting ck and cr denote the investment cost of improv-
ing hydropower eciency and constructing a new reservoir, respectively, the
cost-egectiveness of the two investments can be compared. We have the
following result:
10Construction of large dams has become a hugely controversial issue in development
debates because of their adverse environmental and social impact as argued by the grass-
roots organisations. As a consequence, traditional dam Þnancers, such as the World
Bank, typically hesitate to support dam construction these days (see Khagram (2004) for
a discussion).
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Proposition 6 Indirect intervention (hydropower investment at the interior
solution) is more cost-egective than direct intervention (downstream reservoir
expansion) in terms of reducing the negative externality if and only if:
b
ck[
µYf(qW1)
Yq1
f(qW1) B
Yf(qW2)
Yq2
f(qW2)
¶
>
1
cr
(24)
Proof. This result follows directly from the expression:
YqW1
Yk
ck
>
Y(qW1+r)
Yr
cr
.
Where
dqW1
dk has been derived from total digerentiation of (12) and [ < 0 is
the variable deÞned in the proof of Proposition 3 (Equation 22).
The intuition behind this result is most easily derived by considering the
case of constant returns to scale and setting ck = cr. Condition (24) be-
comes Ba23a1
b(1+B) k32 > 1, i.e. indirect intervention is likely to be more attractive
than direct intervention when the digerence between Þrst- and second-period
electricity demand is suciently large.
6. Case study: Syr Darya11
As highlighted in the introduction, the overall aim of this chapter is to
provide an analytical framework within which various intertemporal river
conßicts can be examined. To illustrate the relevance of the framework we
consider here the case of the Syr Darya conßict in Central Asia. This section
uses the theoretical insights developed above to examine the conßict-reducing
impact of a range of infrastructure project currently under way in the Central
Asian region. Before doing so, however, we present a detailed introduction
to the Syr Darya conßict. Apart from aiding the analysis relevant to this
chapter this sub-section is intended to prepare the reader for the analysis in
Chapter 4 which also features the Syr Darya conßict.
11The background information provided in this section draws upon EIU (2004ab), ICG
(2002), IMF (2003), Moller et al. (2005), OHara (1998, 2000ab), SPECA (2004), USDA
(2004) and World Bank (2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e).
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6.1 The Syr Darya conßict: Background
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the newly independent Cen-
tral Asian Republics (CARs) with a dicult transition task and inter-state
relations that have not always been easy. Almost immediately a conßict arose
over the use and allocation of the waters of the Syr Darya river with major
economic and political ramiÞcations for the region. Upstream Kyrgyzstan
operates the huge Toktogul Reservoir to facilitate hydropower production
while the downstream riparians, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, abstract water
from the river to irrigate land dominated by cotton cultivation. The con-
ßict stems from the diametrically opposed seasonal requirements for water
in the digerent countries. Kyrgyzstan has the highest demand for electricity
in the winter months thus generating an incentive to store summer inßows
into Toktogul for release during the winter. In contrast the downstream
countries want water to be released during the summer months so that they
can irrigate their agricultural lands. Thus, the characteristics of the Syr
Darya conßict are quite similar to those outlined in the theoretical model
with the notable digerence that there are two downstream riparians on the
Syr Darya.
Water resources are of critical importance to the Central Asian economies.12
Mountainous Kyrgyzstan has a substantial hydropower potential currently
covering up to 80 percent of its domestic energy needs. Hydropower exports
- through barter trade to other CARs and to Russia in cash - account for
approximately ten percent of total exports with an estimated monetary value
of US$ 46.8 million in 2001. In Uzbekistan, irrigated cotton production is the
12With a GDP of US$ 1.6bn. and a population of 5m, Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest
countries in the region. Uzbekistan is larger and slightly less poor. It has a GDP of US$
9.7bn and a population of 25.3m. Kazakhstan is the most prosperous country in a poor
region. Its GDP is US$ 24.2bn in a population of 14.8m.
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most important economic activity in an agriculturally dominated economy.
The country is the Worlds second largest cotton exporter with a market
share of almost 10 percent.13 Cotton exports totalled US$ 669 million in
2002, equivalent to 26.7 percent of total exports and around 60 percent of
hard-currency export earnings. Finally, although the Syr Darya is of rela-
tively low economic signiÞcance to the oil-dominated Kazakh economy, it is
nevertheless of substantial regional importance. Cotton exports from South-
Kazakhstan (one of the two provinces that the Syr Darya ßows through)
equalled US$ 104.6 million in 2002, or one percent of total Kazakh exports.
Map 3.1. The Syr Darya river
Note: Map not drawn to scale. Source: World Bank (2004a).
The Syr Darya, one of Central Asias most important transboundary
rivers, rises in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan. It has two main tributaries,
the Naryn and the Kara Darya which merge in eastern Uzbekistan to form
13In addition to taking water from the Syr Darya Uzbekistan also uses signiÞcant vol-
umes of irrigation water from the Amu Darya and the Zerefshen Rivers. The Þgures given
in this section are for the country as a whole and not just production in the Syr Darya
Basin.
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the Syr Darya proper. From there the river ßows into Tajikistan14 before re-
entering Uzbekistan and Þnally ßowing in to Kazakhstan where it discharges
into the remnants of the Aral Sea (see map 3.1).15 Its annual discharge varies
from 21 to 54 billion cubic metres (BCM) with a mean of 37 BCM. The ßows
of the Syr Darya and its tributaries are regulated by a series of reservoirs
built during the Soviet period. The most important of these being the huge,
multi-purpose Toktogul Reservoir built in the 1970s on the Naryn River
in Kyrgyzstan. The reservoir which has an active storage capacity of 14.5
BCM was primary used to even out seasonal variations in river ßows thereby
maximising its irrigation potential. Toktogul also produces hydropower.
The digerent water requirements of the upstream and downstream re-
publics has long been problematic.16 During the Soviet period the decision
on when and how much water was to be released from the upstream reservoir
was made by the central planners in Moscow. Toktogul was operated under
an irrigation regime whereby 75 percent of the annual discharge was released
from the reservoir in the summer months (April-September). Releases during
the winter months (October-March) accounting for the remaining 25 percent.
Surplus hydropower generated in the summer was fed into the Central Asian
Power System for use by the Uzbek and southern Kazakh regions. Since the
Kyrgyz region lacked any signiÞcant fossil fuel resources, they were trans-
14Tajikistan plays only a minor, regulatory role on the Syr Darya due to its relatively
low reservoir storage capacity and insigniÞcant irrigation withdrawal rates. For this reason
Tajikistan is not treated explicitly in this analysis.
15The tragedy of the shrinking Aral Sea is a disastrous side eect of intensive irrigation.
This issue is outside the scope of this thesis.
16When Stalin delimited the borders of the CARs in the 1920s and 1930s he deliber-
ately created water-rich and water-poor republics. This ensured that there was always
competition between the upstream and downstream republics. Such competition worked
to Moscows advantage in two ways. First, disputes over water reinforced the national
distinctiveness of the Republics, thus limiting the potential for regional cooperation which
would threaten Soviet control. Secondly, as competition for water increased the Republics
were forced to ask Moscow to intervene; a role it was more than willing to undertake.
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ferred from the Uzbek and Kazakh republics to enable the Kyrgyz region
to meet its winter demand for electricity and heat. After independence, the
Soviet arrangement came under great strain. Fossil fuel prices rose quickly
to world price levels and payments were increasingly demanded in hard cur-
rency. Households switched from expensive fossil fuel Þred heating to electric
heating, thus increasing winter electricity demand. Kyrgyzstan could not af-
ford to import fossil fuels to generate electricity and started to increase winter
discharges of water from Toktogul to meet its winter power demand and re-
duce summer releases to store water for the following winter. As a result,
farmers in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan faced irrigation water shortages in
summer. Furthermore, the frozen waterways and canals were unable to han-
dle the larger volume of water in winter, occasionally causing ßooding on
downstream territories.
In the absence of a central planner to solve this conßict, the newly in-
dependent CARs were forced to seek voluntary cooperative agreements. In
February 1992 they signed the Almaty Agreement whereby the CARs agreed
to the joint ownership and management of the regions water resources, while
retaining sovereign control over crops and electric power obtained from them.
The agreement further reiterated the need for cooperation. But this, as well
as annual agreements for the release of water and exchange of electricity and
fossil fuels, proved inegective and could not arrest the increasing orientation
towards power production of the Toktogul operation. Eventually in March
1998, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan entered into a Long Term
Framework Agreement which explicitly recognised that annual and multi-
year irrigation water storage has a cost and that it needs to be compensated,
either through a barter exchange of electricity and fossil fuels or in cash.
However, the supply of fossil fuels generally fell short of agreed quantities
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and quality, forcing Kyrgyzstan to increase winter discharges. In wet years
downstream states did not need the agreed volumes of summer discharges
and this agected the export of electricity and the compensating quantities of
fossil fuel transfers to Kyrgyzstan. The latter was thus exposed to a serious
risk in meeting its winter demand for heating and power. To reduce this risk,
Kyrgyzstan, on average, reduced summer releases to 45 percent of the annual
discharges (and winter releases increased to 55 percent) during the 1990s.
Third-party agencies have been actively involved in resolving the conßict.
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) played a critical role
in brokering the 1998 Framework Agreement, for instance. The multilateral
development banks (the World Bank in particular, and, to a lesser extent,
the Asian Development Bank) have also been involved. Their contributions
have tended to focus on facilitating political and technical dialogue between
riparians with the ultimate purpose of brokering a regional agreement which
maximises Syr Darya net beneÞts. In recent years, the prospects of reaching
a regional agreement have diminished considerably as the co-riparians failed
to conclude barter agreements for 2003 and 2004.17 Increasingly disillusioned
by these developments, the World Bank (2004b) recently revised its approach
away from encouraging multi-country consensus and contractual agreements
towards national interventions with the objective of promoting intra-state
cooperation. This change of strategy clearly increases the relevance of the
type of interventions analysed in this chapter. Below we discuss a range of
infrastructure projects currently under preparation (or construction) in the
region and comment on their potential impact on the river conßict.
17The reasons for this failure are discussed in chapter 5.
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6.2 The role of infrastructure projects
The Kyrgyz government, in an attempt to ensure energy self-suciency,
is actively pursing the construction of two new hydropower plants on the
Naryn cascade above the Toktogul reservoir (Kambarata I and II) that will
have a combined capacity of 2,260 MW. The qualitative implications of this
project, which could be completed by 2020, are broadly similar to those of
increasing k in the model although it also ogers the potential of electricity
exports beyond the Central Asian region. The estimated cost of construction
of US$ 2.3 billion, or approximately one and a half times the Kyrgyz GDP,
implies that a co-Þnancing scheme is essential. The World Bank would be
an ideal facilitator and contributor to such a scheme, but it argues that the
economic cost of 0.0717 US$/kwh is too high. Interestingly, downstream
Kazakhstan, which is considerably richer than its co-riparians, has ogered
to invest in the Kambarata projects. Given the high cost of investment,
this oger is likely to have been driven primarily by an intention to project a
positive international image in the region (see LeMarquand, 1977). In re-
turn for this investment, the Kyrgyz authorities would have to allow Kazakh
representatives to sit on the board of the Toktogul hydroelectric plant con-
trolling downstream releases (EIU, 2004a).18 Kyrgyz ocials have so far
rejected the proposal, possibly because they do not wish to surrender their
sovereign right to control the water and because Toktogul represents the
only source of regional inßuence of the Kyrgyz Republic. On the basis of
the results developed in this chapter, however, it could be argued that it
makes good sense for Kazakhstan to demand political inßuence in exchange
for co-Þnancing. While the Kyrgyz Republic stands to beneÞt from this
investment, Kazakhstan (and Uzbekistan) would beneÞt only if the Kyrgyz
18Such an arrangement is not uncommon. To illustrate, Egyptian ocials are also
represented at the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda (Waterbury, 2002).
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Republic releases more water during summer and less during winter. As the
theoretical analysis has demonstrated, an upstream riparian may only under
certain conditions voluntarily choose to alter the release pattern in this man-
ner. Recall that a positive downstream impact requires that two conditions
are fulÞlled: First, that the hydropower plant operates at an interior solution
and secondly, that the hydropower production function exhibits suciently
high returns to scale. Unless this is the case, the co-Þnancer must impose
additional policy conditionality to make a positive downstream impact more
likely.
An alternative project which aims to increase winter power generation in
the Kyrgyz Republic involves the completion of a 400 MW thermal power
plant, Bishkek II, by 2007. At a cost of US$ 200 million or 0.0255 US$/kwh,
this project has better prospects of attracting external Þnancial support,
notably from the World Bank. A major drawback, however, is the in-
creased Kyrgyz dependency on Uzbek natural gas. The Kyrgyz government
is therefore hesitating to pursue this investment essentially because the re-
lations between the two countries are strained, as a result of disputes over
water and international borders. An increase in second-period electricity
supply cannot be analysed explicitly in the model without further modiÞca-
tions. However, its implications for the negative externality are similar to
that of a reduction in second-period hydropower demand, represented by the
variable a2.
19 Graphically speaking, an decrease in a2 implies a downward
shift in the SW2 curve. By totally digerentiating (12) and re-arranging we
get dqW1
da2
= b[B
Yf(qW2)
Yq1 > 0 at the interior solution, i.e. the negative externality
would be reduced. If the hydropower plant is operating at a corner solution
19This comparative static, however, does not adequately reßect the impact on upstream,
and hence, basinwide social welfare.
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then a decrease in a2 has no impact on q
W
1, unless if the supply constraint be-
comes non-binding in which case qW1 increases. Since the Toktogul reservoir
generally operates at an interior solution, although the storage constraint is
occasionally binding, the construction of Bishkek II has good prospects of
promoting regional stability.
With respect to reservoir construction, a number of interesting and im-
portant developments have taken place in recent years. Most importantly,
Uzbekistan has intensiÞed egorts to increase its downstream water-regulating
reservoir capacity which could provide additional storage of about 2.5 billion
BCM of water downstream. As demonstrated in the model, this could absorb
the equivalent additional release from Toktogul in winter and subsequently
release the same quantity of water again in summer for downstream irrigation.
These projects are self-Þnanced, although the Uzbek government did apply
for Þnancial assistance from USAID and the US Department of Agriculture
(USDA). This application was later withdrawn, however, because the Uzbek
government did not agree to conduct an environmental impact assessment.20
Finally, the Kazakh government is also contemplating the construction of a
reservoir (Koksarai) west of Shymkent. This reservoir would cost US$ 200
million and have an active storage capacity of 3 BCM. The proposed incre-
ment to the combined active storage capacity of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
may, according to some observers, be sucient to eliminate the seasonal
conßict.21 Whether this would indeed be the case depends partly on the
behavioural response of the co-riparians - an issue we take up in Chapter 4.
A complete ranking of the four infrastructure projects discussed above,
akin to that presented in section 5.1, would be beyond the scope of this
20Personal communication, Mr Ken McNamara, USAID, Almaty 14/12/04.
21Personal communication, Mr Leonid Dmitriev, Kazgiprovodhoz, Almaty 15/12/04.
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chapter. Nevertheless, in conclusion, we do make a few partially comparative
remarks. Based on the information available, the construction of the Bishkek
II thermal power plant does emerge as one of the most attractive investments
due its relatively low costs and good prospects for reducing the externality.
Given their high relative cost, the Kambarata projects appear less attractive
than the theoretical analysis would suggest, even if the Kyrgyz government
should agree to surrender absolute political control over Toktogul. The
merits of constructing downstream reservoirs, the Uzbek ones in particular,
are analysed in-depth in the subsequent chapter.
7. Conclusion
In this chapter we have analysed the potential conßict of interest embod-
ied in upstream hydropower use and downstream irrigation use on a trans-
boundary river. More speciÞcally, we addressed the question of whether
there is a role for multilateral development banks in reducing regional tension
and improving basinwide social welfare. We identiÞed two Pareto-improving
policy interventions, both of which have the beneÞcial egect of reducing the
unidirectional, negative externality caused by upstream regulation of the nat-
ural river ßow. Investment in upstream hydropower eciency is one such
intervention, but it requires that the MDB (or any other co-Þnancier) can
credibly enforce policy conditionality. This is necessary, because the up-
stream riparian may face incentives which could undermine the positive im-
pact on the downstream riparian. The MDB should reach an agreement with
the upstream riparian about the amount by which Þrst-period release must
increase, although care should be taken not to demand too large increases in
Þrst-period release since otherwise the project might reduce upstream wel-
fare. In addition, in exchange for co-Þnancing, the upstream riparian must
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also agree not to expand its reservoir capacity since this increases the negative
externality. The second type of intervention, expansion of the downstream
reservoir capacity, involves less risk. This reduces the need for conditionality,
but brings beneÞts only to the downstream riparian. The chapter also ar-
gued that the presence of a unidirectional externality presents policy options
which could potentially be attractive. More speciÞcally, we established the
conditions under which an MDB could more egectively assist a downstream
client through upstream intervention. Similar options are available on other
transboundary rivers and should be explored further.
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Figure 3.1 Noncooperative equilibrium
a) Upstream hydropower production - marginal social welfare
(interior solution)
MSW2MSW1
b) Downstream agricultural production - marginal profit
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Figure 3.2 Noncooperative equilibrium
a) Upstream hydropower production - marginal social welfare
(storage constraint binding)
MSW2MSW1
b) Downstream agricultural production - marginal profit
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Figure 3.3 Noncooperative equilibrium
a) Upstream hydropower production - marginal social welfare
(supply constraint binding)
MSW2
MSW1
b) Downstream agricultural production - marginal profit
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b) Downstream agricultural production - marginal profit
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Figure 3.4 Expanded hydropower efficiency (interior solution and CRS)
a) Upstream hydropower production - marginal social welfare
Q -s1 Q1
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Figure 3.5 Expanded hydropower efficiency
a) Upstream hydropower production - marginal social welfare
(supply constraint binding)
MSW2
MSW1
b) Downstream agricultural production - marginal profit
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Figure 3.6 Expanded downstream reservoir capacity
a) Upstream hydropower production - marginal social welfare
MSW2MSW1
b) Downstream agricultural production - marginal profit
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Appendix E. Central Asia Þeld trip
Chapters 3 and 4 were informed by a Þeld trip to the Central Asian Re-
publics of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan conducted on 4-17 December 2004.
In addition to the author of this thesis, the study team consisted of Lecturer
Klaus Abbink (School of Economics) and Professor Sarah OHara (School of
Geography)1. The trip was generously funded by the Asia Fund of the Uni-
versity of Nottingham. Its objective of was twofold: 1) To collect primary
data otherwise inaccessible outside the region; 2) To assess the preferences
and motivation of policy makers in the region. To meet these objectives we
conducted semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, including gov-
ernment representatives, development partners and academia (see Table E.1
for a list). The preparation for this trip was complicated by the fact that
we did not have any professional or personal contacts in the countries we in-
tended to visit. This made it dicult and cumbersome to secure entry visas.
A planned visit to Uzbekistan was cancelled for this reason. In preparation
we drew up a list of potential interviewees on the basis of reports and other
material available on the internet and secured appointments via email and
telephone. Fortunately, the trip itself went a lot smoother than its prepara-
tion. We successfully arranged and completed 16 interviews, most of which
proved highly valuable. In terms of tangible outputs we obtained the fol-
lowing essential background information: a) The World Bank (2004a) Water
and Energy Nexus Report; b) Flow data at the Toktogul reservoir compiled
by JSC Kyrgyzenergo, and; c) Background notes detailing the progress of
Uzbek reservoir construction. The most substantial intangible outcome of
1Unfortunately Sarah OHara was unable to participate in the trip.
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the visit was the way in which the research objectives changed in light of our
consultation with stakeholders. The original objective was to examine the
egects of climatic change (and thus changes in water availability) on ripar-
ian cooperation. However, during our visit we were made aware of a more
interesting development in the region, namely the construction of reservoirs
in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Since our ability to inßuence current policy
debates in the region was an important objective of the research we decided
to change our focus in this direction.
Table E.1.a List of stakeholders met in Bishkek
Date Name Position Organisation
6/12 Natalia Operations Ocer, World Bank
Charkova Infrastructure/Energy.
6/12 Peter Project Manager Tarig Policy and
Graham Utility Reform
Project (DFID)
7/12 Bakyt National Program Swiss Development
Makhmutov Ocer Cooperation
7/12 Dyushen Director, Institute for Kyrgyz Academy of
Mamatkanov Water Problems and Science
Hydroelectric Power
7/12 Alexi Engineer JSC Kyrgyzenergo
Zyryanov
7/12 Zharas Programme Ocer, United Nations
Takanov Environment Development
Program
8/12 Kydykbek First Deputy Water Economy Dept.
Beishekeev General Director Ministry of Agriculture
and Water
8/12 Akylbek Vice Director, State Energy Agency
Tumenbaev Executive Member
8/12 Cholpen Regional Cooperation Asian Development
Mambetova Specialist Bank
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Table D.1.b List of stakeholders met in Almaty
Date Name Position Organisation
12/12 Tim Hannan TA United Nations
Development
Program
14/12 Paul Shaminder TA Asian Development
Bank
13/12 Simon Kenny Regional Program World Bank
Co-ordinator
15/12 Igor Steinberger Engineer - Kazgiprovodhoz
hydrologist
15/12 Leonid Dmitriev Chairman Kazgiprovodhoz
15/12 Aliya Satubaldina Project Manager European Union
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Chapter 4. The Syr Darya River Conßict
- An Experimental Case Study1
In the previous chapter we adopted a noncooperative approach to hydro-
power-irrigation conßicts in general, and to the Syr Darya conßict in particu-
lar. We argued that the failure of riparians to conclude barter agreements in
recent years has increased the relevance of externality-reducing interventions
in what is presently a noncooperative environment. To some extent, this
approach rests on the assumption that the barter agreement system which
emerged in the 1990s has ultimately failed and that riparians will not seek to
cooperate over water and energy in the future. While this assessment may
well reßect current sentiments among riparian governments and international
agencies it is also necessarily a short-sighted and static view. In compar-
ison, this chapter is based on the premise that the policies and approaches
of regional stakeholders may, for various reasons, change in the future. A
cooperative approach is adopted in which the Syr Darya conßict is framed
as a trust game. We examine whether cooperative outcomes emerge in a
laboratory experiment with pay-og schemes derived from real data from the
region. The aim of this exercise is to gain insights about the possible impact
of Uzbek reservoir construction on cooperative behaviour on the Syr Darya.
1The analysis contained in this chapter draws upon a paper co-written with Klaus
Abbink and Sarah OHara. The chapter builds on information presented in the case
study analysis of chapter 3 (section 6). The reader is therefore advised to consult this
text Þrst.
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1. Introduction
The failure of the Central Asian republics to conclude annual agreements
in 2003 and 2004 can to some extent be attributed to above-average pre-
cipitation in those years.2 More fundamentally, however, the collapse of the
barter agreement system was due to a change in the Uzbek position towards
a decisive unilateral stance. The most explicit expression hereof has been
the decision to construct a series of re-regulating reservoirs. Uzbekistan
is currently proceeding with the design of new water storage capacity of
the Karamansay reservoir (0.69 BCM), as well as constructing the Razaksay
(0.65-0.75 BCM) and Kangkulsay (0.3 BCM) reservoirs. These facilities to-
gether with the natural reservoir in the Arnasai depression (0.8 BCM) will
provide additional storage of about 2.5 BCM.3
The impact of the Uzbek decision has been substantial for Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan. The Kyrgyz challenge is that even when the reservoirs
are operated in the noncooperative power mode, hydropower production is
insucient to cover domestic winter electricity demand. In the absence
of a regional agreement, the Kyrgyz government must aim to cover this
deÞcit through a combination of domestic reforms and construction of new
power-generating facilities - both of which represent daunting challenges.
Kazakhstan, which had otherwise pursued a cooperative strategy towards
2Recall from chapter 3 that wet years reduce the downstream countries need for water
released from Toktogul and thus aects their willingness to compensate Kyrgyzstan for its
additional discharge.
3Recognising the strategic importance of these reservoirs, the Uzbek government gave
little away about its intentions and actions to co-riparians and donors. To illustrate, the
World Bank only learnt about these reservoirs when representatives from a visiting, albeit
unrelated, mission were taken to one of the construction sites. (Personal communication
with Simon Kenny, World Bank, Almaty, 13 December 2004).
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Kyrgyzstan, has had to come to terms with the fact that this strategy ulti-
mately depended on Uzbek willingness to cooperate. Since the latter was
not forthcoming, Kazakhstan has shown renewed interest in the construction
of re-regulating reservoirs on its own territory. As mentioned in Chapter 3,
plans exist for constructing a 3 BCM reservoir (Koksarai) near Shymkent at
a cost of US$ 200 million, although no Þnal political decision has been made
to initiate construction.
To what extent do the new Uzbek reservoirs represent the long-awaited
solution to the conßict? Several issues need to be addressed to answer this
question. First, the fact that the cooperation record has been poor so far
does not imply that this will be the case in the future. The March 2005 rev-
olution in Kyrgyzstan and the forthcoming retirement of senior government
ocials in all the riparian states bring new players to the negotiation table.4
It is possible that new players will act digerently, making expensive reservoir
construction obsolete. So the question arises whether the previous failure of
cooperation is systematic or idiosyncratic. In other words, has cooperation
failed because this is inherent to the problem, or because the decision makers
in charge have been incapable of working together? Secondly, the capacity
of the proposed new reservoirs is limited. While they mitigate the costs of
uncoordinated behaviour, they do not eliminate the need for cooperation to
maximise basinwide eciency. If incentives to cooperate get even worse, not
much may be gained.
The aim of this chapter is to address these questions. We designed a
4Many of the most senior ocials in the water sector are near or have passed the ocial
age of retirement.
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model that estimates the economic impact of the new reservoirs on the ri-
parian economies. In doing so we had to tackle two diculties. First, the
model needed to trace the real economic situation as accurately as possi-
ble, despite notoriously limited data availability. We collated data from a
variety of sources and from a series of interviews with experts on location
- government ocials and representatives of donor agencies - to make esti-
mates as informed as possible. Secondly, costs and beneÞts from the new
reservoirs crucially depend on the ability of decision makers to cooperate,
which is a behavioural issue. To examine this, we introduce a novel ap-
proach to the analysis of transboundary river conßicts. We used a model
estimated from real data and designed a game that resembles the strategic
environment in the Syr Darya river conßict. Controlled laboratory exper-
iments were then conducted to study the likelihood of future cooperation.
We re-create an analogous, although stylised, set of conditions where we
can analyse the strategic environment of the Syr Darya conßict in digerent
future scenarios. In two separate treatments, we simulate the economic sce-
nario with and without the new Uzbek reservoirs under three representative
hydrological regimes.
We Þnd that Uzbek reservoirs do not represent the solution to the river
conßict. Maximisation of basinwide eciency continues to require ripar-
ian cooperation. Though they alleviate Uzbekistans problems in low-water
years the reservoirs are not suciently large to achieve Uzbek self-suciency
in irrigation water. Moreover, the experimental results reveal that cooper-
ation is indeed very hard to establish in the present strategic environment,
especially in low-water years. Thus failure to cooperate should not solely
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be attributed to the unwillingness or incapability of current decision makers.
Finally, we Þnd that reservoirs improve the likelihood of cooperation only
marginally.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 brießy
reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 develops the model and its estima-
tion. Section 4 describes the experimental design. Section 5 presents the
experimental results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
Arguably, the central problem for the interstate agreements has been one
of trust. Short of military action there are no means to enforce a contract
between sovereign republics who are generally suspicious of each other. If
Kyrgyzstan discharges additional water in summer, it must trust the down-
stream riparians to deliver fossil fuels in winter, otherwise it will face a severe
problem of not being able to meet its energy demand in the subsequent win-
ter. Hence, it incurs a temporary loss and relies on compensation from the
downstream neighbours - without being able to enforce the reward. Uzbek-
istan and Kazakhstan, on the other hand, are less inclined to pass fossil fuels
to Kyrgyzstan if they fear that the latter will deviate from the agreement by
releasing large volumes of water in winter. The Syr Darya conßict there-
fore has the nature of a trust game, reminiscent of those that have been
extensively studied in the experimental economics literature (e.g. Fehr et al.
(1993), Berg et al. (1995), Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Abbink et al.
(2000), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Ga¨chter and Falk (2002)).5
5Irlenbusch (2005a, 2005b) reports results from a slightly more complex game, but with
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In trust (or reciprocity) games a Þrst mover can send money to a second
mover, who in turn can voluntarily reward the trustor by sending money
back. The games are constructed such that by doing so, both players would
be better og with respect to Þnal payogs, but in equilibrium no trust and
no rewarding would be exhibited. Contrary to the theoretical prediction,
the common Þnding of these studies is that Þrst movers often show trust
by passing money, and second movers often reward them by sending money
back, even if the game is played only once and under completely anonymous
conditions. In light of these Þndings the poor record of cooperation in the
Central Asian river conßict looks surprising. However, the games in the
literature use artiÞcial payog structures which diger from those underlying
the Syr Darya river game, and involve only two players.6
The literature reviewed in Chapter 3 remains relevant for the analysis
presented here, including our own contribution. In Chapter 3 we adopted a
noncooperative analysis of the Syr Darya conßict by examining the conßict-
reducing impact of a range of infrastructure projects. Construction of down-
stream reservoirs was found to reduce conßict by reducing the impact of the
negative externality caused by upstream regulation of the natural river ßow.
Basinwide welfare increases directly as a consequence of the increase in down-
stream welfare. In comparison, the World Bank (2004a) takes a cooperative
approach to the Syr Darya conßict by examining how side payments can
be used to attain ecient outcomes. It demonstrates that net Syr Darya
the non-binding contracts that characterise the situation on the Syr Darya.
6With the notable exception of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) the standard assump-
tion in the literature is that the amount sent by the Þrst mover is trippled by the experi-
menter and handed to the second-mover.
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basin beneÞts are substantially higher when the Toktogul reservoir is oper-
ated in an irrigation mode than under the power mode. Developed before
the collapse of the barter agreements, the report recommends a number of
ways in which the existing regional cooperation mechanisms could be im-
proved. These include inter alia proposals to use multi-year rather than
annual agreements, a letter of credit-scheme, and, the introduction of a
monitoring and guarantee mechanism to ensure compliance with agreed obli-
gations. Reception of these proposals by riparian governments, however,
was largely negative (see World Bank 2004b for details).
Building on the work contained in World Bank (2004a) this chapter also
explores the scope for cooperation in the Syr Darya conßict. Using similar as-
sumptions about key economic variables we develop a more general economic
model which is then used for laboratory experiments.7 The major digerence
between our model and that in World Bank (2004a) is threefold: The Þrst
relates to digerent assumptions about water availability. We assume an aver-
age annual water outßow of around 13 BCM compared to 9 BCM used in the
World Bank report. The latter Þgure has been discredited (and World Bank
(2004b) concedes) because it is based on a non-homogenous data set for the
1911-2000 period compiled by BVO Syr Darya (a basinwide agency located
in Tashkent) which under-records inßow since 1975. Secondly, the Bank
report compares two digerent water allocations (irrigation and power mode)
while we generalise the analysis by considering a continuum of allocations
7Experiments on games informed by real-world data are surprisingly rare. Some have
been carried out in the course of consulting projects for spectrum auctions, but their
results are often not published due to conÞdentiality concerns of the clients (an exception
is Abbink et al. (2002)). In a dierent context, Gu¨th et al. (2003) parameterise a
bargaining game with data from a case study on the Þlm industry.
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within the historically relevant range. Thirdly, and as a consequence, we
have introduced a range of capacity constraints to provide a realistic treat-
ment of extreme scenarios. The subsequent section develops the model and
estimates its parameters.
3. The Model
Before formulating the economic model we had to make some choices.
First, since Uzbek reservoirs are at an advanced stage of construction we
decided mainly to focus on these in the experiment, and not to include the
Kazakh reservoirs because the government has not yet approved their con-
struction. Further, we neglect the impact of winter ßooding, though this is
a much-discussed concern of the Uzbek and Kazakh governments. Reliable
estimates of the damages of ßooding proved impossible to obtain, but there
are some indications that the economic costs of ßooding are relatively small.
The most substantial damage seems to be political, since ßooding is a very
visible event likely to stir public anger.
3.1 Payog Functions
Kyrgyzstan
Electricity output in the summer season of year t, Y st MWh, is given by
the hydropower production function (for ease of notation we suppress the
time variable t from this point onwards):
Y s = kqsky (1)
where k > 0 is a productivity parameter and qsky BCM is the Kyrgyz water
release from the Toktogul Reservoir in the summer season. Kyrgyzstan must
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cover a domestic energy demand of Es MWh in summer.8 Due to technical
losses, the gross power generation necessary to cover this demand is given by
Es
Ds MWh, where Ds 5 [0; 1] is an eciency parameter. The Kyrgyz domestic
energy deÞcit in the summer season, Ds MWh, is deÞned as follows:
Ds =
Es
Ds  kq
s
ky (2)
To cover this deÞcit Kyrgyzstan operates its thermal power plant, Bishkek I,
fuelled by imported natural gas and coal. Bishkek I has a short-run marginal
cost of CI US$/kWh and an operating capacity of K MWh. If the domestic
energy deÞcit is larger than the capacity of Bishkek I, a second thermal power
plant, Bishkek II, is operated. It has a short-run marginal cost of CII > CI
and an assumed unlimited capacity within the relevant range of the model.
Conversely, in the case of a domestic energy surplus, Kyrgyz electricity is
exported to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Electricity payments are not mod-
elled explicitly, but may implicitly constitute a part of the side payments
between countries. The Kyrgyz gross payog during summer (excluding side
payments), measured in million US$, is given as follows:
Zsky = MAX{CIDs, 0} for Ds  K (3)
Zsky = CIK  CII(Ds K) for Ds > K
In winter, hydropower is produced using the same constant-returns-to-
scale technology as expressed in (1). Denoting all seasonal variables by
8The speciÞcation of a constant electricity demand diers from the model in chapter
3 where demand was a function of the electricity price. In this chapter we assume that
the Kyrgyz government is bend on covering a Þxed electricity demand to avoid political
protests during winter.
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superscript w, the Kyrgyz domestic energy deÞcit in winter is given by:
Dw =
Ew
Dw  kq
w
ky (4)
A domestic energy deÞcit is covered by the Bishkek I and II thermal power
plants in the same manner as in the summer period. In case of a domestic
energy surplus, Kyrgyzstan is assumed to have no export markets in the
winter period.9 The Kyrgyz gross winter payog is written:
Zwky = MAX{CIDw, 0} for Dw  K (5)
Zwky = CIK  CII(Dw K) for Dw > K
Denoting the side payment received by Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan for its
water and electricity services by Sky the Kyrgyz total payog (in million US$)
is:10
Zky = Iky + Zsky + Zwky + Sky (6)
The intercept of the payog function, Iky, is not speciÞed and can be chosen
arbitrarily, since our economic analysis only aims at comparing payogs in
digerent scenarios.11 If it is omitted, then a zero Kyrgyz payog corresponds
to a situation in which the domestic energy deÞcit is non-negative in both
seasons.
9Since Kyrgyz winter electricity exports are associated with additional water releases
in winter, downstream countries would eectively be importing a negative externality in
addition to electricity if winter exports were allowed in the model.
10In the model, Kazakhstan does not issue a side payment directly to Kyrgyzstan (as it
does in reality), but rather to Uzbekistan. This is done to ensure that Uzbekistan has an
incentive to release water to Kazakhstan. In reality, the Uzbek incentive to release water
to Kazakhstan is mainly political, i.e. Uzbekistan does not want to upset international
relations with its downstream neighbour.
11In the experiment, the intercept values of all three payo functions were set at an
appropriate level (see section 4.2 for details).
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Uzbekistan
Uzbek payog relates only to the summer period and can be divided into
two components: irrigation and electricity. Uzbek irrigation supply for
cotton production is available from two main sources: summer water released
by Kyrgyzstan, qsky, and water available in the new Uzbek reservoirs, R,
which are Þlled in the winter period where R < qwky. Uzbekistan releases
some of this water to Kazakhstan, quz  qsky+R, and withdraws the residual,
qsky +R quz, for cotton production. Of its total water withdrawals, only a
share 0  quz  1 is used for cotton irrigation with the residual 1quz used
for other crops, the production of which is assumed non-proÞtable.12 The
economic value of irrigation water for cotton production is P US$/KCM.
While we have not explicitly modelled an agricultural production function,
it would be unrealistic to expect that marginal beneÞts are always positive,
especially for high levels of water input. It is therefore assumed that if
irrigation input reaches an optimum point, Ouz, then the marginal value of
irrigation water is zero.13 Uzbek gross irrigation beneÞts (in million US$)
are thus written:
PquzMIN{(qsky +R) quz, Ouz} (7)
We now turn to the Uzbek electricity beneÞts. Suppose that Kyrgyzstan
12This simplifying assumption implies that agricultural beneÞts of irrigation are limited
to the cotton sector. World Bank (2004a) employs a similar assumption.
13Clearly this represents a substantial simpliÞcation of a more realistic cotton production
function with diminishing returns to scale (and possibly a negative marginal product).
The practical signiÞcance of this for the experimental results, however, seems neglible. A
considerable amount of time was devoted to estimating representative production functions
on the basis of available data. The implied economic value of water of these calculations
(22-177 US$/m3 or 57-146 US$/m3 depending on the approach), however, was much higher
than the price quoted in the World Bank report (20-50 US$/m3) (see chapter 5 section 4
for details). The estimations were not considered suciently reliable and therefore not
used in the analysis.
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runs a domestic energy surplus in summer and that a share of this surplus
is exported to Uzbekistan. In this case Uzbekistan can import electricity at
a lower cost than were it to produce this electricity domestically. The gross
beneÞt of electricity imports is valued at the opportunity cost of operating a
coal Þred power plant in Uzbekistan, the short-run marginal cost of which is
Cuz US$/kWh. After accounting for the technical loss of transmitting elec-
tricity through the Uzbek power grid, electricity available for import equals
4Ds, where 0  4  1 is an eciency parameter. Due to technical con-
straints in the transmission grid, electricity exports cannot exceed X MWh.
The exported electricity is shared between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. De-
noting Uzbekistans share by 0    1, its electricity beneÞts are:
MAX{Cuz4MIN{Ds,X}, 0} (8)
Denoting the side payment from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan by Suz, we can
write the Uzbek payog as follows:
Zuz = Iuz + PquzMIN{(qsky +R) quz, Ouz} (9)
+MAX{Cuz4MIN{Ds,X}, 0}+ Suz  Sky
As with the Kyrgyz payog function the intercept does not have any mean-
ingful interpretation. If intercept and side payments are omitted and there
are no reservoirs (R = 0) and then a zero payog corresponds to a situation
in which Kyrgyzstan releases no water at all in summer.
Kazakhstan
Like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan also beneÞts from irrigation and electricity
in the summer period. The Kazakh payog-function is similar to that of
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Uzbekistan and is given by the following expression (where Kazakh variables
are denoted with subscript ka):
Zka = Ika + PqkaMIN{quz, Oka} (10)
+MAX{Cka(1 )4MIN{Ds, X}, 0} Suz
where Ika is the unspeciÞed intercept of the Kazakh payog function.
3.2 Estimating the model
Having deÞned the payog functions of the three riparians the next step
is to use real data to estimate the model. Analytically, this procedure
is straightforward since it simply involves the use of numerical values for
all exogenous variables and parameters. In practical terms, however, the
compilation and selection of relevant data constituted a signiÞcant challenge.
Water availability is a key determinant of riparian payog. We use primary
data collected by JSC Kyrgyzenergo for the 1988-2003 period (see Appendix
F, Table F.1). Water inßow is a stochastic variable determined by nature
while water outßow is a reßection of political decisions made by Kyrgyzstan.
The presence of what is, in egect, two stochastic variables (summer and
winter inßows) adds complications to the experimental design. We thus
make the simplifying assumption that Kyrgyz winter release is residually
determined, qwky = Qqsky where Q denotes annual inßow. This is equivalent
to assuming that annual inßow equals annual outßow.14 While this is true
in the medium to long term it is a restrictive assumption on an annual basis.
Thus while in practice the Toktogul Reservoir is large enough to enable multi-
annual regulation, our analysis focuses exclusively on the seasonal conßict.
14Ambec and Doucet (2003) make a similar assumption.
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Table F.2 (Appendix F) summarises the assumed values of the remain-
ing exogenous variables and parameters. A few assumptions deserve special
mention: First, we have set the economic value of irrigation water at US$
20/KCM (1,000 cubic meters). According to the World Bank (2004a), the
value of irrigation in Central Asia is estimated as being in the region of $20-
$50 per KCM. To produce conservative beneÞt estimates we choose the lower
bound of this estimate. Secondly, optimal irrigation input was calculated on
the basis of total land under cotton in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, including
additional land introduced in the medium term. Our results are consistent
with those provided by Antipova et al. (2002) who estimate a total down-
stream irrigation need of 6.5 BCM. Thirdly, to capture the egect of increased
marginal cost of thermal power production beyond the capacity of Bishkek I,
we used cost Þgures for Bishkek II. The Bishkek II plant, however, currently
exists only at the design stage and although it could be completed by 2007
the Kyrgyz government is yet to approve its construction.
3.3 Properties of the model
The payog functions of the three riparians in equations (6), (9) and (10)
can be expressed as cost and beneÞt functions if the intercepts and side
payments are omitted. The costs of cooperating are borne entirely by Kyr-
gyzstan and are deÞned as:
C(qsky, Q)  Zky(qsky, Q) (11)
The beneÞts of cooperation accrue jointly to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan:
B(qsky)  Zuz(qsky) + Zka(qsky) (12)
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This reformulation of the model turns out to be quite useful in illustrating
its properties. In the following we use Q = 13 as a benchmark and as-
sume, for illustrative purposes, that water is shared equally between the two
downstream riparians, i.e. quz =
qs
ky
2
.15
Figure 4.1 Marginal costs (MC) and marginal beneÞts (MB), Q= 13 .
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the marginal costs and beneÞts as a function of qsky.
Marginal costs and beneÞts are constant, piecewise linear and each schedule
has Þve steps. Consider Þrst each of these steps on the marginal beneÞt
curve starting from the left: (1) For low values of qsky, downstream marginal
beneÞts are limited to cotton irrigation. (2) Marginal beneÞts increase for
higher values of qsky as the associated Kyrgyz energy surplus enables import of
15This assumption (also used in World Bank (2004a)) does not aect the properties
of the model in any signiÞcant way. It merely aects the size of total beneÞts and the
distribution of those beneÞts between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Equal water sharing
produces conservative beneÞt estimates because the potential for downstream optimisation
is not neccessarily exploited. Note that the variable quz is endogenous in the experiment.
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cheaper summer electricity by downstream countries. (3) Marginal beneÞts
then fall slightly as Kazakh irrigation demands are saturated. (4) They
fall substantially when the capacity constraint of electricity exports becomes
binding. (5) Marginal beneÞts eventually reach zero as Uzbekistan receives
sucient irrigation water.
Marginal costs are determined by summer as well as winter egects. Low
values of qsky are associated with a domestic energy deÞcit in summer (and a
surplus in winter) while the reverse is the case for high values of qsky. The
Þve steps on the marginal cost curve are characterised as follows: (1) For
low qsky-values, Kyrgyzstan operates both thermal power plants in summer
(Bishkek I and II). Each additional water unit qsky released reduces the cost
of operating these plants, thus marginal costs are negative (i.e. Kyrgyzstan
incurs a marginal beneÞt). (2) As qsky increases Kyrgyzstan only requires
to operate Bishkek I and marginal costs increase, but remain negative. (3)
Marginal costs equal zero when the primary energy balance is non-negative
in both seasons. (4) For higher levels of qsky marginal costs (of operating
Bishkek I) become positive since a high summer release causes a winter energy
deÞcit. (5) Marginal costs peak when Bishkek II also needs to be operated
in winter. Finally, we note that net beneÞts of cooperation are maximised at
the intersection between the marginal cost and marginal beneÞt schedules.
The properties of the theoretical model depend critically on the two treat-
ment variables: water inßow (Q) and Uzbek reservoirs (R). Consider Þrst
model sensitivity to changes in Q within the historically relevant interval:
[10; 16]. A change in Q agects the cost function but not the beneÞt function,
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cf. equations (11) and (12). The noncooperative equilibrium is non-unique
and thus deÞned as an interval of qsky-values (Table 4.1 refers). The start
interval is always qsky = 3.3 because this value is sucient to eliminate the
domestic energy deÞcit in summer. The end interval - which is increasing
in Q - is determined by the point where Kyrgyzstan incurs a domestic en-
ergy deÞcit in winter. The cooperative optimum is typically unique and
increasing in Q because higher overall water availability reduces the Kyrgyz
marginal costs in winter and shifts the right-hand part of the marginal cost
schedule downwards. Cooperation typically involves a higher Kyrgyz sum-
mer discharge, qsky, than noncooperation, except in high-water years where
the two may be identical. This implies that the downstream riparians have
a higher marginal productivity of water than Kyrgyzstan. Table 4.1 also
illustrates the intuitive property that basinwide gains from cooperation are
highest when water is scarce.16
Uzbek reservoirs are represented by the second treatment variable, R,
which thus far has taken the value zero. To consider the economic impact of
reservoir construction we simply set this value to 2.5. The economic impact
of the new reservoirs is as follows: First, Uzbek cotton beneÞts, and thus
basinwide new beneÞts, increase by up to 8.8 million US$ depending on Q.
By and large, the basinwide gain from Uzbek reservoirs is decreasing in Q,
i.e. reservoirs are most useful in low-water years. Secondly, Uzbek reservoirs
16Note that the value of basinwide gains depend on the selection of the non-unique,
noncooperative equilibrium. Table 4.1 produces conservative estimates because we assume
that the equilibrium with the highest release is selected. This is also the most ecient
one. Equilibria with lower releases do not beneÞt Kyrgyzstan but harm the downstream
countries.
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may make cooperation slightly less attractive.17
To maximise basinwide eciency, it is necessary for riparians to cooperate
(with or without reservoirs), except when water is abundant. In this sense
the reservoirs do not establish Uzbek self-suciency in irrigation water, i.e.
Uzbekistan could increase its beneÞts by cooperating. For a normal water
year we compute a cooperative surplus equal to US$ 9.0 million per year.
Table 4.1. Model results for alternative values of the treatment variables
Q 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Noncooperative
equilibrium (qsky) 3.3 3.3-4.2 3.3-5.2 3.3-6.2 3.3-7.2 3.3-8.2 3.3-9.2
Cooperative
optimum (qsky) 4.2 5.2 6.2 7.2 7.9 8.3 9.0
W
Basinwide gains from
reservoirs (million US$)
- NoncooperativeWW 8.8 8.7 8.8 8.8 6.3 2.8 0.0
- Cooperative 8.8 8.7 8.7 6.3 3.9 2.4 0.0
Basinwide gains of co-
operation (million US$)
- Without reservoirs 9.5 9.0 9.0 9.0 6.4 0.0 0.0
- With reservoirs 9.5 9.0 8.9 6.5 4.0 0.0 0.0
Wqsky = 9.0 without reservoirs but q
s
ky 5 [7.9; 9.2] with reservoirs.
WWRefers to the highest noncooperative water release.
17The eect of the new reservoirs on Þgure 4.1 is that Uzbek irrigation demands are
saturated earlier as qsky increases. For Q = 13, Uzbek and Kazakh demands are met
simultaneously at qsky = 4 and thus the marginal beneÞt curves in the third and fourth
step are each reduced by US$3.5 million.
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4. Design and Procedures
4.1 The stage game
Having formulated the payog functions we now turn our attention to
the strategic environment. The Syr Darya river conßict is characterised by
negotiations between governments of the three countries and the problem
of their subsequent implementation. Consequently, we design a game that
consists of two parts. First, in a negotiation part the three players - each
representing a country - are given the opportunity to make a contract on a
combination of water releases and possible side payments. This contract,
however, is non-binding, as there is no way in which a country can be forced
to obey (leaving aside the unlikely possibility of military intervention). In
a second part of the game the players decide on the water releases and side
payments they actually implement.
In the real conßict negotiations take place annually in trilateral negoti-
ations. In the experimental design we attempt to model such a scenario.
However, to make it playable in the laboratory we needed to impose a certain
structure on the negotiations, which takes into account that laboratory time
is limited. We simpliÞed the bargaining process by randomly giving one of
the players the opportunity to make a proposal and asking the other players
to accept or reject. The proposal consists of the following four elements:
1. Kyrgyz water discharge from Toktogul in summer, qsky.
2. Uzbek water discharge to Kazakhstan in summer, quz.
3. A compensation payment from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan, Sky.
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4. A compensation payment from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan, Suz.
The inßow is exogenously given and known.18 Uzbekistan can release to
Kazakhstan any quantity of water up to what it receives from Kyrgyzstan.
The compensation payments are amounts of money. This rule represents a
simpliÞcation of conduct of play in the real conßict, where Uzbekistan refuses
to make any monetary payments in exchange for water or to attach a price
on water (services) - a demand from the Kyrgyz side. In practice, however,
Uzbekistan has implicitly agreed to pay compensations through an inßated
price for the electricity it receives from Kyrgyzstan in summer. For the
experiment simplicity is important, such that we decided not to model these
additional behavioural complexities.
At the Þrst stage of the game, one player makes a proposal to the other
two players. We chose to draw the proposer at random in each round of
the game (each with a probability of one third), in the absence of a natural
candidate.19 After the proposal is speciÞed, its terms are communicated to
the other two players. These players are then simultaneously asked to accept
or reject it. Note that since the contract is not binding, the negotiation part
18In practice there is an additional complexity since the inßow level is a stochastic
variable (see appendix table E.1). Agreements are generally made before knowing the
actual inßow level. However, since most of the inßow into Toktogul comes from glacier and
snow melt in spring, the years inßow is largely known when Kyrgyzstan makes a decision
on releases. Hence, the governments could make agreements contingent of the inßow if
they wished (though so far they did not). We therefore model the realised inßow in a
given year as known.
19One may argue that the downstream country is the most natural candidate, since
the downstream riparian wishes to change the status quo and alter the behaviour of the
upstream player. However, always making Kazakhstan the proposer seems somewhat at
odds with the reality of the conßict, in which the strongest conßict of interest is between
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
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of the game is merely cheap talk in the game theoretic sense. It may be
used to co-ordinate the players behaviour, but it cannot be enforced and
does not restrict the players in their subsequent actions.
After the proposal has been either accepted or rejected, the players make
the decisions for real. As the Þrst mover Kyrgyzstan decides on a release of
water from Toktogul (qsky). At the next stage Uzbekistan makes two decisions
at once. It chooses which quantity of water to release to Kazakhstan (quz),
and an amount of money to pay to Kyrgyzstan (Sky). At the Þnal stage
of the game, Kazakhstan decides on a side payment to make to Uzbekistan
(Suz). At all stages all players are informed about all players decisions at
preceding stages.20
4.2 The conduct of the experiment
Since the payog functions developed from the available real-world data
are complex, they needed to be presented in the simplest possible way. We
used tables that list the payogs obtained by each combination of water re-
leases from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan and from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan.
Depending on the range of feasible releases these payog tables could quickly
become very large and incomprehensible. Therefore, the number of choices
was restricted. Water discharges had to be in integer numbers. We fur-
ther cut the strategy space in a way that Kyrgyzstan could pass any integer
number from 3 to 9 units. Releases outside this range are historically irrel-
evant and did not seem to be plausible choices. The resulting payog tables
20There are some information problems due to neglect of metering stations and a gener-
ally secretive attitude of the Central Asian governments. At the aggregate level, however,
the relevant information is largely available.
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consisted of 49 lines and four columns. The Þrst three columns showed the
payogs for each of the three players, the last column the sum of the three
payogs (enabling participants to identify ecient outcomes). The payog
tables can be found in Appendix G.
For the speciÞcation of the payog values from the payog functions we
had to make some choices. First, we adopted the principle that a dollar is
a dollar, thus we did not account for a digerent marginal utility of money
in the three countries. Those could arise from their digerent population
sizes or GDP levels. Such corrections, however, would have been somewhat
arbitrary (for example, in Kazakhstan water beneÞts apply to the South
Kazakhstan and Qyzlorda provinces only). Further, such considerations do
not seem to play a signiÞcant role in the actual policy debate. Secondly,
in the theoretical model payogs are formulated in additional costs of water
release for Kyrgyzstan and additional beneÞts for the downstream riparians.
In the experiments absolute payogs needed to be implemented, thus the un-
speciÞed intercepts of the payog functions had to be deÞned. We decided
to choose the intercepts in a way which was experimentally most suitable,
rather than derive them from some real-world benchmark (such as GDP).
As a benchmark we chose the least inecient noncooperative equilibrium
outcome without reservoirs in the normal water year (Q = 13), where Kyr-
gyzstan discharges 6 and Uzbekistan releases 1 (see next section 4.3), since
this is currently the most relevant scenario in reality. Payogs were adjusted
in a way that each player gets 370 talers (the experimental currency unit) in
this scenario. From there we calculated all other payogs using the cost and
beneÞt functions derived earlier. Each taler digerence between two numbers
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in the payog tables corresponds to US$ 100,000 per year in the real game.
Note that side payments would be added or subtracted from these Þgures,
such that a wide range of payog combinations was achievable.
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Decision Research and
Experimental Economics (CeDEx) of the University of Nottingham. The
software for the experiment was developed using the RatImage programming
package (Abbink and Sadrieh, 1995). Subjects were recruited by e-mail from
a database of students, who had previously registered at CeDEx as potential
participants in experiments. Each subject participated in only one session,
and no subject had participated in experiments similar to the present one.
The subjects were undergraduate students from a wide range of disciplines.
The majority of participants were British. Among the substantial fraction
of foreign students the largest group was Chinese. Virtually all subjects
were aged between 19 and 25, with a balanced gender distribution.21
In each session subjects interacted in Þxed groups of three subjects. The
role of a participant as representing Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan
did not change throughout the experiment. This set-up reßects the repeated-
game character of the real situation. Subjects were not told who of the other
participants were in the same group, but they knew that the composition of
the groups did not change. Each session began with an introductory talk.
21Ideally we would have wished to conduct the experiment with participants from a
Central Asian cultural background. However, few students from that region are enrolled
at Nottingham University, and in Central Asia we did not have access to a computerised
laboratory. Experiments conducted with participants from dierent cultures sometimes
show dierences (Roth et al. (1991), Willinger et al. (2003)), sometimes not (Brandts et
al. (2000), Lensberg and Van der Heiden (2000)). Typically the dierences are not large
and do not lead to radically dierent conclusions.
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The experimenter read aloud the written instructions (see Appendix H).
The language used in the instructions was semi-natural. The situation was
framed as that of a resource being passed from one player to the other, but
we did not label the players as the three countries they represented. Since we
did not expect many students to be familiar with the Syr Darya river conßict,
we were concerned that an entirely natural framing would cause confusion.
On the other hand we did not expect a beneÞt from completely disguising
the situation using abstract terms as this would have made the instructions
more dicult to understand.22
We conducted 24 rounds of the stage game.23 These were divided into
three phases of eight rounds, using the digerent inßow levels of 10, 13, and
16 to represent low, normal and high water levels, respectively. The order
of the three phases was varied in a way that each water level was played in
each of the phases in the same number of sessions. The digerent levels of
inßow implied digerent payog distributions, but otherwise the structure of
the game remained the same in each phase.
22The evidence from the literature is ambigous regarding the eect of context or in-
struction framing. Burnham, McCabe, and Smith (2000) report less trustful choices in a
reciprocity game when the other player is called opponent rather than partner. Abbink
and Hennig-Schmidt (2002), on the other hand, Þnd no signiÞcantly dierent behaviour
between a neutrally and a naturally worded version of a bribery experiment. A similar
example can be given for tax evasion experiments: Baldry (1986) reports more evasion
when the task is presented neutrally (as a gambling opportunity) while Alm, McClelland,
and Schulze (1992) Þnd no signiÞcant dierence.
23Subjects were informed about the number of rounds for reasons of transparency and
practicality. This creates a deviation from the real situation which resembles an inÞnitely
repeated game. Contrary to the real-life decision makers, subjects could theoretically
solve the 24-round supergame by backward induction and be guided by this solution.
However, since such behaviour is not typically observed in other experiments (and greatly
at odds with the existing evidence from trust games), it seems unlikely to be the case in
our setting.
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Subjects were granted a capital balance of 1,000 talers at the outset of
each session. The total earnings of a subject from participating in the exper-
iment were equal to the capital balance plus the sum of all the payogs he or
she made during the experiment minus the sum of that subjects losses. A
session lasted for about two hours (including time spent to read the instruc-
tions). At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their total earnings
anonymously in cash, at a conversion rate of one pound sterling for 400 talers.
Subjects earned between $3.44 and $39.10 with an average of $21.95, which
is considerably more than students regular wage in Nottingham.
We conducted three sessions with each treatment (with and without
Uzbek reservoirs). The treatments diger in the payog tables, but not in
the structure of the game. Each session comprised of 12, 15, or 18 subjects,
where the variation is due to show-up rates. Subjects interacted with each
other within groups but not across groups so that each group of three coun-
tries can be considered a statistically independent observation. In total,
we gathered 15 independent observations in the treatment without reservoirs
and 16 in the treatment with Uzbek reservoirs.
4.3 Game-theoretic considerations
Using the payog tables shown in Appendix G, the subgame perfect equi-
libria (Selten (1965, 1975)) of the stage game can easily be identiÞed with
a backward induction argument. It is straightforward to see that in a non-
cooperative equilibrium no side payments are made. At the last stage a
side payment only reduces Kazakhstans payog. Since the other players
decisions have been taken, Kazakhstan cannot gain anything from making a
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Þnal payment. Analogously, Uzbekistan does not gain from making a side
payment to Kyrgyzstan, since Kyrgyzstans decision is already made.
The equilibrium choices with respect to water releases can be obtained
from the payog tables. Since Kyrgyzstan foresees that it will not receive
compensation payments, its payog is not agected by the choices being made
downstream. Thus it will simply release the quantity that maximises its own
payog.24 For example, in the benchmark case of Q = 13 without reservoirs,
Kyrgyzstan can release anything from 4 to 6 units (BCM) in an equilibrium
and earn 370 talers (see Appendix Table G.3). Uzbekistan then chooses the
quantity to pass to Kazakhstan given this behaviour. If Kyrgyzstan has
chosen, for example, 6 units, then Uzbekistan passes on 0 or 1 units to Kaza-
khstan.25 Thus, the combinations (qsky, quz) = (4, 0), (5, 0), (6, 0) and (6, 1),
combined with no side payments, constitute subgame perfect equilibria of
the game. In comparison, the socially ecient allocations are those which
maximise total payog. Such allocations need to be sustained by side pay-
ments in order to be individually rational. Table 4.2 illustrates the subgame
perfect equilibria and socially ecient allocations for all six scenarios.
24This feature eases the game-theoretic analysis, as we do not require a full-ßedged
backward induction analysis.
25Note that passing on zero does not imply that the Syr Darya is dry at the Uzbek-
Kazakh border. We examine only the Naryn cascade, but as mentioned in chapter 3,
the river is also fed from other sources notably the Kara Darya. Since other sources are
generally unregulated, their inßow levels are not strategic variables in the game and thus
excluded.
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Table 4.2 Equilibria and social optima of the game (qsky, quz).
Treatment Subgame perfect equilibria Social optima
Q = 10, N (3,0) (6,2)
Q = 13, N (4,0), (5,0), (6,0), (6,1) (7,2)
Q = 16, N (4,0), (5,0), (6,0), (6,1), (8,2), (8,3),
(7,0)...,(7,2),(8,0), ..., (8,3), (9,2), ..., (9,4)
(9,0), ..., (9,4)
Q = 10, R (3,0), (3,1) (4,2)
Q = 13, R (4,0), ..., (4,2), (5,0), ..., (5,3), (7,2), ..., (7,5)
(6,0), ..., (6,4)
Q = 16, R (4,0), ..., (4,2), (5,0), ..., (5,3), (8,2), ..., (8,6),
(6,0), ..., (6,4), (7,0), ..., (7,5), (9,2), ..., (9,7)
(8,0), ..., (8,6), (9,0), ..., (9,7)
Note: N = No reservoirs; R = Reservoirs.
The table shows that for the case of abundant water (Q = 16), there is no
conßict between own-payog maximisation and cooperation, since the socially
ecient outcomes are also equilibria of the game. In normal (Q = 13) or
low water years (Q = 10), maximisation of joint payog requires the players
to deviate from the noncooperative equilibrium. The construction of the
Uzbek reservoir widens the range of equilibria and, in some cases, the range
of socially ecient allocations. Interestingly, the reservoirs do not alter the
scope for cooperation. Still, in the case of low and normal water years the
players can improve their payogs by agreeing on a solution that is not an
equilibrium.
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5. Results
In this section we present the results of the experimental data. Our
main focus is the eciency implications of the new Uzbek reservoirs and
the possibility of cooperation under the two regimes. For readability we will
continue to label the players with the names of the countries they represent,
though in fact they were experimental participants.
5.1 Kyrgyz discharges from Toktogul
The economic eciency of the outcome crucially relies on cooperation
between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. We therefore Þrst examine the be-
haviour of the participants representing the Kyrgyz side. Table 4.3 shows
the relative frequency with which the digerent levels of water release occur
in the experimental data.
Table 4.3 Relative frequency of Kyrgyz choices regarding Toktogul release
Kyrgyz quantity passed 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Q = 10, N 0.562 0.298 0.083 0.050 0.008 0.000 0.000
Q = 13, N 0.050 0.142 0.083 0.383 0.333 0.008 0.000
Q = 16, N 0.017 0.075 0.050 0.117 0.008 0.258 0.475
Q = 10, R 0.586 0.188 0.164 0.023 0.023 0.016 0.000
Q = 13, R 0.023 0.102 0.039 0.500 0.234 0.094 0.008
Q = 16, R 0.047 0.102 0.031 0.078 0.055 0.305 0.383
Note: The modal frequencies are set in bold face.
In low water years we observe that the noncooperative choice is dominant
in the data. Recall that with Q = 10 (no reservoirs) the noncooperative re-
lease is 3 units and the socially ecient choice is 6 units (see Table 4.2). The
choice generating the ecient solution is made in only 5 percent of the cases,
while in more than half of the rounds we observe the noncooperative release.
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Thus the subjects representing Kyrgyzstan did not show much trust in their
downstream counterparts. This may be surprising given the high incidence
of trustful choices in previous experiments on reciprocity games. A possible
explanation is the high risk that Kyrgyzstan must take when deviating from
the noncooperative (3 units) to the socially ecient choice (6 units). Under
this scenario Kyrgyzstan renounces 477 talers (US$ 47.7 million), and to gain
maximum beneÞts relies on receiving at least as much as a side payment from
Uzbekistan (see Table F.1). To make such a high payment Uzbekistan would
also need to trust Kazakhstan to cooperate. Given that the total beneÞt
from cooperation (the pie that can be divided among the two players on top
of the noncooperative payogs) is only 189 talers (US$ 18.9 million), it is quite
plausible that the players representing Kyrgyzstan in the laboratory deemed
cooperation too risky.
Though the new reservoirs reduce Kyrgyzstans risk of cooperation con-
siderably for Q = 10 (the socially optimal release is then only 4 units and
requires Kyrgyzstan to renounce only 61 talers), the egect on the likelihood
of cooperation is minor. While the frequency of socially optimal releases
increases signiÞcantly from 5.0 to 18.8 percent (k = 0.025 one-sided, Fishers
two-sample randomisation test) it is still below one Þfth, and there is an ab-
solute majority of noncooperative choices. Thus even with the reduced risk
for Kyrgyzstan the payog structure of the game imposes substantial hurdles
to riparian cooperation.
In normal water years (Q = 13) noncooperative choices are also most
frequent, and we even observe a substantial fraction of spiteful decisions
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(releases of 4 or 5 units, which yield the maximum payog for Kyrgyzstan
but harm Uzbekistan). These may be acts of punishment against the Uzbek
player in response to default on side payments. Taking together the three
equilibrium options (4, 5 and 6 units) we observe noncooperative behaviour
in more than 60 percent of the cases. However, the prospect for cooperation
is not as bleak as in low-water years. Without reservoirs the socially optimal
release (7 units) is realised in one third of the rounds, making this the second
most frequent option. These results are independent of the new reservoirs,
which do not have a statistically signiÞcant egect on cooperation.
When water is abundant (Q = 16) participants usually do not Þnd it
dicult to sustain one of the ecient outcomes (a release of 8 or 9 units).
However, note that in high water years there is no conßict between individ-
ual payog maximisation and eciency, such that this result does not hint
at strong egorts to cooperate. In high-water years the new reservoirs are
practically obsolete, and consequently they do not have a signiÞcant egect
on the experimental results.26
5.2 Uzbek compensation to Kyrgyzstan
In order for all three countries to beneÞt from cooperation Uzbekistan
needs to compensate Kyrgyzstan for its additional summer release of water.
Table 4.4 shows Uzbekistans median side payment to Kyrgyzstan, condi-
tional on the quantity of water that Kyrgyzstan has released in summer. It
emerges that Uzbekistans reluctance to make sucient payments is a source
of cooperation failure. This is particularly pronounced in low water years
26Note that the Uzbek reservoirs are too small to enable multi-year regulation, i.e. to
store water inßows in high-water years and release it in low-water years.
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(Q = 10) without reservoirs. Recall that Kyrgyzstan renounces 477 talers
(US$ 47.7 million) when moving from noncooperation to the social optimum.
The experimental Kyrgyzstan players who did so, however, received in the
median a mere 25 talers (US$ 2.5 million) back as compensation. In the
presence of Uzbek reservoirs Kyrgyzstan typically did not receive any reward
for releasing the ecient 4 units. This explains the low level of cooperation
we observe in low water years despite the fact that reservoirs make cooper-
ation less risky. For Q = 13 Kyrgyzstan must forego 98 talers to sustain
a socially optimal outcome (with and without reservoirs), but the median
Uzbek compensation payment also falls short of this (45.5 talers without
reservoirs and 92.5 talers with reservoirs). Finally, in high-water years we
also observe some use of side payments. Although Kyrgyzstan receives the
same payog in the interval 4 to 9 units, its decision greatly agects Uzbek-
istan. Therefore, Uzbekistan may choose to use side payments to reward
Kyrgyzstan for non-spitefulness thereby sustaining high releases.
Table 4.4 Median compensation payment from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyz quantity passed 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Q = 10, N 0 0 15.5 25 0 - -
Q = 13, N 0 0 0 2 45.5 100 -
Q = 16, N 0 0 0 0 25 80 41
Q = 10, R 0 0 90 205 0 10 -
Q = 13, R 0 0 20 0 92.5 170 0
Q = 16, R 5 0 5 1 0 50 50
Note: In talers. -No observations.
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5.3 Downstream collaboration
The downstream riparians, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, rely on Kyr-
gyzstans behaviour in order to achieve maximum payogs. However, even
without Kyrgyzstans good will they often have room for improving their
payogs by cooperating. For each subgame (deÞned by Kyrgyzstans release)
we can identify a noncooperative equilibrium and a socially optimal alloca-
tion (although these may coincide). In the payog tables, each subgame is
identiÞed as a block of cells (marked with a thin line) with identical Kyrgyz
water discharge. Noncooperative equilibria for the sub-game are those rows
within each block that maximise Uzbek payog. The social ecient alloca-
tion is characterised as the Uzbek choice(s) maximising total payog within
the block. To illustrate, suppose that in a normal water year without reser-
voirs Kyrgyzstan has chosen to release 6 units (see Table G.3). Uzbekistans
payog is then maximised if it passes either 0 or 1 units. Thus both choices
constitute noncooperative equilibria for the subgame with a Kyrgyz release
of 6 units. The social optimum for this subgame, is for Uzbekistan to pass
2 units.
As illustrated in Table 4.5, Uzbekistans choice can fall into one of four
categories depending on whether it is a social optimum and/or a nonco-
operative equilibrium or neither. The table shows that egorts to cooper-
ate between the downstream riparians have been modest. Social optima
which are not equilibria have only been implemented in very few rounds.
Noncooperative equilibrium play is therefore the dominant outcome. In the
treatment with reservoirs, virtually all of Uzbekistans decisions fall into that
category. Since social optima often coincide with equilibrium choices in the
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subgames, this behaviour is not always inecient. In at least 43 percent of
cases the most ecient downstream solution was realised.
Table 4.5 Frequency of Uzbekistans passed quantities
Social Equilibrium, Social Neither
optimum, but not optimum social
but not social and optimum nor
Treatment equilibrium optimum equilibrium equilibrium
Q = 10, N 0.050 0.075 0.717 0.158
Q = 13, N 0.075 0.325 0.417 0.183
Q = 16, N 0.034 0.184 0.683 0.100
Q = 10, R 0.000 0.547 0.430 0.023
Q = 13, R 0.000 0.500 0.492 0.008
Q = 16, R 0.000 0.336 0.664 0.000
5.4 The contracts and their adherence
In all six variants of the game participants Þnd it dicult to come to
an agreement, and if they do these agreements are frequently broken (Table
4.6).27 When water is scarce (Q = 10) an agreement is made in only about
a third of the rounds, and from these more than three-quarters are broken.
The record is best when water is abundant and there is no conßict between
short-run self-interest and cooperation. Still, even in those years a majority
of contracts are not adhered to. In this case, however, the high rate of
broken contracts may just reßect that contracts are not considered necessary
and therefore taken less seriously. Recall that in high water years there is a
range of socially optimal choices. If the allocation implemented is digerent
from the one that has been agreed on this then does not necessarily have
negative consequences for the players.
27Any deviation from the agreement constitutes a breach.
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Table 4.6 Frequency of agreements (in percent)
Treatment Years with agreement Broken agreements
Q = 10,N 0.308 0.730
Q = 13, N 0.525 0.714
Q = 16, N 0.625 0.533
Q = 10, R 0.414 0.830
Q = 13, R 0.508 0.754
Q = 16, R 0.648 0.614
The high frequency of noncooperative choices raises the question of whether,
and to what extent, subjects proposed a social optimum in the non-binding
agreements. Table 4.7 reveals that the socially ecient allocation was pro-
posed at least once in the majority of cases (column 1). Nevertheless, the
social optimum was implemented much less frequently, particularly in low
water years (column 2). A similar picture emerges when comparing the total
frequency of socially ecient proposals and their implementation (columns
3 and 4).
Table 4.7 Social Optima (SO): Proposals and implementation.
(1) Groups (2) Groups (3) Frequency (4) Frequency
proposing SO implementing SO of SO of SO
at least once at least once proposals implemented
Q = 10, N 10/15 1/15 0.175 0.016
Q = 13, N 14/15 11/15 0.408 0.283
Q = 16, N 14/15 15/15 0.725 0.608
Q = 10, R 9/15 5/15 0.141 0.067
Q = 13, R 13/16 7/16 0.375 0.195
Q = 16, R 16/16 14/16 0.781 0.477
5.5 Payog and social eciency
Figure 4.2 shows the payog (in US$ equivalents) for the six treatments of
the experiment. Recall that the intercept terms of the payog functions are
164
unspeciÞed. This implies that only digerences between every two bars are
meaningful, while the absolute values are partly determined by our choice
for the experimental payog tables.
As expected, high-water years lead to greater economic returns - a Þnding
which is signiÞcant for all pairwise comparisons between two water levels in
a given treatment (k < 0.0001, binomial test). The impact of reservoirs,
however, is limited to low-water years. In those years reservoirs increase the
median total payog signiÞcantly (k < 0.0001, Fishers two-sample randomi-
sation test) by 161 talers (corresponding to US$ 16.1 million in reality).28
The slight rise in normal water years is not signiÞcant. When water is abun-
dant we even observe a slight decrease in social eciency, but this digerence
is not signiÞcant and likely due to random variation.
28This Þgure is higher than the theoretical value in table 4.1. The dierence stems
mainly from the restrictive assumption on water sharing in that table which we drop later
in the experimental design.
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Figure 4.2 Median total payog in million US$ equivalents
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The total payog gained by the three players jointly also gives a measure
of the social eciency of the experimental outcomes. Table 4.8 compares
median payog with the payog in the socially optimal and the noncooperative
allocations. We Þnd that the experimental payog was typically similar to
that under noncooperation. The social optimum was only attained when
this coincided with the noncooperative equilibrium. This suggests a low
level of overall social eciency which the reservoirs had little impact on.
Table 4.8 Median Payog (talers) compared to theoretical benchmarks
Treatment Median Noncooperative Social
payo (least inecient) optimum
Q = 10, N 428 428 617
Q = 13, N 1,110 1,110 1,246
Q = 16, N 1,509 1,509 1,509
Q = 10, R 589 589 711
Q = 13, R 1,134 1,166 1,246
Q = 16, R 1,453 1,509 1,509
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5.6 Analysis of individual behaviour
A more detailed analysis of individual behaviour enables us partly to ex-
amine alternative player strategies and partly to identify characteristics of
cooperative behaviour. Importantly, we Þnd that in three-quarters of the
cases the socially optimal allocation is sustained by a system of side pay-
ments which splits total proÞt almost equally between players. Conversely,
socially optimal allocations which are not equitable are almost always unsta-
ble. Thus, perceptions of fairness emerge as an important determinant of
cooperative behaviour in this experiment.
Behaviour in low-water years is largely noncooperative. Interestingly,
the experimental Kyrgyz players often attempt to cooperate. The com-
pensationary side payment from Uzbekistan, however, is generally too low
and this discourages Kyrgyzstan from cooperating in subsequent rounds. A
similar picture emerges for Uzbek-Kazakh cooperation, although due to low
water availability, Kazakhstan can only participate meaningfully if Uzbek-
istan receives sucient water from Kyrgyzstan. Only one group attains
social optimality occasionally, but the players representing Kyrgyzstan earn
less than their noncooperative payog. The presence of reservoirs does not
change these observations substantially apart from the fact that more groups
(6) occasionally attain the socially optimal outcome, although none of them
are able to sustain it. This may partly be because of inadequate compensa-
tion and partly because of an uneven split of total proÞt.
Noncooperative behaviour is also the norm in normal water years, al-
though attempts to cooperate are relatively more successful. Behaviour can
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be broadly classiÞed into three digerent categories (irrespective of the reser-
voir variable). In at least one third of the groups, the social optimum is never
attained. To some extent this is the result of spiteful Kyrgyz behaviour - a
strategy which has the (possibly intended) egect of increasing Kyrgyzstans
relative rather than total payog. Kazakhstan typically plays no role here.
In another sub-set (25 to 47 percent of groups, depending on the reservoir
variable) we observe the occasional, albeit not systematic attainment of the
social optimum. Total payog in the socially ecient allocation is split un-
evenly and this may be one reason why it is unstable. In most of these
groups the Kyrgyz subjects pass the optimal quantity without being ade-
quately compensated by Uzbekistan. This then triggers a punishment from
Kyrgyzstan which, ultimately, leads to cooperation break-down. Uzbekistan
does not need a side payment to pass the optimal quantity to Kazakhstan,
yet the latters payog depend positively hereof. This gives Uzbekistan the
power to extract side payments for passing high quantities and to punish if
they are not forthcoming. Uzbek players occasionally punished Kazakhstan
by releasing sub-optimal quantities, but this was a successful strategy in
only half the cases. A Þnal, but smaller, subset of groups (33 to 45 percent)
successfully sustain the socially optimal allocation. These groups are often
characterised by attaining the ecient outcome early in the game and by
splitting total proÞt in an equitable manner.
In high water years Kyrgyzstan does not lose from passing the optimal
quantity to Uzbekistan, although it may expect to be rewarded for this as
it holds the means of punishment. As before, outcomes can be classiÞed in
three digerent categories. Three to four groups fail to attain social eciency
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entirely. This may sometimes be caused by unsuccessful attempts by Kyr-
gyzstan to coerce the Uzbek player into making higher side payments. Six
groups attain optimal outcomes occasionally, but not persistently. Again,
payogs are not evenly split in the social optimum. Kyrgyz punishment con-
tinues to be a relatively impotent source of power. Finally, six groups succeed
in attaining social eciency early in the game and four of these implemented
the equal payog allocation.
5.7 Evolution of behaviour
To analyse the evolution of behaviour, Figure 4.3 illustrates the median
eciency loss (maximum payog - actual payog) over time.
Figure 4.3 Evolution of play: Median eciency loss
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There are clear signs of a systemic Þrst-round egect: Median payog in
the second round is at least as high as in the Þrst round in all six treatments.
Subsequent rounds exhibit no systemic trends, except in high water years
where eciency tends to increase or remain constant. There are also some
signs of a last-round egect: Increased eciency loss in the last round is
observed in half of the treatments.
While Figure 4.3 illustrates the evolution of the game, it masks important
digerences in the Þrst- and last-round egects. It does not distinguish between
groups that played this phase (of eight rounds) for the Þrst (or the last) time
in the experiment and those that did not. Table 4.9 produces separate
Þgures for these two types of groups. First-round egects are more prevalent
in groups which played it for the Þrst time in the experiment. The same
egect prevails for other groups, although it is less pronounced. Thus subjects
needed some time to familiarise themselves with the experiment (and to
some extent with new payog tables as a new phase was initiated) in order
to coordinate their behaviour towards less inecient outcomes. Last-round
egects tend to occur as some players use backward induction and realise
that the best strategy in the last round of the experiment (and the game) is
noncooperation. Interestingly, last-round egects were much less pronounced
for groups playing the 24th round in the experiment as opposed to groups
that were playing the 8th or 16th round. Thus, subjects generally tended to
ignore the negative reputational impact of such behaviour and this may have
undermined the scope for cooperation in subsequent phases.
170
Table 4.9 Median eciency loss (taler)
Groups playing phase for the Other groups
Þrst or the last time.
Round 1 2 7 8 1 2 7 8
Q = 10, N 67 53 189 189 189 189 53 135
Q = 13, N 325 192 115 112 154 68 189 278
Q = 16, N 626 105 0 0 18 0 28 217
Q = 10, R 122 122 178 178 122 122 122 126
Q = 13, R 136 80 96 136 108 136 68 136
Q = 16, R 228 200 56 284 277 0 112 0
6. Conclusion
We examined the likely impact of new Uzbek reservoirs on the Syr Darya
economies. This impact crucially depends on two issues. First, the reservoirs
change the seasonal distribution of water availability in downstream Uzbek-
istan and Kazakhstan for any given release by Kyrgyzstan. Thus, payogs
from Kyrgyz water releases to the three countries have to be re-estimated.
Second, the changed parameters may change the likelihood of regional coop-
eration. We designed a strategic game to address these issues. Costs and
beneÞts of water releases are computed using data from the region. We then
set up a laboratory experiment using the obtained payog functions.
The theoretical analysis reveals that regional cooperation is still required
for basinwide net beneÞts to be maximised. In this sense the reservoirs
do not achieve the goal of Uzbek self-suciency. The experimental results
strongly suggest that failure to cooperate is systematic. Inecient nonco-
operative outcomes prevail in our experiments, in line with past behaviour
in the river conßict, but in contrast to most trust games reported in the ex-
perimental literature. The digerence with the literature can be explained as
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follows. In our experiments, the payog structure is such that players often
run high risks, but receive a relatively modest gain. Moreover, for cooper-
ation to prevail it requires the simultaneous trust of three players. In the
experimental literature, on the other hand, payogs are much more favourable
to cooperation and trustful behaviour is required by only two players.
We also Þnd that experimental participants fail to set up mutually ben-
eÞcial agreements (particularly in low-water years) and if agreements are
made they are frequently broken. Thus our results suggest that failure to
implement cooperative agreements should not be attributed to current de-
cision makers unwillingness alone. Cooperation failure is inherent to the
structural features of the river conßict. Thus our results leave us pessimistic
about decision makers being able to play the game more cooperatively in the
future. Rather, they suggest to change the structure of the game, notably
the sequence of water release and compensation payments that appears to
make cooperation so dicult. While there are physical limits to synchronis-
ing water release and compensation in a barter scheme (due to prohibitive
storage costs of energy and fuel), sophisticated instalments schemes using
money payments may help to reduce the risks to trustful behaviour.29 Once
29In this sense, our data call for a further development of a letter of credit scheme as
suggested in World Bank (2004a). Under this proposal, the water services charge paid by
downstream riparians to Kyrgyzstan would have a Þxed and a variable component where
the latter is a function of the rainfall level. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan would open a
letter of credit for the water services charge, and the Þxed charges could be drawn down
in 6 equal monthly installments based on certiÞcation by the BVO (a monitoring agency)
that agreed volume of water had been released in summer. The variable charge could be
drawn down in one installment at the end of the winter based on BVO certiÞcation that
winter discharges did not exceed the agreed levels. This arrangement could be backed
by guarantees provided by a Guarantee Fund contributed by bilateral and multilateral
donors.
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these mechanisms are developed, new experiments can be designed to test
their likely egectiveness.
The enhanced basinwide eciency egect of the new reservoirs originates
mainly from Uzbekistans reduced dependency on Kyrgyz summer releases,
and is limited to low-water years. A possible egect of enhanced cooperation
can be detected statistically, but it is relatively small. As an overall egect
of the new reservoirs we observe a median eciency gain of the equivalent of
an annual US$ 16.1 million for the low-water years, and no signiÞcant egect
for normal and high-water years. Though this Þgure can naturally not be
precise, it may provide an order of magnitude for a cost-beneÞt analysis of
constructing the reservoirs. The beneÞts need to be weighed against the
high construction costs. For these no ocial Uzbek Þgures are available,
but they are estimated in the order of several hundred million dollars.
Of course, our Þndings have their limits. Though we have made every
egort to trace the real economic framework as accurately as possible, no
economic model (experimental or theoretical) can guarantee that no salient
features of the real situation are lost or distorted when simplifying the eco-
nomic environment. Undeniably the laboratory environment adds some
artiÞciality as well. Despite these caveats we believe that the experimental
methodology widens the scope for economic case studies, when behavioural
inßuences are known to be relevant but natural data are unavailable.
Further, for the Þrst experimental study on the Syr Darya river conßict
we had to restrict the analysis to a few representative scenarios. Many fu-
ture developments are uncertain today. In the long run, population growth,
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economic development, or world market demand for cotton may alter the
parameters of the real-life situation. There are also worries that the glaciers
and snow Þelds that feed the Syr Darya will shrink because of climate change.
As a consequence, inßow would rise in the short run (because the melting
water is added to the natural inßow), but fall in the long run (as glaciers are
depleted). This increased scarcity of water could reinforce the conßict in the
future. The relevant long-term future scenarios are also agected by strate-
gic decisions outside our economic analysis. If construction plans for the
Kambarata I and/or II hydropower plants are eventually realised an entirely
digerent situation would arise. Kambarata I could enable the Kyrgyz Re-
public to produce winter electricity (and export it) by discharging water into
the Toktogul Reservoir rather than into the territories of the downstream
countries. Kambarata II is a run-og-the river scheme and it does there-
fore not have any beneÞcial downstream impact, but it has relatively better
prospects of being completed as it is cheaper, smaller and because construc-
tion is more progressed. Further research would be needed to incorporate the
structural changes in the parameters that any of these plants may produce.
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Appendix F. Data used for model estimation
Table F.1 Historical ßow data (BCM), Toktogul Reservoir, 1988-2003.
Total Total Summer Summer Winter Winter
Year Inßow Outßow Inßow Outßow Inßow Outßow
1988 16.52 12.24 13.46 8.80 3.06 3.44
1989 10.13 14.97 7.34 10.97 2.79 4.00
1990 12.99 11.60 10.25 7.09 2.74 4.51
1991 10.74 13.16 7.93 8.51 2.81 4.65
1992 12.05 12.19 9.05 6.55 3.00 5.64
1993 13.64 10.59 10.61 4.41 3.03 6.18
1994 15.24 14.52 12.08 6.72 3.16 7.80
1995 10.89 14.62 7.88 6.33 3.01 8.29
1996 13.70 14.53 10.94 6.16 2.76 8.37
1997 10.83 13.68 8.09 6.08 2.74 7.60
1998 14.49 11.16 11.50 3.68 2.99 7.48
1999 14.47 13.47 11.01 5.07 3.46 8.40
2000 12.62 15.18 9.19 6.48 3.43 8.70
2001 12.56 15.15 9.29 5.91 3.27 9.24
2002 16.67 11.38 13.51 3.65 3.16 7.73
2003 15.67 14.16 12.00 4.90 3.67 9.26
Average 13.33 13.29 10.26 6.33 3.07 6.96
Relative 100% 100% 77.0% 47.7% 23.0% 52.3%
Minimum 10.13 10.59 7.34 3.65 2.74 3.44
Maximum 16.67 15.18 13.51 10.97 3.67 9.26
SD 2.09 1.56 1.96 1.91 0.28 1.94
Note: Summer: April-September and Winter: October-March.
Source: Primary data provided by JSC Kyrgyzenergo, Bishkek.
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Table F.2 Assumed values of exogenous variables and parameters
Name Description Unit Value Source
k Hydropower eciency kWh/m3 0.86 1,3
Es Net energy demand, summer GWh 2,550 1
Ew Net energy demand, summer GWh 4,950 1
Ds Technical transmission eciency, summer percent 90.0 1
Dw Technical transmission eciency, winter percent 85.0 1
K Generation capacity, Bishkek I GWh 876 1
CI Short-run marginal cost, Bishkek I US$/kWh 0.0150 1
CII Short-run marginal cost, Bishkek II US$/kWh 0.0255 2
Cuz Short-run marginal cost, Uzbekistan US$/kWh 0.0230 1
Cka Short-run marginal cost, Kazakhstan US$/kWh 0.0210 1
4 Technical power transmission eciency percent 94.0 1
 Share of electricity exported to Uzbekistan percent 50.0 1
X Maximum hydropower export volume GWh 4,000 4
P Economic value of irrigation water US$/kcm 20 1
Ouz Optimal irrigation input for Uzbekistan BCM 4.5 1,3
Oka Optimal irrigation input for Kazakhstan BCM 2.0 1,3
Sources: (1) World Bank (2004a); (2) World Bank (2004b); (3) Antipova et
al (2002), and; (4): Peter Graham, Tari Policy & Utility Reform Project, DFID
Bishkek (personal communication, 9 February 2005).
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Table G.1 Payoff table for Q=10 without reservoirs 
Units 
passed 
Units 
passed 
Player 
1’s 
Player 
2’s 
Player 
3’s 
by 
player 1 
by 
player 2 
payoff payoff payoff 
Total 
payoff
3 0 333 12 83 428 
3 1 333 -58 139 414 
3 2 333 -128 195 400 
3 3 333 -198 195 330 
4 0 272 148 144 564 
4 1 272 78 200 55 
4 2 272 8 256 536 
4 3 272 -62 256 466 
4 4 272 -132 256 396 
5 0 76 277 229 582 
5 1 76 242 285 603 
5 2 76 172 341 589 
5 3 76 102 341 519 
5 4 76 32 341 449 
5 5 76 -38 341 379 
6 0 -144 370 314 540 
6 1 -144 370 370 596 
6 2 -144 335 426 617 
6 3 -144 265 426 547 
6 4 -144 195 426 477 
6 5 -144 125 426 407 
6 6 -144 55 426 337 
7 0 -364 463 399 498 
7 1 -364 463 455 554 
7 2 -364 463 511 610 
7 3 -364 428 511 575 
7 4 -364 358 511 505 
7 5 -364 288 511 435 
7 6 -364 218 511 365 
7 7 -364 148 511 295 
8 0 -583 549 478 444 
8 1 -583 549 534 500 
8 2 -583 549 590 556 
8 3 -583 549 590 556 
8 4 -583 514 590 521 
8 5 -583 444 590 451 
8 6 -583 374 590 381 
8 7 -583 304 590 311 
8 8 -583 234 590 241 
9 0 -803 549 478 224 
9 1 -803 549 534 280 
9 2 -803 549 590 336 
9 3 -803 549 590 336 
9 4 -803 549 590 336 
9 5 -803 514 590 301 
9 6 -803 444 590 231 
9 7 -803 374 590 161 
9 8 -803 304 590 91 
9 9 -803 234 590 21 
 
 
Table G.2 Payoff table for Q=10 with reservoirs 
Units 
passed
Units 
passed
Player 
1’s 
Player 
2’s 
Player 
3’s 
by 
player 1
by 
player 2
payoff payoff payoff
Total 
payoff
3 0 333 117 83 533 
3 1 333 117 139 589 
3 2 333 47 195 575 
3 3 333 -23 195 505 
4 0 272 183 144 599 
4 1 272 183 200 655 
4 2 272 183 256 711 
4 3 272 113 256 641 
4 4 272 43 256 571 
5 0 76 277 229 582 
5 1 76 277 285 638 
5 2 76 277 341 694 
5 3 76 277 341 694 
5 4 76 207 341 624 
5 5 76 137 341 554 
6 0 -144 370 314 540 
6 1 -144 370 370 596 
6 2 -144 370 426 652 
6 3 -144 370 426 652 
6 4 -144 370 426 652 
6 5 -144 300 426 582 
6 6 -144 230 426 512 
7 0 -364 463 399 498 
7 1 -364 463 455 554 
7 2 -364 463 511 610 
7 3 -364 463 511 610 
7 4 -364 463 511 610 
7 5 -364 463 511 610 
7 6 -364 393 511 540 
7 7 -364 323 511 470 
8 0 -583 549 478 444 
8 1 -583 549 534 500 
8 2 -583 549 590 556 
8 3 -583 549 590 556 
8 4 -583 549 590 556 
8 5 -583 549 590 556 
8 6 -583 549 590 556 
8 7 -583 479 590 486 
8 8 -583 409 590 416 
9 0 -803 549 478 224 
9 1 -803 549 534 280 
9 2 -803 549 590 336 
9 3 -803 549 590 336 
9 4 -803 549 590 336 
9 5 -803 549 590 336 
9 6 -803 549 590 336 
9 7 -803 549 590 336 
9 8 -803 479 590 266 
9 9 -803 409 590 196 
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Table G.3 Payoff table for Q=13 without reservoirs 
Units 
passed 
Units 
passed 
Player 
1’s 
Player 
2’s 
Player 
3’s 
by 
player 1 
by 
player 2 
payoff payoff payoff
Total 
payoff
3 0 333 12 83 428 
3 1 333 -58 139 414 
3 2 333 -128 195 400 
3 3 333 -198 195 330 
4 0 370 148 144 662 
4 1 370 78 200 648 
4 2 370 8 256 634 
4 3 370 -62 256 564 
4 4 370 -132 256 494 
5 0 370 277 229 876 
5 1 370 242 285 897 
5 2 370 172 341 883 
5 3 370 102 341 813 
5 4 370 32 341 743 
5 5 370 -38 341 673 
6 0 370 370 314 1,054 
6 1 370 370 370 1,110 
6 2 370 335 426 1,131 
6 3 370 265 426 1,061 
6 4 370 195 426 991 
6 5 370 125 426 921 
6 6 370 55 426 851 
7 0 272 463 399 1,134 
7 1 272 463 455 1,190 
7 2 272 463 511 1,246 
7 3 272 428 511 1,211 
7 4 272 358 511 1,141 
7 5 272 288 511 1,071 
7 6 272 218 511 1,001 
7 7 272 148 511 931 
8 0 76 549 478 1,103 
8 1 76 549 534 1,159 
8 2 76 549 590 1,215 
8 3 76 549 590 1,215 
8 4 76 514 590 1,180 
8 5 76 444 590 1,110 
8 6 76 374 590 1,040 
8 7 76 304 590 970 
8 8 76 234 590 900 
9 0 -144 549 478 883 
9 1 -144 549 534 939 
9 2 -144 549 590 995 
9 3 -144 549 590 995 
9 4 -144 549 590 995 
9 5 -144 514 590 960 
9 6 -144 444 590 890 
9 7 -144 374 590 820 
9 8 -144 304 590 750 
9 9 -144 234 590 680 
 
 
Table G.4 Payoff table for Q=13 with reservoirs 
Units 
passed
Units 
passed
Player 
1’s 
Player 
2’s 
Player 
3’s 
by 
player 1
by 
player 2
payoff payoff payoff
Total 
payoff
3 0 333 117 83 533 
3 1 333 117 139 589 
3 2 333 47 195 575 
3 3 333 -23 195 505 
4 0 370 183 144 697 
4 1 370 183 200 753 
4 2 370 183 256 809 
4 3 370 113 256 739 
4 4 370 43 256 669 
5 0 370 277 229 876 
5 1 370 277 285 932 
5 2 370 277 341 988 
5 3 370 277 341 988 
5 4 370 207 341 918 
5 5 370 137 341 848 
6 0 370 370 314 1,054 
6 1 370 370 370 1,110 
6 2 370 370 426 1,166 
6 3 370 370 426 1,166 
6 4 370 370 426 1,166 
6 5 370 300 426 1,096 
6 6 370 230 426 1,026 
7 0 272 463 399 1,134 
7 1 272 463 455 1,190 
7 2 272 463 511 1,246 
7 3 272 463 511 1,246 
7 4 272 463 511 1,246 
7 5 272 463 511 1,246 
7 6 272 393 511 1,176 
7 7 272 323 511 1,106 
8 0 76 549 478 1,103 
8 1 76 549 534 1,159 
8 2 76 549 590 1,215 
8 3 76 549 590 1,215 
8 4 76 549 590 1,215 
8 5 76 549 590 1,215 
8 6 76 549 590 1,215 
8 7 76 479 590 1,145 
8 8 76 409 590 1,075 
9 0 -144 549 478 883 
9 1 -144 549 534 939 
9 2 -144 549 590 995 
9 3 -144 549 590 995 
9 4 -144 549 590 995 
9 5 -144 549 590 995 
9 6 -144 549 590 995 
9 7 -144 549 590 995 
9 8 -144 479 590 925 
9 9 -144 409 590 855 
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Table G.5 Payoff table for Q=16 without reservoirs 
Units 
passed 
Units 
passed 
Player 
1’s 
Player 
2’s 
Player 
3’s 
by 
player 1 
by 
player 2 
payoff payoff payoff
Total 
payoff
3 0 333 12 83 428 
3 1 333 -58 139 414 
3 2 333 -128 195 400 
3 3 333 -198 195 330 
4 0 370 148 144 662 
4 1 370 78 200 648 
4 2 370 8 256 634 
4 3 370 -62 256 564 
4 4 370 -132 256 494 
5 0 370 277 229 876 
5 1 370 242 285 897 
5 2 370 172 341 883 
5 3 370 102 341 813 
5 4 370 32 341 743 
5 5 370 -38 341 673 
6 0 370 370 314 1,054 
6 1 370 370 370 1,110 
6 2 370 335 426 1,131 
6 3 370 265 426 1,061 
6 4 370 195 426 991 
6 5 370 125 426 921 
6 6 370 55 426 851 
7 0 370 463 399 1,232 
7 1 370 463 455 1,288 
7 2 370 463 511 1,344 
7 3 370 428 511 1,309 
7 4 370 358 511 1,239 
7 5 370 288 511 1,169 
7 6 370 218 511 1,099 
7 7 370 148 511 1,029 
8 0 370 549 478 1,397 
8 1 370 549 534 1,453 
8 2 370 549 590 1,509 
8 3 370 549 590 1,509 
8 4 370 514 590 1,474 
8 5 370 444 590 1,404 
8 6 370 374 590 1,334 
8 7 370 304 590 1,264 
8 8 370 234 590 1,194 
9 0 370 549 478 1,397 
9 1 370 549 534 1,453 
9 2 370 549 590 1,509 
9 3 370 549 590 1,509 
9 4 370 549 590 1,509 
9 5 370 514 590 1,474 
9 6 370 444 590 1,404 
9 7 370 374 590 1,334 
9 8 370 304 590 1,264 
9 9 370 234 590 1,194 
 
 
Table G.6 Payoff table for Q=16 with reservoirs 
Units 
passed
Units 
passed
Player 
1’s 
Player 
2’s 
Player 
3’s 
by 
player 1
by 
player 2
payoff payoff payoff
Total 
payoff
3 0 333 117 83 533 
3 1 333 117 139 589 
3 2 333 47 195 575 
3 3 333 -23 195 505 
4 0 370 183 144 697 
4 1 370 183 200 753 
4 2 370 183 256 809 
4 3 370 113 256 739 
4 4 370 43 256 669 
5 0 370 277 229 876 
5 1 370 277 285 932 
5 2 370 277 341 988 
5 3 370 277 341 988 
5 4 370 207 341 918 
5 5 370 137 341 848 
6 0 370 370 314 1,054 
6 1 370 370 370 1,110 
6 2 370 370 426 1,166 
6 3 370 370 426 1,166 
6 4 370 370 426 1,166 
6 5 370 300 426 1,096 
6 6 370 230 426 1,026 
7 0 370 463 399 1,232 
7 1 370 463 455 1,288 
7 2 370 463 511 1,344 
7 3 370 463 511 1,344 
7 4 370 463 511 1,344 
7 5 370 463 511 1,344 
7 6 370 393 511 1,274 
7 7 370 323 511 1,204 
8 0 370 549 478 1,397 
8 1 370 549 534 1,453 
8 2 370 549 590 1,509 
8 3 370 549 590 1,509 
8 4 370 549 590 1,509 
8 5 370 549 590 1,509 
8 6 370 549 590 1,509 
8 7 370 479 590 1,439 
8 8 370 409 590 1,369 
9 0 370 549 478 1,397 
9 1 370 549 534 1,453 
9 2 370 549 590 1,509 
9 3 370 549 590 1,509 
9 4 370 549 590 1,509 
9 5 370 549 590 1,509 
9 6 370 549 590 1,509 
9 7 370 549 590 1,509 
9 8 370 479 590 1,439 
9 9 370 409 590 1,369 
 
Appendix H. Instructions for the experiment
General information
We thank you for coming to the experiment. The purpose of this session
is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. During the
session it is not permitted to talk or communicate with other participants.
If you have a question, please raise your hand and the facilitator will come
to your desk to answer it. During the session you will earn money. At the
end of the session the amount you have earned will be paid to you in cash.
Payments are conÞdential. We will not inform any of the other participants
about the amount you have earned. In the following, all amounts of money
are denominated in talers, the experimental currency unit.
The participants in this session are divided into groups of three partic-
ipants. These groups play completely independently. The composition of
the groups remains the same throughout the experiment. You do not know
which of the other participants are in your group. There are three types of
players in this game: Player 1, player 2, and player 3. Participants play the
same role throughout the experiment. The experiment consists of twenty-
four rounds with the same decision situation. Each round is structured as
explained below.
Payog structure
In each round the three players must divide a resource. At the end of
each round the players receive a payog depending on how the resource has
been divided. The division of the resource takes place as follows:
Player 1 receives a quantity of the resource. Player 1 can then pass on
some quantity of the resource to player 2. After player 2 has received a share
of the resource, he or she can pass on some quantity of this share to player
3.
Player 1s payog from the resource depends on two factors: (1) how much
of the resource is available, and (2) how much of the resource is passed on to
player 2.
Player 2s payog depends on the quantity of the resource received from
player 1 minus the quantity passed on to player 3.
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Player 3s payog depends on the quantity of the resource received from
player 2.
The payog of the three players is listed in the enclosed table.
The three players payog also depends on the payments they make to
each other in exchange for the resources received. This is explained in more
detail below.
The decision situation
Each of the twenty-four rounds consists of two stages. The Þrst stage is
the negotiation stage. The second stage is the implementation stage.
The negotiation stage
In the negotiation stage the players can make a non-binding agreement
over (1) the division of the resource, and (2) payments they make between
each other. This is done in the following steps:
Step 1: One of the three players is selected to be the proposer. This selec-
tion is random and each player is selected to be the proposer with probability
one third.
Step 2: The selected player makes a proposal which speciÞes the following
aspects:
 How many units of the resource player 1 passes on to player 2. All
integer numbers between three and nine are feasible.
 How many units of the resource player 2 passes on to player 3. Feasible
are all integer numbers between zero and the maximum possible (i.e.
the number of units passed from player 1 to player 2).
 How many talers player 2 pays to player 1. All integer numbers from
0 to 1,000 are feasible.
 How many talers player 3 pays to player 2. All integer numbers from
0 to 1,000 are feasible.
Step 3: Each of the two other players (apart from the proposer) decides
whether to accept or reject the proposal.
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Note that an agreement made in the negotiation stage is not binding. It
does not commit the players to act in any particular way at the implemen-
tation stage.
The implementation stage
In the implementation stage the division of the resource as well as pay-
ments between players are implemented. This is done in the following steps:
Step 4: Player 1 decides how many units of the resource to pass on
to player 2. This integer number must be between three and nine (both
inclusive).
Step 5: Player 2 decides how many units of the resource to pass on to
player 3. Feasible are all integer numbers between zero and the total amount
of units received from player 1.
Step 6: Player 2 decides how many talers to pay player 1. All integer
numbers from 0 to 1,000 are feasible.
Step 7: Player 3 decides how many talers to pay player 2. All integer
numbers from 0 to 1,000 are feasible.
Phases
The experiment is divided into of three phases, each consisting of eight
rounds. Each round is played exactly the same way as described above. The
rounds diger in the quantity of the resource that is available.
The players payogs vary with the available quantity of the resource.
Therefore a digerent payog table is used for each phase. At the outset of
a new phase you will be given the relevant payog table. Please note that
the payog table lists the payogs of the players excluding the payments made
between them.
Payogs
You start with an initial capital of 1,000 talers. Your payog from each
round will be added to this amount. At the end of the session the talers are
converted into Pound Sterling at an exchange rate of $2.50 per 1,000 talers.
The minimum payog is $3.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion
In this thesis we have examined three issues arising from transboundary
river sharing: 1) the equity-eciency trade-og; 2) the role of multilateral de-
velopment banks (MDBs) in reducing hydropower-irrigation conßicts, and;
3) cooperative behaviour on the Syr Darya river. The purpose of this Þnal
chapter is to bring together the issues raised in chapters 2-4, to highlight
lessons learnt and to consider possible future directions for the research pro-
gramme. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 1 summarises the key
Þndings of the thesis. Section 2 contains a comparative analysis of the three
core chapters. Section 3 highlights some limitations of the research Þndings
and the methodology used. Section 4 suggests areas of future research.
1. Summary of Þndings
Chapter 2 explored the relationship between equity and eciency on a
transboundary river. This was done in a theoretical model by comparing
riparian proÞt in the noncooperative allocation with that in the equal quota
cooperative agreement. We found that the noncooperative approach is so-
cially inecient when water is scarce due to decreasing marginal productivity
of water. Moreover, if the upstream riparian uses its optimal quantity the
downstream riparian sugers disproportionately. In comparison, the equal
quota allocation is at least as ecient as noncooperation when riparians are
identical or when the downstream riparian is relatively cost-egective and
generates a cooperative surplus if water is suciently scarce. The equity-
eciency trade-og is found to be relatively insigniÞcant, in magnitude as well
as prevalence, limited to some special cases where the upstream riparian has
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a high relative cost advantage and water is very scarce.
At a more general level, the analysis aimed to provide an analytical frame-
work for examining the eciency implications of any exogenously deÞned
sharing rule. The proposed policy algorithm sheds light on some of the
key steps involved in making economically rational decisions about how to
reach a water sharing agreement. Encouragingly, the algorithm is roughly
similar to the approach taken by the World Bank in its involvement with
governments sharing transboundary rivers.1
Chapter 3 looked at the role of multilateral development banks (MDBs) in
reducing regional tension over upstream hydropower use and downstream irri-
gation use. Our Þndings were based on a theoretical model with two riparians
in which we derived the comparative static properties of the noncooperative
equilibrium. We found that regional stability and basinwide social eciency
can, under certain conditions, be improved through externality-reducing and
Pareto-improving investments, such as enhancement of upstream hydropower
eciency and expansion of downstream reservoir capacity. Investments in
upstream hydropower eciency should be made only under two conditions:
a) that the upstream riparian agrees to increase water releases in the down-
stream vegetation season, and; b) that the upstream riparian commits itself
not to expand its reservoir capacity further. The aim of both conditions
is to reduce any potential harm that the upstream riparian may impose on
its downstream neighbor. We also considered the possibility that a down-
stream client state could be more egectively assisted by an MDB through
1This was pointed by Aaron Wolf, Oregon State University, as he reviewed an earlier
version of chapter 2 (personal communication 3 March 2003).
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upstream intervention. This policy option is particularly attractive if there
are substantial seasonal variations in upstream power demand.
More generally, the analysis facilitated the evaluation of a range of rele-
vant policy interventions. By narrowing down the policy objectives to only
two dimensions (externality impact and basinwide welfare) we showed that it
was possible to rank these interventions. Using this approach, some policies
could be eliminated (i.e. upstream reservoir expansion) while others would
be relevant only under certain conditions (i.e. upstream hydropower e-
ciency). These conditions included hydropower production technology and
the possibility of binding supply/storage constraints.
Finally, in Chapter 4, we examined cooperative behaviour in the Syr
Darya river conßict. In laboratory experiments, subjects played a multi-
round three-player trust game with non-binding contracts. This game rep-
resented a simpliÞed version of the existing system of annual barter agree-
ments. Costs and beneÞts of alternative water releases were computed using
best available data from the region. An important research objective was
to establish the economic impact of Uzbek reservoirs. From Chapter 3 we
learnt that construction of a downstream reservoir can reduce the impact
of the negative externality and improve downstream welfare by increasing
irrigation water availability and reducing the risk of ßooding. This result
was developed in a noncooperative setting, however. It therefore excluded
the possibility that Syr Darya riparians could resume cooperation over water
releases in the future in which case behavioural responses may become impor-
tant. The laboratory experiments conducted are well-suited for addressing
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this issue. A possible egect of enhanced cooperation can be detected sta-
tistically in the experimental data, but it is relatively small. As an overall
egect of the new reservoirs we observe a median eciency gain of US$ 16.1
million per year in low-water years, and no signiÞcant egect for normal and
high-water years. The experimental results also suggest that the causes of
noncooperation on the Syr Darya are systematic rather than idiosyncratic.
Inecient noncooperative outcomes prevail in our experiments, in contrast
to most trust games reported in the experimental literature. This digerence
can be explained as follows. In our experiments, the payog structure is
such that players often run high risks, but receive a relatively modest gain.
Moreover, for cooperation to prevail it requires the simultaneous trust of
three players. In the experimental literature, on the other hand, payogs are
much more favourable to cooperation and trustful behaviour is required by
only two players.
Chapter 4 also demonstrated how economic analysis can contribute to un-
derstanding the incentives for cooperation on transboundary rivers. Recall
the study by Wolf et al. (2003) reported in the introductory chapter. That
study identiÞed the determinants of conßict and cooperation using multivari-
ate regression analysis on a data set containing all international river basins
in the world. The behavioural experiments reported in Chapter 4 represent
an alternative methodology to identifying these determinants for an individ-
ual basin. SpeciÞcally, we examined the impact of two determinants: Uzbek
reservoirs and water availability. In fact our results that noncooperation
occurs in years with low water ßow provides evidence in support of the Neo-
Malthusian hypothesis (see Chapter 1). In comparison, Wolf et al. (2003)
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found little evidence of this tendency in their cross-sectional data analysis.
Thus, while water scarcity cannot be said to generally cause noncooperation,
it does play an important role on some transboundary rivers, such as the Syr
Darya.
2. A comparison of the three contributions
The essays contained in this thesis do have many similarities in terms
of approach and methodology, but there are important digerences as well.
Table 5.1 compares the three chapters in terms of a range of deÞning char-
acteristics. Chapters 2 and 3 both consider river problems in a theoretical
model involving two riparians and share a normative analytical approach.
Chapters 3 and 4 deal with hydropower-irrigation conßicts and with Syr
Darya. Finally, chapters 2 and 4 both take a cooperative approach.
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Table 5.1 Comparative analysis of the three core chapters
2. Sharing 3. Hydro-irrigation 4. The Syr Darya
transboundary rivers conßicts and the conßict - an expe-
fairly and eciently role of MDBs rimental case study
Objective IdentiÞes a fair and Ranks externality- Investigates
ecient alternative reducing policies riparian
to noncooperation and compares cooperative
upstream vs. down- behaviour
stream intervention
Methodology Microeconomic Microeconomic Experimental
theory theory economics
Approach Cooperative Noncooperative Cooperative
Analysis Normative Normative Positive
Generality of Analytical Analytical Case study only
results framework framework with
case study
Riparians Two Two Three
Conßict type Quantity sharing Inter-temporal Inter-temporal
Water-related Irrigated agriculture Irrigated agriculture Irrigated agriculture
activity and hydropower and hydropower
Policy Aids negotiators Ranks qualitative Informs regional
relevance in implementing an properties of policy stakeholders of
exogenous sharing interventions. the impact of
rule. Uzbek reservoirs.
3. Limitations
It is inevitable that any study concentrates on certain aspects of a problem
to the exclusion of others and this thesis is no exception. In this section
we brießy highlight a number of important issues which have been excluded
from the analysis.
1. Water is essential for all life on this planet. It follows that water
has multiple uses. This thesis focuses on water as an input in the
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production of a marketable output with economic value. More speciÞ-
cally, it deals exclusively with water use for agricultural irrigation and
hydropower production. As a consequence there are other economic
aspects of transboundary water use which have been ignored, notably
water for industrial use, navigation and tourism. Access to clean wa-
ter and sanitation also has an impact on labour productivity (through
reduced illness), but again, such aspects are ignored here.
2. A number of important issues related to geography deserve mention.
First, by focusing exclusively on rivers with an upstream-downstream
geography the thesis ignores other relevant types of geography. In the
case of river basins shared by only two countries, the most important
exception is border rivers, i.e. rivers which form the international bor-
der between two countries. Recall from the introductory chapter that
176 of the 261 international river basins of the world have only two
riparians. Seventy-six of these rivers are in fact border rivers and the
analysis contained in chapters 2 and 3 is therefore not relevant for these
rivers (albeit the remaining 100 rivers are). Secondly, the thesis deals
exclusively with rivers with a so-called I-geography, i.e. where the wa-
ter ßows from an upstream country to a mid- or downstream country.
For rivers with 3 or more riparians, there is a range of possible ge-
ographies. Consider, for instance, the Y-geography with two countries
upstream and one country downstream. The lack of readily available
statistics classifying transboundary rivers according to their geogra-
phy makes it dicult to assess the extent of this omission. Finally,
while two-riparian upstream-downstream rivers have been well-covered
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in chapters 2 and 3 and three-riparian rivers touched upon in Chapter
4 the thesis has little to say about rivers that are shared by 4 or more
riparians. In sum, the analysis contained here is of high relevance to
some, albeit not all transboundary rivers in the world.
3. The stochastic nature of the annual volume of river water is an impor-
tant issue that deserves mention here. Kilgour and Dinar (1995) is
one of the few contributions that treat this physical fact explicitly in
their theoretical analysis. They point out that river ßow is well known
to be agected by weather, for example, and ßuctuations of 25% above
or below the mean annual ßow volume are quite common (ibid. p.
4). Digerent levels of water availability are considered throughout the
thesis, but the stochastic nature is often omitted. In chapters 2 and 3
we assume that water ßow is exogenously determined or perfectly fore-
cast. The range of water ßow plays a role in the policy algorithm of
Chapter 2, but is not modelled explicitly. The experimental design in
Chapter 4 originally involved a stochastic resource availability, but this
aspect was eventually omitted because of the complexities involved in
negotiation the sharing of a resource, the size of which is stochastically
determined.
4. Policy analysis takes a central role in the thesis. We consider, however,
only a limited set of these objectives here to the exclusion of others.
Our attention has been on the objectives of economic eciency, equity
and regional stability. An important omission, however, which should
be mentioned here is the lack of consideration of environmental sus-
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tainability. This omission stems from our principal analytical interest
in river conßicts rather than in water as a scarce resource.
5. As in the case of stochastic ßows, there is a tendency in the literature to
ignore the issue of water quality (Sigman, 2002 is a notable exception).
Arguably, a transboundary river agreement may fail for reasons related
to water quality as well as quantity. Whether an upstream country has
pure water is determined by that country alone, whereas the purity of
the downstream countrys water is determined by both countries. Wa-
ter quality is particularly relevant when countries use irrigation water
because return ßows have a high salinity content and thus the quality
of the water decreases the further downstream the Þelds are located.
Irrespective of this, this thesis is based on the assumption that water
quality is homogenous throughout the river basin.
4. Directions for future research
In conclusion, we highlight directions for future research. We address
two questions: First, if this research had to be conducted again, how could
it have been done digerently? Secondly, if the research programme were to
continue which directions could it usefully take?
What could have been done digerently?
In answering this question we focus exclusively on two methodological
issues encountered in the experimental analysis contained in Chapter 4. The
Þrst relates to the desirability of exploring the multi-year regulation abil-
ity of the Toktogul reservoir. Recall that this ability was ignored using
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the assumption that annual inßow equals annual outßow. By relaxing this
assumption, the Kyrgyz player would have been equipped with an extra vari-
able, namely the storage reservoir, the volume of which would pass from year
to year (round to round). In this case, a minimum and a maximum storage
capacity would also have needed to be included. By considering Toktoguls
multi-year ability the validity of our Þndings would have been increased.
Why was this assumption made then? Basically, because the real-life situ-
ation was complex and the experiment had to be simple, there was a great
demand for simplifying assumptions. In actual fact, the subjects learnt the
game faster than anticipated (see section section 5.8 in chapter 4). In hind-
sight, therefore, adding an extra variable to the game would probably have
been possible without to great a cost in terms of complexity added.
The second issue relates to the cotton production function in the experi-
mental analysis. Ideally, this production function would have been estimated
empirically using real data from the region. As a consequence, considerable
amounts of time and egort went into this process. Two digerent approaches
were taken. The Þrst approach, based on macro data regressed Uzbek cot-
ton yields against summer releases from Toktogul. In the second approach,
micro data was used by regressing cotton yields in the Uzbek province of
Ferghana with water use within the Yazavan district of that province. Both
approaches relied on relatively few observations based on annual time series
data from the 1990s. Although, the OLS regression results were robust
(high R2 and signiÞcant t-values), the estimated value of water turned out to
be unrealistically high. Depending on the total water availability (we esti-
mated a quadratic production function), the micro approach yielded 22-177
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US$/KCM while the macro approach yielded 57-146 US$/KCM. In compar-
ison, the World Bank (2004a) quotes a study which estimates the value of
water at 20-50 US$/KCM in the Central Asian region. As a consequence,
we decided to use a linear production function with a saturation point us-
ing the lower bound of that estimate (US$20/KCM) to produce conservative
beneÞt estimates. What were the reasons for the digerences in the esti-
mation of the economic value of water? First, there was a considerable
discrepancy between the geographical location of the independent and the
dependent variables. Ideally, the relationship between cotton yields and wa-
ter input should be studied on the farm level, but unfortunately we did not
have access to this type of data. Secondly, there was a lack of data for other
relevant explanatory variables, notably precipitation. Finally, the number
of observations was too small to allow accurate estimations.
Directions for future research
As a starting point, future research could aim to address some of the
limitations of the methodological approach taken, as outline in section 3.
This includes testing the robustness of theoretical results in chapters 2 and 3
with respect to: a) digerent types of geography; b) the stochastic nature of
water and; c) water quality. Moreover, one could also consider what would
happen if each country had, say, two water-using sectors thereby allowing for
more ßexibility in water sharing.
In Chapter 3 we analyse what is essentially a dynamic problem using a
static two-period model. As mentioned above this is made possible through
the assumption that total inßow equals total outßow. While a static model
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is entirely suitable for our purposes it is possible that a dynamic model
may yield further insights and challenge the general validity of some of the
theoretical Þndings. This thus represents one possible route for further
research. Moreover, it could also be thought of merely as a process towards
the much more ambitious objective of developing a comprehensive economic
model of the Syr Darya river basin using mathematical programming akin
to the many US case studies reported in Chapter 3. Substantial analytical
work of this kind has already been conducted with the support of USAID as
reported in Antipova et al. (2002). A major drawback of their work (from
the perspective of an economist) is that the optimisation criterion used is
to minimise the cost of covering Kyrgyzstans domestic energy demand as
opposed to the preferred criterion of maximising basinwide social welfare.
Finally, the introduction of experimental economics to the study of trans-
boundary river conßicts also represents a possible avenue for future research.
This methodology opens the possibility of examining behavioural responses
to changes in important parameters on the river. Examples include changes
in government policy, proposed investments or climatic change. In addi-
tion, experiments can shed light on existing conßicts by examining whether
their causes are systemic or idiosyncratic. Finally, as mention above, experi-
ments constitute an alternative methodology to identifying the determinants
of cooperation on individual rivers. Follow-up experiments on other trans-
boundary river conßicts therefore seem relevant where these conßicts can be
framed in game-theoretic terms.
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